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This study examines the potential impact on American

politics of

a

severe reduction in economic growth rates.

An important initial claim of this project is that

and steady rate of economic growth has been

a

a

major sup-

portive factor in maintaining political stability.
style of political conflict

— termed

high

Our

"consensus politics"

is shov/n to be quite successful at submerging, deflecting

and moderating

a

host of potentially divisive issues

having to do with economic inequality.

This success is

due in large measure to society's ability to provide mech-

anisms for the gratification of economic wants which do
not necessitate redistributive policies.

In this way,

economic growth diverts the attention of materially deprived
groups away from disruptive political activity, thereby

maintaining the stability of the political system.
in
The study then turns to the forces and trends

threaten to
the physical and social environment which
vii

reduce rates of economic growth.

Various possible

obstacles to continued growth are explored

— natural

re-

source scarcity, pollution, economic, political and social
breakdown.

In addition, the influence of three central

variables affecting the likelihood of an economic downturn
are taken into account

— technology,

politics and time.

It is argued that an expectation of limits to growth is

reasonable, indeed probable, and therefore speculation

regarding the future of politics given such an eventuality
is a valid topic for further investigation.

The dissertation finally focuses on the changes
in the political system that can be anticipated in a no-

growth or slow-growth society.

The "public choice"

approach employed in this analysis is contrasted with and

offered as an improvement upon the apolitical, eliteoriented, deterministic forecasting methodologies utilized
in most futures research.

Four different images of the

future (scenarios) are developed.

In the process,

the

strategies, values and policies associated with each
image, the probable political interaction (competition)

among them, and the situational variables which will

influence their relative public appeals are examined.

The

study concludes by noting that while some attitudinal and

behavioral adjustment to economic limits is inevitable,
the actual nature of this adjustment is fraught with
viii

intense political significance and therefore will be

subject of intense political conflict.

constitutes the politics of the future.

ix

This conflict
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that those who do not heed the

past are condemned to repeat it.

Might it also be claimed

that those who do not wonder about the future are destined
to be its victims?

Speculation on the future of politics

in the United States is a necessary and appropriate focus

of political research.

Its academic legitimacy is aptly

defended by Bertrand de Jouvenel
Forecasting would be an absurd enterWe have
prise were it not inevitable.
to make wagers about the future; we have
The proof
no choice in the matter.
of improvidence lies in falling under
The means of
the empire of necessity.
avoiding this lies in acquainting oneself
before
with emerging situations
^
they have become imperatively compelling.
.

.

.

.

.

.

We are living in a time in which events in environmental,
social and economic systems threaten or promise to bring

about vast changes in our political system,
studies of political behavior did not often take into

account such nonpolitical factors as the gradual depletion
of natural resources or the psychological tensions of

indicates the basic security their authors
Today that security is not

had in an immutable present.

1

2

deserved.

Current patterns of political conflict are in

the process of being undermined.

If we are not to be

overwhelmed by the changes and decisions facing us, then
we must discuss the future whenever we seek to describe a

dynamic present.

These are inextricably interrelated

endeavors
The topic of this dissertation should be considered
in light of the foregoing.

my research:

One general question directs

What will be the effect of a severe decrease

in rates of economic growth on America's political attiIt is my contention that our ability

tudes and behavior?

to sustain growth at the levels we have and in the manner

we have is questionable.

The factor of a high and steady

rate of economic growth, which many social scientists had

taken to be

a

fixed moderating influence on political con-

flict, has suddenly become a dynamic variable.

This being

the case, it behooves us to contemplate the shape of the

political future as
future.

a

consequence of our assumed economic

We cannot expect current political structures to

survive the coming economic upheaval.
The current political structures

I

focus on are those

aspects of the political system which reduce conflict over
economic inequality.

The fact is that American politics

is uniquely nonpolarized and non-ideological.

Though the

price of industrial development has been harsh and unevenly

3

paid and in spite of a violent history of labor strife and

against the present backdrop of inequality and deprivation,
the issues of relative shares and the distribution of wealth

have rarely come up.

Unlike other Western democracies we

have neither a strong radical tradition nor
ist party.

a

major social-

Chapter II below explores this situation and

the processes--labeled "consensus politics" --by which it is

maintained.

Other writers have recognized, often with

pleasure, the ability of the political system to prevent
the rise of a powerful structural critique of stratification.

Specific demands for economic redistribution rarely

see the political light of day, being suppressed,

ignored,

deflected or transformed by the procedural and conceptual
biases of consensus politics.

Actual conflict over economic

benefits and burdens often approaches (as an ideal type)

a

self-perpetuating cycle of limited demands carried forward
by limited strategies and resulting in limited and nonre-

distributive concessions.

That some temporary improvement

in the status of disfavored groups is often gained by this

process encourages its continued application, leaving the
fact and the structure of inequality, which had given rise
to the original demand, an unacknowledged and unchallenged

part of the political culture.

conflict

— party

In two distinct areas of

politics and labor-management relations

combatants are locked into patterns of thought and action

4

which perpetuate the structures of stratification.

Chapter

II concludes by showing that both radical and establishment

explanations of these phenomena depend upon

a

common

element--economic growth.
The third chapter argues that economic growth under-

pins the operation of consensus politics and thereby insulates the economic system from structural criticism.

My

initial interest centers on public awareness of this nation's

material success.

The perceptual context which helps to

define the concept of success determines the types of

demands placed on economic and political institutions, and
it provides criteria by which to evaluate the ability of

society to deliver.
to function well.

Within this context the system seems
Most groups believe that some improve-

ment in their standard of living will occur or has already
occurred.

And this happens without the prolonged and in-

tense struggles which foster frustration, irreconcilable
positions, class consciousness and ideological criticism.

This expectation of incremental and peaceful progress rests
on a continuation of economic growth.

In the absence of

growth a group can demand material progress for itself,
but only at the expense of some others; more income or

opportunity for disadvantaged classes necessarily involves
attacks upon the possessions and privileges of the economic
elite;

the stratification system itself must then become

5

the visible reason for relative deprivation and the visible

obstacle to advancement.

Economic growth avoids the divi-

sive consequences of redistributive conflict by providing

two system-supportive outlets for economic demands.

First,

growth increases rates of upward mobility by creating positions for advancement, so that pressures for

a

higher

standard of living are mostly channeled into demands for
more opportunity; and since growth appears to make upward

mobility possible, the political system is spared the resent
ment of those groups who otherwise would have been displaced
Second, growth allows most parties to gain from a shared

prosperity, thereby deflecting attention from the issue of

relative shares.

As long as the future holds out the

promise of mutual progress, disadvantaged groups are less
inclined to challenge the inequities of the present.

In

both these cases economic growth promotes the types of

demands and the levels of participation which are in line
with consensus politics.
The major thrust of these two initial chapters is to

establish what is often conceded and then ignored in most
research and debate about the future.
ing stability,

The forces maintain-

the foundations of the past, must be under-

stood in order to anticipate change and shape the future.
tensions
The success of consensus politics at reducing the
rests.
of inequality is the premise upon which stability

6

Only by appreciating the social energy now directed toward
growth can we realize the strength of the tensions that
may be released upon growth's decline.
therefore,

It is important,

emphasize that our economy does indeed par-

cel out material resources very unequally and that such

economic stratification is the major variable in the dis-

tribution of every other desirable social value.

The

viability of current political arrangements hinges on the
economy's ability to turn our attention

av/ay

from that

objective fact, to cloud that reality, by directing our
striving toward growth and growth's promises.
Under these circumstances, discussions about the

limits to economic growth must raise questions for political
analysis.

Public policies, market mechanisms and advanced

technologies may ease the impact of economic slowdown or
even prolong our belief in the permanence of national

material progress.

But increasing numbers of studies are

putting into doubt the capacity of the economy to expand at
the rates and in the directions it traditionally has.

A

reckoning with limits cannot be indefinitely postponed.

My

fourth and fifth chapters explore debates over no-growth
and slow-growth hypotheses.

The major theme here is to

weigh the strengths and weaknesses of the contending arguments in light of the three central variables in the debate:
politics, technology and time.

While no definitive judgments

7

on this raultifaceted question can be laid down,

I

do mean

to show that limits to growth positions have a substantial

basis.
.

In light of this conclusion,

speculation about the

future of politics under the assumption of limits thus

becomes a vital enterprise.
The sixth chapter examines possible consequences
of economic slowdown on political behavior.
of course not predetermined.

The future is

Social choice in a context of

political conflict must be accepted in any assessment of
future possibilities.

Not surprisingly, the way we identify

these choices, the types of political scenarios we imagine
and desire are products of our social and ideological

perspectives.

Liberals, emphasizing regulation and oppor-

tunity tend to promote policies centralizing economic plan-

ning without centralizing ownership and opening up the
class system without changing its basic structure.

Radicals

sense that with economic slowdown may come the creation
of a massive socialist constituency demanding changes in

the stratification system.

Authoritarian forces would seek

to shift power to established elites under the guise of

protecting democracy from internal and external threats.
Classic conservatives would preach

a

traditional conserva-

tive position, that lower classes lessen their economic

expectations and accept their station in
system.

a

more static social

Thus, we have here four sets of values,

strategies

8

and policies, each designed to deal with future economic

realities.

Whether a strategy will be effective in garner-

ing support, whether a scenario will be believable, depends

on a host of interrelated conditions:

the actual extent

of decreased growth and how different groups are affected

by the decline,

the presence of cross-cutting or status-

reinforcing foreign and domestic issues, the capability and
inclinations of leadership, the role of the media, the
extent of coercion employed in the face of dissent, the

evolution of values, etc.

Thus, the politics of the future

will remain political; that is, choices will still have to
be made between competing alternative images of the future.

A futurology which stresses imperatives rather than options
has ignored the political nature of social history.

We determine the shape of tomorrow by what we do
today.

"The future is not an overarching leap into the

distance; it begins in the present."

2

Recent headlines

concerning natural resources, pollution, international
economic competition, social breakdown and the like reflect
and justify past work that has been done on these topics.

Present research is being conducted with the object of

anticipating the implications of these headlines for our
economy.

Political science must take notice of the tram

of events which moves from one subsystem of society to

another.

Change will not stop at the door of

a

discipline

9

which chooses to ignore its own future

— or

its own past.

Knowing what to expect is not essentially, or even primarily,

an exercise in soothsaying.

backward as well as forward.

As

The crystal ball looks
I

have already implied,

past and future, history and forecasts ought to be employed
in any account of present political trends.

objective that this dissertation is directed.

It is to this

CHAPTER

II

CONSENSUS POLITICS

A Taxonomy of Conflict Management

The United States' economic system provides

a

vast

diversity of goods and services to the consumer -citizen
Some of these have had an enormous influence on social at-

titudes and behavior, especially in the communications and

transportation fields.

But of all the outputs

(products

and by-products) of the economy, economic stratification
has had the most long-term impact on our lives.
lems,

The prob-

fears and wants of the majority of citizens are in

some measure shaped by their place in the stratification

system.

Income and wealth variables are primary variables

in determining the distribution of almost every other valued

personal attribute, from mental health and job satisfaction
to educational attainment and leisure time.

Given this

situation we might anticipate political battles over redis-

tributive policies, tense struggles of self-interest between

mobilized economic groupings, or theoretical critiques of
and justifications for the economic status quo.

But the

issues of relative shares, generalized deprivation and the
rules of the stratification system rarely if ever animate

10
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our political processes.

The institutions of government

seem isolated from those pressures and inequities which

debilitate our personal relationships and weaken our social
fabric.

These problems get transformed as they enter the

political arena into issues of
structural nature.

a

nonideological and non-

The policies these issues call forth

often satisfy the immediate demand without meeting the underlying need which the expressed demand should reflect.
The pattern of conflict that has evolved in this country
to deal with the contradictions of economic inequality is

not uniquely American, but it is sharply distinguishable

from other types of political confrontation and other

models of democratic industrialized polities.
This chapter examines those elements of the political system that cause the submergence of redistributive

issues.

Initial reference is made to

a

four-cell taxonomy

which frames a comparison among different modes of dealing

with such issues.

Our approach,

termed "consensus politics

is then analyzed as to the nature of the economic demands

which are advanced and the political constraints confronting economic demands.

The structural mechanisms that will

have been thus far described are further illuminated by

investigating two arenas where conflict over economic
inequality conceivably might arise but in fact rarely doesparty politics and labor relations.

As a style of conflict

12

management, consensus politics is the starting point in
this study's exploration of the direction of future economic
and political change.

The following taxonomy classifies divergent ways in

which conflict over inequality is expressed in the politiNumerous variables could have been used for

cal system.

this purpose.

I

have chosen to stress two characteristics

which seem most central to delineating differences in
styles of political conflict in the United States and in

similarly developed countries.

The first factor is the

intended consequences of the economic policy demands that
are brought up for political debate.

The dichotomy

I

wish

to offer is between structural and reformist demands.

The

second factor highlights the level of intensity with which

these demands are sought--high vs. low intensity.

Each of

the resulting cells refers to a pattern of political conflict which is more or less divisive and a set of political

strategies which is more or less threatening to the stability and continuity of the system.

Models of Political Conflict Over
Redistributive Issues
Intended Consequences

Level of Intensity

High

Low

Structural

Reformist

I

II

III

IV

13

The four models thus presented are not necessarily
permanent or stable approaches

— movement

from one to another cell

is possible and perhaps likely within a given set of circum-

stances; nor is it assumed that a society exemplifies the
same ideal type on all issues

— some

areas of conflict are

bound to be more intense and the positions taken to be

more destabilizing than would be true concerning other

matters of policy.

The hope is that, in contrasting consen-

sus politics with other models of conflict, the distinctive

nature of our system will be emphasized.
Cell

I,

the politics of polarization,

represents

those societies in which conflict rages over basic values.
The rules of the distribution system are themselves challenged
at either or both of the following points.

An alternative

set of rules on the distribution of economic shares may be

presented against which the system of inequality is compared
and in light of which it will be modified, and/or policies
for the alleviation of generalized deprivation are demanded

which consciously and necessarily involve basic attacks on
the structure of stratification itself.

A high level of

emotional involvement plus a narrowed time frame impart to
these demands an immediacy with which most governmental

processes cannot cope.

Thus, confrontations of this type

often will involve strategies of mass mobilization and coun-

termobilization with both sides holding positions which

14

require basic concessions from the other.

The stability

of such a system is usually dependent upon the sometimes

tenuous ability of status quo forces to check the power
and popularity of the party seeking change.
This pattern of political conflict, so alien to our
own experience, is not irrelevant to the histories of other

industrialized democratic states.

The series of confronta-

tions between Communist and National Socialist forces in

Weinmar Germany is in some respects an example of this
style of politics.

Modern day Japan exhibits many of the

qualities of political polarization, especially during
those times when crucial issues come to the fore and allow

various radical groups to mobilize opinion against the

established business ideology.

All situations in which

there is a potential for revolutionary change through elec-

toral means can be placed with some validity in this category.
The politics of politici zation

(11)

highly intense pursuit of minor changes.

involves the

Though there

exists general support for or acquiescence in the justifi-

cations and values of the stratification system, specific

improvements relating to one's particular economic situation are demanded.

Often these proposed adjustments are

incremental in scope and reformist in character and can

easily be accommodated within the present structure of benefits and burdens.

However, demands of this type (more jobs.

15

higher wages, better social services) are made with such
an uncompromising intensity that immediate political ful-

fillment is difficult, often due to the resistance of

other groups in society.

The strategies discussed with

respect to the preceding ideal type are somewhat relevant
here, but the focus of mobilization is on specific,

struc-

turally isolated issues which subside once resolution is
achieved.

There is the possibility that continual frustra-

tion will lead to permanent lines of combat with the need
for ideological supports which go beyond the original nar-

row issue.

More likely,

this pattern of political conflict

is the product of manipulation by group elites who sense

the usefulness of controlled intensity.

An escalation of

the level of debate may have a number of strategic advan-

tages over subtler and more easily ignored forms of confrontation.

For instance, groups gradually gaining power

and importance will seek to transform their new status into

economic improvements.

But first they must prove themselves,

as it were, by demonstrating their own increased determina-

tion, unity and strength or by revealing the weakness of

countervailing interests.

A show of force (sit-ins, marches)

would not be lost on political and economic leaders.

development of industrial unionism, reflected in

a

The

bitterly

fought battle over relatively reformist objectives, represents an excellent example from our own history of such

a

16

modus operandi (although the inference should not be drawn

that this conflict was purely
izers)

a

fabrication of union organ-

.

Cell III symbolizes the most common pattern of con-

frontation in industrial democratic society:
of evolutionism.

the politics

Mass based organizations representing

disadvantaged economic (or regional or cultural) groups
band together, more or less united in their support of
party or movement whose expressed aims involve
shaping of the distributive system.

a

a basic re-

Anti-reformist in its

ultimate intent, this party or movement may propose policies

which appear incremental and system supportive but which,
taken in total, are consciously designed to change rather
than make more bearable the rules of stratification as they

currently operate.

The critique of inequality put forth

interrelates the economic injustices of the various non-elites
in the society.

Thus,

solutions are generalized and struc-

tural (i.e., nationalize heavy industry, control investment
capital, redistribute wealth)

reformist.

rather than isolated and

But these policies and demands are not made with

the same intensity and immediacy nor do they lead to the
same level of mass involvement
two ideal types.

as is the case in the first

Instead, the leadership tries to work

within the boundaries of traditional political processes in
order to gradually and peacefully promote

a

more egalitarian

17

society.

A long time frame allows supporters of this posi-

tion to deal with temporary electoral set-backs without

the divisive and unbending attitudes characteristic of the

politics of polarization or politicizat ion.

Countries with a strong democratic socialist party
seem to typify this pattern of political conflict.

But the

resemblance could be rather superficial for the politics
of evolutionism is difficult to sustain.

This is so, first,

because the party's leaders, unpressured and isolated from
an unmobilized membership, may gain more from preserving

the present structure than from working towards an egali-

tarian alternative.

As Robert Michels demonstrates,

elites who head supposedly conflicting groups often have
closer proximity of interests than do those

tliey

represent.

a
2

The piecemeal and reformist policies that come out of elite

compromises are masked behind ideological rhetoric and
public relations flourishes.

Evolutionism is

a

precarious

political stance, secondly, because the nature of egalitarian alternatives involves

redistributions of power as well

as wealth, increases in personal choice as well as popular

control.

A worker who sits on the political sidelines

until told to march (or strike or vote) by his union's

leaders is not being allowed to participate in his own re-

structuring and growth.

If inequality is such a critical

feature of our society and our life, then it is only logical

18

that an individual's political involvement on economic

issues should reflect that degree of importance.

This is

not to say that evolutionism is not viable, but it is vul-

nerable to pressures which push the movement into
ist mold.

a

reform-

The partial Americanization of party conflict

in England and VJest Germany

(to mention two nations with

democratic socialist parties) is indicative of this shift.
As to examples closer to home,

it may be argued

that Martin Luther King tried to establish

a

civil rights

movement that would press for basic changes in race relations, but with the calm, single-minded determination of
a

long-distance runner.

It should be obvious from the last

example that conflict of this type can intensify (Model

I)

if people get frustrated with the slow pace or absence of

basic change.

Thus, pressures of a reformist and a polariz-

ing nature combine to make the stability of evolutionism
suspect.

An analysis of the final ideal type, the politics
of consensus, constitutes the next section of this chapter,

but some prior remarks are in order.

First among these is

the distinction that must be made between consensus politics
and consensual societies.

Our reference here is to a politi-

cal system which structures out issues and demands and

policies of an ideologically divisive nature.

This situation

in some cases may be the result of basic agreements on

19

values with respect to distributive issues, but this is not

necessarily true.

Indeed, all systems exhibit some of the

manifestations of consensus politics on most issues.
ever,

How-

it is rare to find an industrialized society which

reflects its basic features so accurately as does our own.
It is a major achievement to have a political system in

which economic demands are presented in

a

form which allows

them to be so easily accommodated within the ongoiny pattern
of stratification.
But we should be clear as to the nature of the rela-

tive political peace accompanying consensus politics.

It

does not imply that there exists a deep unanimity of opinion

supporting the value and legitimacy of the stratification
system; neither does this peace refer to the outwardly calm

signs of

a

repressive state.

The political peace of con-

sensus politics is real in that

i

t

stems from self-im posed

restraints on a citizen's thought and behavior at every
point in the political process.

The structure protects

patterns of inequality by circumscribing how individuals
define their political interests and how they participate
(or do not participate)

in politics.

Internalized ideologi-

cal prohibitions discouraging the formation of redistribu-

tive demands, coupled with

a

policy-making process designed

to thwart those redistributi ve demands which do surface,

explain the safety and stability of inequality.

20

The most striking characteristic of consensus politics as it operates in the United States is that social

pressures originally stemming from redistributi ve needs
and desires are somehow modified and transformed before

entering the political arena.

The resulting political

demands, without ideological or structural import, reflect
a

narrow and easily accommodated range of choices.

Indeed,

to label these inputs as "demands" is a misnomer since the

strategies that are associated with political conflict in

America do not involve the degree of intensity or depth of
commitment which is implied by the term "demand."

The ex-

tent of political mobilization and consciousness-raising

entailed by these strategies is often minimal.

there

Thus,

is not even an organizational or attitudinal potential for

threatening or seriously disruptive political behavior on
behalf of economic objectives.
aims pursued through limiting

On the contrary,

limited

procedural channels result in

the limited conflict typical of consensus politics:

the

nature of economic demands and the means by which they are

promoted reinforce rather than undermine the political
system.

Past power relationships among elites and between

elites and publics are maintained by this pattern of conflict.

More importantly,

the resulting public policies often

strengthen these relationships, despite the rhetoric of the

political battles which might suggest otherwise.

The

-
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economic concerns of lower income groups are perceived
as and transmitted to the political process in the
form

of symptomatic wants;

that is, they are transformed into

policy requests that skirt the structural roots of problems
and instead focus on their superficial mani f estations

The system, if it responds at all, will not incur more

conflict than is necessary to ameliorate the situation.
Thus,

somewhat superficial programs will be offered.

But

precisely because of the nature of the political demands
and political strategies, these symptom-related programs

have been acceptable.

Whether one believes that this

acceptance is akin to appeasement or to satisfaction, the
political peace that is its consequence is the central
feature of consensus politics.

Demand Formation

There is general agreement on the fact that the

pattern of economic demands, political strategies and institutional responses encompassed by consensus politics in the

United States has effectively defused inequality as
sive issue.

a

divi-

Louis Hartz in his study of Liberalism in

America claims that the lack of class conflict or redistributive political pressures has been a major distinguishing

feature of our social system.

3

Christopher Jencks supports
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the above contention with this account of political
inac-

tivity

:

Almost none of the legislation passed
during the 1960 's tried to reduce disparities in adult status, power, or income in any direct way.
There was no
significant effort, for example, to
make taxation more progressive, and
very little effort to reduce wage disparities between highly paid and poorly
paid workers.
Nor was there much
effort to reduce the social or psychological distance between high- and lowstatus occupations.^
.

Jencks'

.

.

statement, essentially an updated corroboration of

Hartz's observation on America's historic nature, has not
since been refuted by any massive shifts in public con-

sciousness or legislative action.

But if existing economic

relationships and institutions are beyond the pale of
popular political challenge, what then is the sum and substance of the economic demands currently being made by

disadvantaged groups?

What is the context of their desires

for a materially better life which explains why these

desires are compatible with the economic status quo?
Primary in that context is

a

bipartisan an ticommunist

perspective which "has had dramatic and for the most part

conservative effects upon liberal politics.

.

.

.

More than

any other single factor perhaps, it accounts for the demise
of political radicalism in the United States following World

War 11."^

The open and cultivated identification of
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egalitarian demands with socialism and of socialism
with

un-Americanism and Communism removed many potential
redistributive desires, programs and arguments from the
political arena.

Without any pressure from the ideologi-

cal left, present day reformism became even less distin-

guished from

conservative, pro-business stance than was

a

Progressi vi sm.

Another factor affecting the political thrust of
economic demands is in large measure

a

consequence of an

individualistic and anticollectivi st ethos, of which

bipartisan anticommuni sm is

a

present day outgrowth.

We

have made sharp distinctions between public and private,

between what is

a

legitimate issue for governmental

action and what is an unjustified instrusion on personal
freedom.

This ideological bias results in an inhibition

against looking toward politics for redress of many social
grievances.

It is difficult to politicize conflicts

which have been defined by society as private, requiring
private resolutions.

This attenuation of the political

sphere combines with the cold war animosities mentioned

above to moderate redistributive impulses at the start.

They are part of the formative ideological environment
and,

as such,

they affect the way in which citizens view

the legitimacy and efficacy of public solutions to problems of inequality and want.

But these conceptual
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obstacles to politically instigated income redistribution
are reinforced by other factors which flow from the

social structure itself.
It is an easily demonstrated fact that supposedly

nonclass divisions (regional, religious) and nonclass
issues

(crime,

pollution)

are either minor in comparison

to or encompassed within class distinctions.

Nevertheless,

the Madisonian notion persists that our role and interest
as a member of an economic class is only one of numerous

groupings we must respect.

Regional,

religious, commer-

cial and racial divisions create their own loyalties and

antagonisms.

A society so fragmented into diverse,

overlapping and cross-cutting groups has as its counterpart an individual whose political interests and passions

must also be spread rather thin.
a

James Madison,

fearing

majority faction of debtors and propertyless organizing

to redistribute v/ealth,

supported the prophylactic nature

of this social and political arrangement.
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the
same time must be prevented, or the
majority, having such coexistent passion, or interest, must be rendered,
by their numbers and local situation,
unable to concert and carry into effect
schemes of oppression [i.e., redistribution] ^
.

The practical political consequences of

a

fragmented

.
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society is that problems of

a

structural nature are

camouflaged behind divisions and conflicts that appear
more immediate and important.

As we perceive our general

problems more narrowly, we unconsciously change the
focus and target of our economic demands.
"What

into

Hartz again:

[conservative strategy] did was to smash the 'mob'
a

million bits, so that its fierce acquisitive

passion,

instead of being expended against property,

would be expended against itself in the quest for property."

7

Redistributive policies, when consciously pursued

as such,

necessitate

a

broad perspective.

As our perspec-

tive shortens wo look for closer causes of our personal

problems:

structural criticism and class consciousness

thereby give way to intraclass friction and parochial

animosities
The persistence of issues and divisions which blur
and even break down class ties has additional consequences

with respect to the degree of political conflict engendered
by economic demands.

If redistributive desires have to

compete in the public's consciousness with other problems
and concerns,

then egalitarian policies must become as

palatable as possible in order to gain majority support
from an increasingly disinterested public.

In addition,

since issues as they are presently defined cut across

group lines, antagonists in one battle may be allies in
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the next.

Thus,

if one seeks more economic advantage

than an opponent would maximally want to give away,
one

threatens one's position and strength on other non-

economic conflicts which one hopes to wage in the future.
All this is by way of saying that we formulate economic

demands within

a

web of conceptual and strategic con-

straints which impel deference, caution and moderation,
even to the point of political impotence.

Given these constraints, most economic demands on
the part of lower and middle income groups conform to

the pluralist model.

Issues must be framed in terms

which allow for give and take, for compromise.

This

seemingly innocuous condition, central to pluralist
democracy, eliminates from consideration redistributive

policies whose primary justification rests on

a

rejection of inequality and its consequences.
Lowi states,
system]

moral
As Theodore

"there is something about [our political

that prevents us from raising the question of

justice at all, no matter what definition of justice is
o

used.'

Moral concepts and arguments become instrumental

rather than basic to our

policy

debates in government.

Notions of freedom, equality, and justice,

v/hen

they do

arise, are used as v/eapons with which to buttress one's

bargaining position, not as

a

substantive comment on the

righteousness of the stratification system.

Indeed,
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amoral politics provides no means by which to
challenge

inequality as such save in the personal desire to better
one's economic situation relative to one's neighbor's.
Given the fragmented,

fratricidal nature of

American society, this is precisely the thrust of economic
demands.

Groups suffering under or threatened with

economic hardship seek to bolster their market position

vis-a-vis competitors rather than to

align themselves

with these equally victimized groups for the purpose
of attacking the structural causes of their common
plight.

They are unmindful of or unconcerned with the

coalition that could arise because they conceive of
these potential allies,
at all,

if they directly consider them

in terms of an adversary relationship.

Out of

this mindset comes demands of limited impact on the

extent of inequality but of great strategic importance
on its future strength.
Some proposals for the alleviation of inequality's

sting center on the creation of

responsive to

a

a

governmental agency

narrow pressure group, an enclave of

public authority promoting and protecting the interests
of its client.

Groups thereby hope to go beyond direct

legislative pressures with its continual battles and
insecurity.

However, the attempt to set up governmental

privies of private power, opportunity and material gain

—
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ignores the generalized causes of hardship and, in
fact,

creates obstacles to conceiving of demands in such
terms.
In this way a fragmented demand structure complements
a

fragmented social structure.

Though writers like Grant

McConnell and Lowi have called into question the political wisdom and democratic virtues of such techniques,

others like Charles Lindblom commend it as an appropriate and beneficial outgrowth of pluralist democracy:

"Even partisanship and narrovsTiess

.

.

.

be assets to rational decision-making."^
as for James Madison,

will sometimes
For Lindblom

"rational decision-making" means

consensual, nonstructural, nonredistributive political
processes.
tions,

In terms of long-range strategic considera-

interest-group-bureaucratic-agency ties inhibit

class consciousness by reinforcing narrow perspectives.
In addition,

these ties are system supportive as a form

of cooptation and social control.

The institutionaliza-

tion of a group's political power is mistaken for the

reality of economic improvement--repressive tolerance

bureaucratic style.

This type of demand is quite common

not only with respect to the promoting of bureaucratic

footholds but, in

a

more general way, with improving

the bargaining position of groups, narrowly defined,

versus other groups, also narrowly defined;

"the creation

of countervai ling-power situations has become

a

major
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perhaps the ma jor--domestic function of the state.

Much

of the legislation passed by Congress in the
years

since 1933 may be fully understood only from this
point
of view."'^'^

Economic demands that reach the political arena
are not solely or even primarily concerned with establishing bureaucratic agencies to act as spokesmen for private

interests.

The political system must respond to an array

of requests from economic groups seeking various types

of special treatment.

Given the factors controlling the

demand-formation process, it is not surprising then that
the policy requests coming from disadvantaged groups are

totally devoid of redi stributive content and structural
complications.

The political consequences of economic

want are demands for incremental reform.
Incremental ism in the United States reflects

a

pattern of demands and decisions without conscious
structural and theoretical intent.

Political proposals

having economic im.pacts depend upon limited comparisons

between current policies and marginally different alternatives.

There are rarely issues raised which bring into

question the whole range of values (benefits and burdens)
Policy choices are built upon

and alternatives.

and unstated accord with previous arrangements.

accord stems from

a

a

basic

This

fragmented demand structure which
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seeks to maximize certain values without reference
to

other values adversely affected by policy proposals.

For

example, higher minimum wages may result in more
unemployment; or investment credits leading to more jobs
lead,
in turn,

to an increasingly inequitable tax structure.

Demands are never coordinated in order to challenge the

decision-making process of value balancing.

Rather,

the

individual, taking his cue from what he perceives to be
the accepted model of political action,

formulates his

demands to conform to this proven pattern.

Thus,

incremen-

talism as practiced in our political system is not merely
a

reflection of the type of economic demands with which

political institutions must cope; given the probability
that values percolate down the social system much more

effectively than they drift up, it is more likely that the

incrementalism of the decision-making process molds the
political desires of the citizen.

This relationship cannot

help but be system supportive.
An incrementalist policy-making pattern,

mented social context, and

a

a

frag-

very narrowly defined politi-

cal sphere combine to foster and reinforce consensus

politics.

For the most part class conflict over redistribu-

tive political demands are deflected at the initial point
of entry--the citizen's political awareness.

Without

perspective which would give structural and critical

a
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dimensions to personal needs and problems, an individual
can either adhere to the dominant ideological
explanation

of inequality and resign himself to a lowly and deprived
state, or he can modify this perspective along very

calculative, short-range, and limited paths.

The economic

claims that would consequently be offered pose no threat
to the existence of inequality because the attitudinal,

psychological and tactical context underlying these
demands does not constitute

a

of stratification as such.

In fact they reveal an

challenge to the legitimacy

acceptance of the basic outlines of stratification and

a

willingness to work within the political system for personal rather than structural amelioration.

Thus it has

been argued that "the subordinate value system represents

something of

a

bulwark to political class consciousness,

in so far as it entails adaptive rather than oppositional

responses to the status

quo.""'""^

If the forms economic demands take do not put into

jeopardy the reality of inequality, perhaps it might

effect inequality's extent.

This outcome would not be

improbable, especially if demands as initially construed
and offered were supported with the passion and pressure

needed to insure its final passage.

Tlie

impact of many

separate expressions of disadvantage, however fragmented
and limited, may result in a net lessening of the range
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of Stratification in the United States; marginal
shifts
in the rules of stratification, consciously
pursued over

time, can result in substantial change in distributive

arrangements; at the very least, these demands can be the

catalyst for an escalating political battle between

defenders and opponents of economic privilege.

However,

this scenario presupposes a strategic single-mindedness

of purpose which proponents of redistribution have rarely

displayed.

The important point here, to be examined in

more depth in the next section, is that political strategies are as accommodative to the stratification system
as are the economic demands they are designed to promote.

Those egalitarian tendencies that manage to sift

through the constraints of the demand formation process
are confronted with an equally restrictive set of ideolog

cal and institutional factors which limit the public

appeals and political strategies employed by deprived and

underprivileged groups.
process is at work.

A type of cumulative biasing

Inhibitions against the proposing of

redistr ibutive demands are supplemented by psychological
and political conditions insuring their eventual revision
or withdrawal.

Why some economic claims, once made,

appear untenable in the context of give-and-take politics
is a result of this biasing process as it relates to the

realm of effective and allowable political strategies.
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Policy Formation
Americans, both leaders and electorate, have
been
loath to acquire political support based on
outright

class appeals.

While the liberal rhetoric of defending

"the little man" is pervasive, the radical tactic
of

organizing the working man on
seemed un-American.

a

class basis has always

Part of this reaction is due to the

belief that there is a consensus of interests out of which
will evolve a solution beneficial to all groups in society.

Perhaps more importantly,

self-interest is

a

a

long-range appeal to class

corollary to demands for outright

economic redistribution.

A fierce anticommunism moderates

both strategies and gives neither the force needed to

truly threaten the stratification system.

This historical

adversion to class appeals has been augmented by relatively
recent changes in the nature of liberalism and the prefer-

ences of its spokesmen.
of the underclasses

The Democratic Party, the champion

(but only relative to the Republican

Party), has shifted its base to become more suburban and

elitist.

Jack Newfield has noted that, "beginning with

Stevenson's two Presidential campaigns, the Democrats began
the slow process of disengaging from the needs and hopes
of the white lower middle class."

]

2

They ignored the

economic problems and class conditions that were still

3
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important to many people.

This trend has continued to

the point at which George McGovern's 1972 campaign,
while

appearing radical to conservative and upper-middle
class
voters, seemed almost irrelevant to the lower-middle
class.

Associated with this bias against class based
political strategies is

a

decline in the prevalence of

moral discourse and appeals to justice.

The rejection

of an ethical stance which is an end in itself stems from
a

fear that the strategic commitment this stance may entail

v/ill

turn politics into an all-or-nothing battle.

But

conflict between competing definitions of economic justice
(or stratification's justifiability)

is an integral part

of ideological diversity and structural criticism.

When

we amoralize political debate we rcm.ove the raison d'etre

of a critical perspective, the contrasting of present

conditions with an idealistic and ethically desirable
alternative.

Politics stripped of moral appeals leads to

strategies grounded in

a

narrow self-interest.

David

Reisman's account of changes in popular attitudes towards

politics recognizes this point.

While the inner-directed

man of the past tended to be a "moralizer," the other-

directed man of today is an "inside-dopester
politics cynically and from a distance.

1

,

"

viewing

Consensus poli-

tics can easily accommodate itself to such an outlook;

structural criticism cannot.
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This amoral objectivity moderating
political
conflict conforms quite well with other
ideological biases.
It is not accidental that Pragmatism
found a very receptive
audience in our society and our political
system.
The

problem-solving approach isolates rather than
interrelates
social analysis.
Strategic appeals are directed
at

narrowly defined interests rather than structurally
situated classes.
If redistributive policies
are
proposed,

they are defended by reference to the immediate problem,
not by reference to broader questions of justice.

Norman

Thomas' criticism of the New Deal's pragmatic experimenta-

tion states the case clearly;

Roosevelt was exhibiting

"a kind of American progressi vism which calls itself

practical because it has no general principles."''''^

Our

emphasis on pragmatic, non-ideological responses to concrete individual problems stems from an optimism that the

whole will take care of itself.

protected as

a

In truth,

the system is

result of the ideological context within

which piecemeal, pragmatic solutions are sought.

Political

pragmatism mirrors an unconscious ideology, the general
principles of consensus politics.

But the ideology goes

unchallenged because, given the strong emphasis placed on
pragmatic approaches, its impact on policy formation is

often unacknowledged.

This constitutes another bias

against strategies in support of structural change.
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Another consequence of this emphasis is
the depoliticizing of certain social issues. The
reliance on
technical expertise in garnering political
support is

necessitiated by the prgamatic, problem-solving
perspective.

The claim is that "the problems which are pressing

for the society are of a high complexity, do
not have

clear solutions, and political methods do not appear
the

most fruitful means of treatment "^^
.

are ever called upon to judge on

a

Thus,

if citizens

certain controversy,

'

they are forced to decide on the basis of conflicting

technical information, not on the basis of subjective selfinterest or ethical principles.

Strategies which have

drifted from these personal moorings are unable to gain
firm footing in appeals to scientific accuracy.

a

The grow-

ing emphasis on management and administration depoliticizes
the citizen's role by conceptually divorcing his personal

situation from his political problem.

The black vs. white

perspective behind redistributive demands cannot prosper
in the gray limbo of technical deliberation.

The institutional context of consensus politics

also exhibits

a

firm bias against strategies associated

with structural pressures and redistributive demands.
Edward Shils states what are the established institutional
expectations regarding political strategies:

8

'
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Pluralist politics is marked also by
the moderation of political involvement.
A lukewarm
pol i ticiza t ion
is a feature of pluralist politics.
Pluralist politics
also
prohibits emotional intensity, especially emotional excitemonl: continuing
over long stretches of time or running
on without intermission. 1^
'

.

.

.

.

Anticipation of the growth of

a

.

.

mobilized, politicized mob

underpins fears of mass participation.

However,

in the

process of preventing imagined revolutionary threats, our

country has tolerated, condoned, ond even fostered an
incredibly

higli

level of political

apatliy.

A style of

politics which looks the average citizen out of the decision making process stems from "an ideology which is

grounded upon

a

profound distrust of the majority of

ordinary men and women.

The elitism implicit in consen-

sus politics is justified as the primary moans of inhilDiting

the formation of redistributive demands, moderating those

that do get presented and insuring the maintenance of

accommodative processes, all toward reducing threats to
the political

and economic systems.

This fits in rather

well with the redefinition of political issues;

"what once

were ideological disputes have now bocome mere technical

administrative difficulties suited to the i^roblem-sol ving
1

skills of managerial elites.""

Given

tlie

fact that re-

distributive demands are by their very nature threats to
the status quo, the existence of massive nonpar ticipation
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and elite decision-making protects
current structural

arrangements.

Strategies aimed at mobilizing underclassses

in order to bring about basic change
are successful within
an atmosphere of angry resentment,

not one of disillusioned

apathy.

Even for those who do participa te--in elections
for

instance— the passive role of the voter and

the lack

of accountability of the elected combine to minimize
the

utility of that arena of politics.

The fragmented nature

of the demand structure mitigates against relying on

party victory as the means of achieving one's goals.

In-

stead, conflict among organized interest groups within

governmental institutions tends to bo the effective
strategy used between elections.

The reliance upon the

pressure group system rather than the

E^^rty

system has

three consequences detrimental to redistributive demands.
First, the former forum is highly oligarchical; in E.

Schattscheider

'

s

words,

E.

"The flaw in the pluralist heaven

is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-

class accent.

Probably about 90 per cent of the people

cannot get into the pressure system." 19

Based upon class

bias alone there seems to be little chance of redistributive policies emanating from pressure group politics.
Secondly, the leader of an interest group often grows so

distant from his disadvantaged followers that he consciously
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or unconsciously ignores their interests.

In an effort

to protect his own quasi-elite position,
or perhaps out

of a well-intended desire to maintain his
influence with

the powers that be, the leader is unable or
unwilling to
act upon the economic discontent of the membership.

The

interest group's hierarchical structure mutes rather than

amplifies criticisms of the system and demands for basic
change.

Finally, the pressure group process of decision-

making lessens publicity, thereby further reducing mass
awareness and involvement.

Questions of

a

political

character which can lead to periodic battles and uneasy
truces are kept out of the public's eye, relegated to

regulatory agencies or Congressional subcommittees.

As

conflict is privatized, the range of values (the viable
alternatives) inherent in

a

specific problem is narrowed.

For the most part the decision-makers have made their

peace with the dominant groups operating in
and have come to

a

a

policy area

conclusion from among various policy

approaches and objectives.

The public is kept out of this

process, often to the point of being left ignorant of the

decisions that are finally reached.

Without popular input,

public policies will reflect both the ongoing biases in
the policy-making process and the established balance of

power among contending interest groups and therefore will

merely perpetuate the distributive status quo.

.
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Within committees and agencies the decision-making
procedures follow
and compromise.

a

well-recognized pattern of bargaining

This give-and-take has been labeled the

very definition of democracy:
even primarily

a

"democracy is not only or

means through which different groups

can attain their ends or seek the good; it is the good

society Itself in operation."

Viewing the system as

a

specific mechanism of conflict resolution ignores the

biased ideological and institutional context within which

demands are formulated, strategies are selected and potential conflicts either gain attention or remain latent.

Only by overlooking these aspects of the political process
can we assume the democratic fairness of group negotiation.
But even with respect to the use of bargaining and compro-

mise objections are raised.

Here, too, bias against

structural criticism and redistributive demands can be
found
If,

as has been argued,

veto groups populate and

police the policy-making process, then powerful interests
can defend their positions of privilege in the face of

challenges from disadvantaged groups.

Compromise with

these privileged interests can only occur at the expense
of reaffirming their entrenched position and the benefits

that accrue.

Once the threatening aspects of

a

demand are

eliminated (i.e., its redistributive intent is deflected).
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agreement becomes possible--but the resulting policy
is structurally conservative

(that is,

system-supportive).

The commitment of the government to compromise as an end
in itself strengthens the conservative implications of

the group negotiation process.

The political system finds

it very difficult to make coercive decisions even if

agreed to by

a

majority of citizens (or representatives)

We confuse majority rule with majority tyranny.
of legitimate

(democratic)

.

The use

authority is rejected in favor

of nonconf lictual bargaining relationships between potential combatants.

However, the nature of redistributive

policy involves the requirement that government give special

treatment for the benefit of

a

group or groups against the

resistance of those interests that stand to lose.

Conse-

quently, the bias against political procedures allowing
for winners and losers, majority and minority,

results in

the freezing of allocative arrangements and the preservation of structural continuity.

The political process has been construed so as to

guarantee the inadmissibility of redistributive demands;
intentionally and

elites and non-elites have joined,
unconsciously, to make inequality

a

non-issue.

This comment

recapitulates the analysis of the factors which enable the

system to avoid considering the topic of relative shares.
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Consensus politics is supported by the strength
and

viability of this invisible counterpart to the decisionmaking process:
nondecision-inaking is a means by
which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated
before they are even voiced; or kept
covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making
arena; or, failing all these things,
maimed or destroyed in the decisionimplementing stage of the policy process.^"'"
.

-

.

Its success in this regard does not depend upon the presence

of overt elite manipulation or a devil theory of history.

Consensus politics is maintained through the specific
behavioral patterns, political norms and power relationships
in our society,

often in the face of well-intentioned but

politically naive challenges.

Admittedly, this political

structure is not free from pointed and well planned
attacks.

Hov\7ever,

the existence of an effective level of

political pressure is itself dependent upon the ideological

context and institutional arrangements.

The structure

nurtures itself, as demands and strategies lead to programs
which reinforce inequality while, ironically, responding
to the initial desire for change.

The type of conflict resolution our political system

permits can be expected to go no further than the demands
and strategies it allows.

The structural bias against
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economic redistribution and political mobilization
succeeds in restricting the range of feasible
policy
choices.
ills,

Few of these choices can alleviate actual social

though each is

a

response to

Policies respond to wants by

"

a

political want.

satisf icing"22--satisf ying

only partially and sufficing only temporarily— and since
this is usually enough to minimize conflict and maintain
the appearance of progress, our political process need do
no more.

Even radicals are aware of the ability pluralist

democracy has in avoiding structural change while meeting
specific economic desires.
Gorz

Note this comment by Andre

:

Certainly, capitalism is incapable of
fundamentally resolving the essential
problems which its development has
brought about.
But capitalism can resolve these in its ov\;n way, by means of
concessions and superficia], repairs
aimed at making the system socially
tolerable ^ ^
.

And these concessions also result in

a

low level of inten-

sity with respect to political strategies.
met to some extent,

If demands are

the political frustration that breeds

redistributive conflict cannot fester.
This is not to say that personal needs are being

fulfilled sim.ply because policies respond to political
demands.

Indeed,

the lynchpin in the demands-strategies-

policies cycle is the system's ability to isolate actual
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need from expressed political want.

Unable to connect

their specific plight to the issue of inequality
in general,
unable to imagine how egalitarian arrangements
would benefit them, disadvantaged groups are forced to
rely on

system supportive formulae for relieving economic need:

narrow and nonclass perspectives, privatized governmental
power,

increased expenditures for superficial programs,

security against "threats from below."

The desires and

attitudes reflected in these political prescriptions do
not speak to the issue of inequality.

The rhetoric of

political action advises us only that demands are satisficed,
conflicts are resolved, wants are responded to and change
held to a minimum.

Regarding the real needs and interests

of those near the bottom of the stratification ladder, no

promises are made and none are kept.

Consensus politics

may eliminate the system-destabilizing impact of political

frustration, but feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness

indicate that frustration has now turned inward.

The

resulting attitudes of apathy, resignation, submission and

acceptance strengthen consensus politics still further.
There are

a

number of ways in which specific politi-

cal demands may be met.

Some of the alternatives which

are eventually considered by policy makers may even have

redistributive ramifications.

Among these are transfer

payment programs involving cash allotments given directly
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to the beneficiary.

Such programs go against the ideologi-

cal grain of most middle class Americans;

the values of

individualism, ambition and competition emphasized in the

culture of capitalist society are undermined by governmental support programs of this type.

In a more general way,

policies which allow for direct transfer payments result
in a pattern of benefits and burdens quite unlike the

pattern of power within society.

And if this dissimilar-

ity is recognized, then power holders will push for alter-

nate policies allocating benefits more in line with the

prevalent structures of power.

As long as the stratifica-

tion system itself is not open to challenge, nonstructural
and nonredistributive alternatives will reflect and therefore perpetuate economic and political stratification.

Howard

P.

Tuckman has termed this relationship between

public policy and economic gain "the internalization of

wealth."

As Tuckman puts it,
no sooner is a new program proposed
than a new method is found by which

Provide a
the wealthy may benefit.
medicare program and watch doctors'
profits grow; build new schools and
observe the increasing prosperity of
large contractors; create a federal
housing program and develop a ncvj^^
class of wealthy property owners.

Policies of this sort can satisfice only because economic

demands do not stem from or are not likely hitched to

a

.
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thoroughgoing critique of inequality.

Instead, they are

usually couched in terms which allow for
various means
of and degrees of fulfillment.

The lack of any structural

awareness results in policies conforming to
structural

requirements

Cases in Consensus Politics

Ideological context, institutional biases and power

relationships combine to form the general political/economic/
social structure.

As might be anticipated, when we focus

on specific areas of conflict,

the structures that are re-

vealed conform to the precepts and processes of the over-

arching framework of consensus politics.

Its perpetuation

depends upon its maintenance and stability within arenas
of stress, not only during situations of calm and cooperation.

The strength of this style of politics is indicated

by its ability to keep the political peace under conditions

which would otherwise have led to divisive and perhaps
ideological clashes.

The following comments on party

conflict and labor-management relations demonstrate the
practical application of consensus politics in areas most

vulnerable to the redistributive impulses that economic

stratification foments.
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Party Politics
The party arena has always been a locus of social
and political conflict in the industrialized West.

It is

often during election campaigns that the tensions of
society come to

a

head;

a

privatized issues become politi-

cized by parties seeking to profit electorally from social
conflict; since party conflict is the largest political

game around, elections encourage parties to mobilize and
involve the masses, thus threatening the elitist tenden-

cies of entrenched power; the organizing efforts of

parties depend upon and help encourage high levels of
emotional involvement which make the citizen open to

appeals and arguments he would dismiss under calmer circumstances.

Often analogy is made to the struggles of

war, and this is not an absurd comparison.
for overwhelming victory,

The potential

crushing defeat, and basic

changes in power relationships is present here more than
in the accommodative styles of Congressional,

and interest group politics.

bureaucratic

In a nation of great

economic disparities, the party system seems

avenue for promoting redistr ibut ive policies.

a

likely
But the

operation of consensus politics maintains stability and
protects the structural status quo by blunting the ideolog
cal potential of party conflict.
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In other capitalist democracies,
especially those

with strong labor, socialist or communist
parties, political campaigns often air egalitarian
views and discuss

redistributive policies.

This involves

a

challenge-

though sometimes perhaps only implicit, partial
and sym-

bolic—to the current patterns of economic stratification.
There is consequently

a

parellel need on the part of

status quo forces to defend and justify inequitable
allo-

cative arrangements.

Whatever the actual electoral outcome,

the fact is that ideological diversity,

structural alter-

natives and even moral debate enter the political arena.
Issues and perspectives are brought up in these countries
which,

if raised during our party contests, would be

tantamount to political suicide.

And workable policy

positions are supported by reference to general and
diverse theoretical frameworks.
does not become

a

Pragmatic problem-solving

cover approach for unconscious ideologi-

cal unity.
Our parties and electoral processes are a far cry

from the style of conflict described above.

In most

elections we have little choice in terms of the range of
viable alternatives offered.

The tweedle-dee,

tweedle-dum

syndrome cannot be fully recognized for what it is if the

electorate has been trained to accept slight variations
in political outlook as major differences in basic
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philosophies.

To a citizenry working within a Lockean

paradigm, Edward Kennedy and Barry Goldwater appear
on

opposite poles of the political spectrum.
apparent to an observer with

a

What is readily

comparative perspective is

that the Democratic and Republican parties operate under
similar ideological assumptions,

in response to similar

power holders, utilizing similar organizational arrangements.

Their actions

— the

appeals they make, the candidates they

offer and the policies they promote

— help

mold the public's

opinions and behavior with the ultimate result of insulating the party system from redistribut ive pressures and

protecting the political system from structural attacks.
The Democrats and Republicans are examples of

electoral as opposed to programmatic parties.

Their

efforts are directed towards the short-run goal of gaining power, not necessarily towards the more elusive aim

of changing society.

Single-member districts and

a

two-

party system strengthens this bent; winner-take-all elections

— with

the Executive, committee chairmanships,

contracts and patronage hanging in the balance

— discourage

minor party campaigns by making coalition government

highly unlikely.

On the contrary,

intraparty coalitions

and campaigns appealing to numerous and diverse interests

are decidely more common.

This power- (rather than policy-)

emphasis of our election process leads to unconscious
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patterns of thought and behavior, all in line with
the

dictates of consensus politics.
First,

successful coalitions between divergent

groups contribute

perspectives.

to and reinforce

narrow, nonclass

Piecemeal demands are balanced and moder-

ated in order to achieve electoral victory.

The multitude

of groups and issues are not Eorged by party leaders into
an alliance with a common campaign promoting shared

structural objectives.

Groups remain isolated and narrow-

ly defined, and each party can realistically attempt to

form

a

pragmatic

(non-ideological) majority coalition by

appealing to all.

Without an obvious class enemy, class

consciousness and ideological perspectives are inhibited.
Consequently, so is the desire for redistributi ve change.
Second, emphasis on immediate electoral success and

the subsequent need for intraparty coalitions lead to
the politics of the middle.

deceptively practical.

Public opinion, seen as

shaped curve on most issues,

harshly.

The argument is familiar and
a

boll-

treats any sort of extremism

Find the golden mean before your opponent does

and the voter will reward you with victory.

The dominance

of this view of campaign strategy results in the vague,

indeterminate, even two-faced oratory so typical of our

election politics.

But more importantly, it forces a

moderation in economic demands which eliminates any
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realistic redistributive impulse.

Institutional arrange-

ments of give-and-take predominate; economic
redistribution is extremism.

Demands which threaten income groups

go against the need for a broad-based moderate
and

successful economic coalition (funds as well as votes
must

come from nonworking class groups).

In addition,

economic

demands face the multitude of non-economic issues with
which parties and candidates must contend.
least,

At the very

the cross-pressures of numerous overlapping

interests and issues, coupled with the conventional wisdom's definition of campaign strategy, prevent

a

concerted

emphasis on inequality as the central social problem.
The formulae for effective political strategies in consensus politics preclude one-issue candidates, however

critical that issue may appear to be.
Third, admittedly there are some class loyalties

determining voter preferences.

The Democrats receive

their major electoral support from the lower-middle and
lower classes and labor unions.

However, this loyalty

is not a reflection of class interests in the same way

that a labor party represents the interests of labor.

The aim, let us not forget, is to gain political power,
and as long as Democrats can count on working class votes

without treading on the interests of the wealthy and
powerful, there is no motivation to promote redistributive
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policies.

The liberal rhetoric of the Democratic
Party

has become a substitute for substantive
recommendations

and structural challenges; it is thus

a

functional

attempt to gain electoral victory with the minimum of
ideological friction within the party and within society.
And if the rhetoric sometimes is not enough to satisfice,
it does not matter.

After all, in consensus politics

where else can the v;orkingman go?
The final consequence of electoral parties is

strongly suggested in the preceding analysis.

Political

parties are elitist and political campaigns are manipulative.

The increasing emphasis on public relations in

insuring the election of
latter claim.
planned,

a

candidate attests to this

While some manipulation is conscious and

some is unconscious and regretted.

Both types

are outgrowths of an elitist mentality pervading voter
and leader roles.

If the electoral success of the indi-

vidual candidate is seen as the major goal, thrust ahead
of his constituency and his program, then he personally

becomes elevated above supporters and principles.

Elitism

is legitimized in the eyes of both leaders and voters

because we elect

a

person rather than a representative

of certain policy positions.

Compounding these psychological supports of elitism
is an organizational separation between party leaders and

53

party identifiers.

A highly hierarchical structure

with little chance for building rank and file input
between elections encourages

a

sense of distance between

representatives and those represented.

Indeed, this

distance receives justification in the notion of buffer
institutions (i.e., groups) insulating and protecting
elected officials from the demands and pressures of the
masses.

Values and interests diverge, giving vent to the

feelings of frustration so typical of the average voter.
But despite these feelings, despite the unrespon-

siveness of the Democratic Party to the economic pressures

experienced by the working class, party loyalties remain.

Party voters still respond to the periodic appeals of

office-seeking cliques, but they remain unorganized,
unmobilized, inactive and, therefore, ignored between
elections.

loyalty is

This limited and temporary nature of party
a

reflection of the types of demands made upon

the party and upon the political processes generally.

Because few long-range structural objectives are seriously
entertained, there is little need to maintain

a

mass-based

grass roots, permanently active organization to push and

politic between elections.
lost)

Once the campaign is won (or

the potentially powerful electorate has served its

primary function, the filling of elective offices.

The

party's supporters are not consulted any further in their
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role as party supporter.

Instead, the narrow band of

party spokesmen presume to speak for the followers
until
the next surge of organizational and electoral fervor.

The manipulative and elitist character of party politics,

stemming from the nonideological pragmatic nature of our

political parties, shores up consensus politics by defusing the potential for structural change inherent in

election campaigns.
We cannot underestimate the impact party organiza-

tion has on muting electoral threats to consensus politics.

Many critics of our political system have pointed towards
the fragmentation of power in the party as

a

major

obstacle to political, social and economic change in our
country.

The debate over party responsibility (by which

is meant both ideological unity and central discipline)

is revealing,

but it seems to be one step removed from

the realities of American politics.

The weakness of

party authority, the diverse positions of party spokesmen
and the subsequent independence of elected officials are

quite in line with other aspects of consensus politics

previously mentioned--f ragmented demand structures,
emphasis on electoral victory rather than long-range

political change, policies based on bargaining instead
of authoritative decision-making.

The party system shapes

and is also shaped by the operation of consensus politics;
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critical evaluations and political activity must be
focused on this more general level.

Whatever the causative factors, the lack of party

responsibility is
system.

a

crucial aspect of our political

Its consequences affect the viability of redis-

tributive electoral strategies in very detrimental ways.
The notion of voting cues provides
the plethora of candidates,
in any election campaign,

a

case in point.

VJith

issues and offices involved

the individual voter cannot be

expected to make separate determinations on each contest.

Party labels provide voting cues, simplifying the numerous options and making the ultimate choices rational in
light of an individual's own desires and problems.
is,

a

That

party claims to support certain groups and interests,

and those groups give their electoral support and hold

the party generally accountable for the protection of the
groups' interests.

But this thread of reasoning and the

validity of party labels as voting cues break down in our
party system.

The lack of a coherent party position and

the organizational inability to deliver on policy promises

impel the voter to look for other guidelines.

Often

elected officials are chosen because of the personal

characteristics they seem to exemplify; thus, campaigns
are increasingly becoming personality contests, with the

individual candidates produced and directed by public
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relations firms.

This voting appeal,

supplemented by

other common cues (ethnic background, regional loyalty)

undercuts and ignores whatever ideological and policy-

oriented potential party conflict has.

Class orientations

are less important to the voter because the party-class

relationship is loose.

Therefore, in terms of voter

perceptions, the lack of party unity undermines class

appeals and forces the voter to rely on cues having little

connection to redis tributive demands.
Organizationally, the lack of party responsibility prevents the coordination of forces needed to push

through structural or redistributive programs.

The out-

right opposition to change on the part of status quo

groups is magnified by the institutional bias of consensus
politics.

The political obstacles to attacks on inequal-

ity necessitate determined, persistent and coordinated

activity.

Only unified effort can bring policy promises

to fruition in the face of these obstacles.

But party

leadership will not gain this unity if it cannot draw
upon common ideological motivations.

The upshot is that

individual representatives must either conform to the
formulae for political action within government or they
must seek change on their own, as individuals.

The

futility of this situation for a well-intentioned official
is obvious.

Elected on the basis of a host of extraneous.
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minor and sometimes mistaken reasons, he
finds these
factors inhibit orderly policy-making and
coordinated

governmental action.

Redistributive strategies cannot

succeed without the discipline and practical focus
on the
issues that responsible parties bring.

Futility is not solely the prerogative of the
sincere, elected representative.

The public sees that

the connection between their vote and governmental policy
is at best coincidental.

And, more critically,

the lack

of responsible parties clouds the issue of blame,

for no

one accepts failure while everyone claims to deserve

credit.

Under these circumstances,

feelings of powerless'

ness, hopelessness and withdrawal are understandable

and frequent.

Structured apathy of this sort is just one

aspect of structured nonparticipation which closes electoral politics off from those groups most likely to demand

and press for redistributive policies.

The low level of

citizen involvement in our electoral processes is justified by system apologists in terms of the anticipated

consequences mass participation would have.

To be sure,

among these consequences would be increased class conflict
and the potential for structural changes.

Nonparticipa-

tion protects the system from these "threats."

The price

we pay in terms of the democratic ideals of citizenship
is supposedly minimized in light of an updated descriptive

.
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definition of democracy.
in election politics,

The lack of mass involvement

stemming in part from the lack of

responsible parties, maintains the stability of
consensus
politics even as it restricts the meaning of democratic

politics
The ongoing disintegration of the party system,

a

result of many of the factors mentioned above, gives rise
to compensating trends.
I

In the beginning of this section

described the possibilities of political decision-making

through party conflict.

In the absence of this type of

party conflict, there is increasing reliance on another
focus of demands and pressures

— the

pressure group system.

As has been previously indicated, this arena offers even

less chance for redi str ibutive policies and structural

change than the party system.

The biases that surround

conflict between organized narrow interests moderate

demands and blunt disruptive strategies.

But more impor-

tantly, the pressure group system is seen as the legitimate

alternative to the frustrating and ineffective party system.

Failure in the latter field of battle means dependence

on the former.

The structure supplies this choice, but

the related biases against redistributive policies and

strategies in both systems leave the individual citizen
at a loss on how to formulate and fight for his economic

demands.

Most groups remain in the boundaries of consensus
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politics, working through the biasing structures
of both

political arenas.

Those few who cannot be satisficed via

either of these alternatives have by definition gone
outside the sphere of consensus politics and are justified

targets of political repression.

Labor-Management Relations
We might tend to think that in comparison to elec-

toral contests, conflict arising out of union-management

differences is potentially

a

more fertile ground for

redistributive demands and class-based strategies.

It

would seem that the clear nature of the "economic enemy"
should bring out

a

sharper awareness of class divisions

than possible in the arena of party politics.
some respects this is the case.

Indeed,

in

"The United States has had

the bloodiest and most violent labor history of any indus-

trialized nation

m

the world."

25

But this militancy has

been directed towards system supportive paths.
there is

a set

Just as

of structural constraints affecting the

thoughts and behavior of people as voters, so there is

a

parallel set which influences people's beliefs and actions
in the sphere of labor relations.

While the restraining

impact of modern trade unionism has been felt by other

industrialized nations, it is probably most evident in our
own country.

Despite the militancy, violence and bitterness
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of labor history in America,

the labor movement still oper-

ates within the narrow bounds of consensus
politics.

Descriptions of trade unionism in the United States

usually take the European labor movement as
reference.

a

point of

The absence of a socialist-oriented party

ideologically (though perhaps not actually) devoted to

egalitarianism and working class interests

is only the

most notable symptom of divergent orientations. "The

American V7orker

'

s

lack of class consciousness is most

often singled out as the characteristic that distinguishes

him from his foreign counterparts."

Many view this

mindset as a sign of trade union maturity, as an indication that trade unions have chosen to spend less time

crusading for political/economic Utopias and more time
involving themselves in the practical goal of bettering
their members' lives.

However, the lessened awareness of

class in industrial relations is not the result of conscious and autonomous decisions by workers.

Rather, the

ideology and institutions shaping the working class in

America conspire to limit labor's economic demands and
thwart its economic power.

The result is that the types

of union-management contracts agreed upon do not seek to

redistribute corporate wealth or workplace authority.
The clashes that do arise, however intense the posturing
by the combatants, are over nonstructural differences.
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thereby leadinq to system supportincj
resolutions.

This

segment of social life conforms very closely
to the
patterns, norms and expectations

consensus politics.

of.

Chief amonc, the ideological supports for consensus

politics in American trade unionism is the desire
for an
interdependent, symbiotic relationship between labor
and

management.

The corpora t is t ideal held by the early

American Federation of Labor spokesmen is the exact antithesis of class conflict.

Its aim of achieving "industrial

stability, order and social harmony"

against the notion that

v\?ithin

goes completely

capitalist society there

is an unbridgeable clash of interests between workers and

the corporate elite. Instead,

the direction trade unions

have taken is toward making unions

haps

a

a

partner, albeit per-

junior partner, in the political economy and the

entire productive function.

Tlius,

tlio

labor movement seeks

to strengthen rather than overturn existing economic

institutions, to integrate the role of unions within these

institutions.

William Apploman Williams has argued that,

despite ideological rhetoric, even the "radical" C.I.O.
sought corporatism,

a

conservative form of syndicalism

which would insure labor's place in the economic status
quo.

28

In this way we can view the c)rowing acceptance of

unionism as the result of
accommodative nature;

it

a

growing realization of its

is an alternate to,

not the
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manifestation of,

a

socialist and class-oriented ideology.

One of the consequences of this general attitude

that pervades American trade unionism is the clouding

over of issues of power and responsibility.

Adam Smith's

"invisible hand" still seems to hold sway in economic

decision-making.

If both labor and management are part

of the same productive function, then both are subject to

the operation of immutable economic laws.

Supply and

demand, not power and exploitation, determine wages,

"...

prices, products, profits:

the domination of man

by man no longer appears an injustice but
legal necessity.

a

biological or

The power of the employer over the worker

has the force of economic necessity and its human substance
is entirely suppressed,"

29

Corporatist ideology also has the effect of creating alliances which impede the development of class con-

sciousness.

Daniel Bell has pointed to the fact that "a

trade-union, operating in

a

given market environment,

necessarily becomes an ally of 'its' Indus try ."

Attitudes

of "my company first" or "my industry first" are the result
of and in turn reinforce the narrow perspectives of trade

unions.

Unlike the I.W.W.'s "One Big Union" approach, the

labor movement is divided into functionally competing
units.

Improvement for one segment is not coordinated

ideologically and organizationally with the impact such
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changes have on other sectors, and,
indeed, often this
seeming progress for part of the working
class is made at
the expense of other workers.
Besides undercutting
the

leveling impact of some labor-management
agreements, this
institutional arrangement, having its roots in
the corporatist ideology of labor leaders, divides
workers conceptually from each other and foments a form of
internecine

warfare that prevents class consciousness.
Another aspect of the ideological context that has

conservative impacts is the consumerist orientation of our
society.

This affects the types of demands made by

workers and their leaders and also provides the criteria

with which to judge the success of union efforts.

The

emphasis has always been placed on the "bread and butter"

aspects of unionism.
is baloney,"

Thus,

George Meany's quote,

"Ideology

signifies the unconscious acceptance of the

dominant ideology through the labor movement's support of
"pragmatic" trade unionism.

In addition,

our mass society

has increasingly weakened and restricted that nexus of

working class values and personal relationships out of
which social movements can emerge,

a

development that is

also occurring in other industrialized countries but to
a

lesser degree.

.
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Capitalist development duriny the postWorld War II period has transformed the
character of everyday life for the working masses of the VJestern nations
[by] the replacement of all the tradi-'
tional forms of proletarian culture and
everyday life--which gave working class
communities their coherence and provided
the underpinnings for the traditional
forms of proletarian class-consciousness-with a new, manipulated consumer culture
The social potential for redistributi ve strategies has

been reduced and undermined as

a

result of the filtering

down of upper middle-class values on to the not-so-middle

-

class worker.
One additional aspect of our social ideology as it

pertains to labor-management relations

is the

belief that

politics and economics are or ought to be separate.

Government's actions in the many clashes between unions
and companies is limited to

a

referee role.

The sanctity

and integrity of the collective bargaining process in

the face of potential political interference is
held by workers and managers alike.

a

value

The European contrast

model indicates the relatively narrow sphere encompassed
by one form of trade unionism, given these ideological

inclinations.
can distinguish a trend toward
the development of two different types of
those in which the main emphasis
unions:
of union work is on the bargaining process and those which tend to exert their
main impact at the level of legislation
.

.

.

v/e
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and administration [the continental
model]
The first group is primarily concerned with the arrangements
that affect the union member directly at
the vrork place--not only wages, but also
work loads, working conditions, seniority rights, his right to a particular
job, and so on.
The second type places
heavier emphasis on the factors that
determine the general economic and social conditions of the country, leaving the determination of a good deal
of the detail of industrial relations
as it arises in the work place to non-

....

•

union organizations 32
.

Thus the bulk of union power in this country is devoted to

influencing the minor and peripheral aspects of worker
well-being.

The major decisions are left to political and

economic elites, beyond the ken of the collective bargaining
process.

This attitude blunts the power of organized

labor not only by creating self-imposed limits on the

influence which unions can have on major economic decisions.

There is also

a

bias against using political pressure in

order to place government on labor's side in the bargaining
process.

That management has never been reluctant to

accept governmental support (e.g., troops) is proven by
any reading of labor history.

In effect,

unions foreclose

the use of one of their major resources, numerical superi-

ority, when they reject spreading the conflict into the

political forum.

Ideological restrictions, among them the

artificial and biased distinctions between public and
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private and between polity and economy,
go

a

long way

towards making redistributive strategies
unworkable.

Institutional factors add another protective layer
surrounding consensus politics. The organizational

hierarchy of trade unionism, as it has grown in
complexity,
has become less a promoter of the interests of
workers
and more a mechanism for their integration and control.

Unions have been transformed into elite-run big businesses,

handling huge pension funds and huge memberships with the
same manipulative techniques.

In order to protect and

strengthen their position in the union and with other
groups in society, union leaders have sought to suppress

militancy and initiative from the rank and file.
of experts

An army

(lawyers, accountants, economists, etc.), with

little or no contact with working class life, seem to

function as professional obfuscators, insuring that

important matters (the true nature of

a

collective bargain-

ing agreement, the explanations of union investment policy,
etc.)

are beyond the comprehension of most workers.

Aided

by these experts, union leaders are further insulated from

workshop problems and grow increasingly sensitive to the
needs and expectations of their supposed economic adversaries.

In addition to these purely social aspects,

the

union hierarchy functions as an arm of the government.
is legally responsible for enforcing the contractual

It
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agreement by which labor is sold for

a

prearranged price.

For the workers to assert themselves
against this prior

arrangement-through wildcat strikes, for
example-threatens
not only the company's but also the union's
leaders.
Given this state of affairs it is no wonder
that many of
the rank and file union members feel as
alienated from

their union spokesman as they do from their
plant managers.
This situation, the result of the structured
elitism of
trade unionism, conforms to the elitism of the
political

system generally.

There is no doubt that it has conserva-

tive and inhibiting consequences on labor's ability to

effect redistributive change through union activity.
The fragmentation of society into competing groups,
and the division in the union hierarchy between leaders

and members has its counterpart in

a

similar institution-

ally fostered fragmentation of the working class.

Racial,

religious, ethnic and, until recently, linguistic distinc-

tions divided workers and impeded the creation of
labor awareness.

a

common

These divisions were either supplemented

or replaced by differences in craft, trade, or level of
skill, leading today to an economic and social hierarchy

within each union as well as within trade unionism as
whole.

a

The v;age differentials which evolve out of this

hierarchy of functions are forms of privatized power and
class distinctions the protection of which cannot help but
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create hostilities and barriers between
segments of the
labor movement.
And a divided working class insures
the continuation of class inequality.

Add to these internal inhibitions against
class
conscious unionism the external limitations of
social and
political realities.
Primary among these is

the low level

of union organization in the United States.

Only 22 per

cent of the workforce is organized into unions,

a

much

smaller proportion than is found in other industrialized
countries.

And the bulk of the work occupations are in

the less class conscious, more difficultly organized
v;hite collar sectors.

While the limits of industrial

unionism have not been reached

— witness

the battle over

organizing farm workers--it is plain that even with further
growth the movement would still include only
of working class groups.

a

minority

More importantly, organizational

and ideological solitarity would be

a

than an actual characteristic.

except for the marriage

So,

rhetorical rather

of convenience between organized labor and the Democratic

Party, unions tend to operate as separate entities within
the political system.

When we remember how the bias of

the pressure group system works in favor of big business,
we realize the extent to which the working class has been

boxed into and has boxed itself into

ineffectual position.

a

politically
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What does all this imply as to the style
of

labor-management conflict?

As stated previously, a

political system, broadly defined, has

a

bias not merely

with respect to which policies and perspectives
will
emerge victorious and which will be defeated.

It not only

shapes the system's conclusions (winners and losers);
it
shapes the issues as well.

The structure will not allow

issues to be raised which bring forth antistructural

alternatives.

Thus, with respect to current trends and

perspectives in the American labor movement, proposals of
a structural,

redistributive nature are not seriously

entertained.

Indeed,

legitimate demands.

they may not even be considered

Labor movements in other countries

are interested in challenging and ultimately sharing man-

agement's authority position by sharing in responsibility
for administrative decisions which effect both sides.

In

the United States demands of this type would be rejected
as socialistic.

More limited challenges to the workplace

authority of management (e.g., on safety, pace, conditions)
are given a very low priority in the bargaining strategy

of negotiators since

a

plea

for more money is invariably

substituted for these more structural concerns.

The power

orientation of European unions is in marked contrast to
the limited short-range perspectives of our material-

benefits approach.
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Of course/ demands for higher
monetary benefits

can have enormous structural
implications.

Discussions

over how the corporate pie is to be
split might bring up
issues of personal need, economic
justice and social
priorities.

Instead,

these demands have arisen from a

consumerist mentality; they are

advertising rather than

a

a

reflection of corporate

means toward egalitarian change.

More importantly, unions have allowed such
demands to be
tied to price rises and productivity campaigns.
These
ties represent the union's admission that collective

bargaining arrangements cannot and will not be used to
upset current distributions of corporate income and wealth.

Moral rejections of inequality are out of place in the

amoral bargaining relationships of industrial confrontation.

Worker demands for "more" are objectified and made

contingent not upon fairness but upon the success of his
firm, his industry, his nation.

Ultimately the decision

resolves around the means by which corporations can maintain and expand their economic position.

Unions which

demand higher wages while going along with and countenancing
these "means"
tal subsidies)

(productivity and price increases, governmenare giving tacit approval to the perpetua-

tion of inequality.
It is on this level that intraclass divisions are

most effective at inhibiting redistributive thoughts and
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actions.

There is, in the final analysis,

critical

a

division of consciousness within each worker.

Trade

unionism does not enable him to see the connections
between his roles as worker, consumer and taxpayer.
out

a

With-

framework and an organization coordinating his

thoughts in these disparate roles, he is forced to concern

himself with one, then the other role.

He cannot succeed,

he cannot improve his relative position,

on this treadmill

of divided consciousness.

The classic strategies of trade unionism in this

country (collective bargaining and job actions) can be used
either to subvert or to further worker interests.

In many

respects our deification of the collective bargaining

process has been detrimental with respect to the most

efficient use of labor's political power.

preoccupation of the U.S. trade unions

v;ith

"It is the

collective

bargaining that has tended to keep their attention away
from broader social goals." 3 3

But even if we focus in on

the more limited scope and more immediate concerns of the

labor movement, we should be av;are of the conservative,

elitist and regulatory nature of collective bargaining
and strikes.

An excellent case study by William Serrin,

The Company and the Union;

The "Civilized Relationship"

of the General Motors Corporatio n and the United Automo-

bile Workers, makes the point that the strike

is

used to
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coerce worker compliance, not to gain
corporate conces34
sions.
As for collective bargaining, it is
difficult
to see,

except with the presence of other critical
factors

how one side would peacefully reduce its share
of corporate wealth without the expectation that
immediate developments will bring
all,

a

large return on that investment.

After

the process of bargaining occurs within a context
of

unequal power relationships.

Indeed, bargaining is

expressly designed to reveal and reflect these differences
Stratification is safely protected by this strategy of
conflict.
The labor union hierarchy has succeeded in convincing its membership of the union's limited role for the

worker and the worker's limited role within the union.
This lowering of expectations and participation augments
and is in turn encouraged by the general social outlines
of consensus politics.

Economic inequality and the struc-

tures which support it constitute the silent partners in

labor-management agreements.

In this forum of conflict,

inequality remains unattacked, undefended and therefore

unacknowledged as the formative context motivating both
sides.

It is safe to say that unions have become part of

the supportive structure of the status quo:

.
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.major unions in both advanced and
developing countries serve as an integrating link, helping furnish political
and organizational support for government, union, business bureaucracies.
[Ulnions help to preserve the
system and the established power and
status relationships within it.35
.

.

.

.

.

Like the Democratic Party, trade unionism presumes
to speak
for the disadvantaged without ever speaking against
the

advantaged
The conservative consequences of American trade

unionism are due to the fact that unions and union leaders
have found

a

niche in the social order.

Thus,

the social

order is now beyond serious (structural) challenge.

The

pitched battles that we sometimes witness might convince
us that basic changes are in the offing.

The rhetoric

and maneuvering however are not that of real combatants;

the ritualistic posturing and symbolic reassurances are

aimed at persuading

a

constituency,

interests are being protected.

the workers,

that its

While debate may rage over

the extent to which the workers are being improved due
to union action, the relative political peace in industrial

relations indicates that

a

primary aim of union leaders

has been largely successfully accomplished.

The workers

are persuaded of the legitimacy of the forms of conflict

operative within the framework of consensus politics.
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Conclusions

While the existence of consensus politics is

generally acknowledged its legitimacy is an object
of
,

debate.

And this is to be anticipated.

Consensus politics

implies the tacit rejection of structural criticism and
the tacit acceptance of the stratification system on
the

part of most working class people.

The understanding of

this attitude, its nature and source,

is a point of sharp

disagreement between establishment apologists ana radical
critics of the political system.

Do lower middle and

lower income groups operate within current political and

economic arrangements out of

a

true appreciation of their

self-interest, or is their complacency the product of

manipulative socialization and institutionalized repression?

The answer depends in part on how we evaluate the

costs and benefits of the status quo.

Defenders of consensus politics claim that the

majority of lower class people consciously support the
system, and this is so because the system "delivers the

goods."

The creation of

a

welfare state has raised minimum

standards of living for most Americans.

In addition,

political procedures and social mobility have insured that
economic growth is distributed to all major sectors of
society.

This commonly shared affluence has given all

groups a stake in preserving the institutional, ideological
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and political components of our economic
system.

Indeed,

with respect to redistributive issues
the argument IS
made that we are in a post-politics era.

In short, cl.
'ass

-

based politics is declining, and rightfully
so, due to

among other things the fact that we are solving
the problems caused by inequality by the economy's overcominc}
the

problems of scarcity.

Critics are not quite as quick to see consensus in
consensus politics.
distributed.

The benefits of society are not fairly

Thus,

support for the system, or even

acquiescence in its operation, is the result of

cooptation of the underprivileged.

a

structural

Even the touted reform

policies of Western democracies do not substantially
improve the

lot

of the average worker.

However,

they do

have the cooptive effect of securing "the dependency of
larger segments of the underlying population on state welfare measures

."

'^^^

Countering the claim that we need to

move away from the outdated class-based conflict of quantitative liberalism (i.e.. New Deal) toward the non-economic

concerns of qualitative liberalism, Jack Newfield and Jeff
Greenfield plead for

a

return to those issues and divisions

which accurately reflect the interests of middle America.

37

The eclipse of class conflict and redistributive demands-if,

in fact,

they were there to be eclipsed

imposed unnecessarily on

a poli. tical

— has

been

system now blinded to
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the tensions and pressures underneath
the "consensus."
And worse, middle America has blinded
itself to economic

explanations of its plight.

False consciousness is the

critical concept in radical analyses of
public acquiescence.
It is in the nature of establishment
explanatory

frameworks to interpret apathy as acquiescence,
complacency
as consent.

There is no hesitancy on the part of apologists

to point to increases in the general living
standard as

proof of the authenticity and legitimacy of working
class
support of stratification.

Such an admission would not

sit well with critics of our political and economic system,

but radicals have been forced to come to terms with

affluence.

The theory of absolute impoverishment

— that

the internal contradictions in capitalism will lead the

working class into increasing misery and increasing class
solidarity

— is

no more than a museum piece.

However,

it

does have the effect of tying the strength of false consciousness to the economic conditions of the non-elites.

Be-

grudgingly it is becoming clear even to some radicals that
material conditions for the lower strata of society have
improved.

There is little perceived need for

based mass movement
conflict:

a

class-

or ideologically oriented political

"immediate economic demands no longer suffice to

express and to make concrete the radical antagonism of the
wo rking class to capitalism.

.

.

.[They]

no longer possess
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an urgency great enough" to result in
questioning or the

mounting of

a

challenge to the economic system.

many leftists then

consensus politics is

a

For

consequence

of a perceived satisfaction--false perceptions
perhaps,

but maintained and strengthened by an economy
which has
shown the capacity to "deliver" even if only partially.

Thus there is a measure of agreement between critics
and defenders on a major support for the continuation
of

consensus politics.

However much they may differ with

respect to the justice of relative deprivation, they both
realize that inequality can be a source of anger and

resentment which can spread into the political sphere.
What is preventing these emotions from breaking througli
the mechanisms of conflict control described in this

chapter is the economic growth with which this country
has been blessed.

Exactly how economic growth has

ameliorated conflict

and how it has softened the anger

and resentment mentioned above

chapter.

are subjects of the next

CHAPTER

III

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE MODERATION OF
CLASS

Introduction
It is not merely fortuitous coincidence
that our

political and social systems are generally insulated
against the potential strains of economic inequality.

Though a person's economic class is perhaps the paramount
factor in determining his life style or life chances,
the stratification system seems impervious to challenge,

either from

a

viable egalitarian movement or from

publicized ideological position.

a

well

The mechanisms of

consensus politics have successfully thwarted the creation
of social or conceptual alternatives to inequality.

Even

the confrontation possibilities in labor-management rela-

tions have been defused.

The pervasive impact of

consensus politics is responsible here as well.
in analyzing the basic thrust of the VJomen

'

s

Indeed,

Liberation

and Black Power movements of recent decades, we cannot

help but be impressed by the way in which opposition to
"The System" takes the form not of "change the rules"
but, rather, of "deal me in."

Egalitarian rhetoric not-

withstanding, the tremendous social forces unleashed by
78
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these movements constitute a major
threat neither to
the privileged nor to the system of
privilege' generally.
In John Kenneth Galbraith's words,
"Few things are more
evident in modern social history than the
decline of

interest in inequality as an economic issue.
The lack of general opposition to economic
stratifi-

cation is

a

source of interest to political analysts on

both ends of the ideological spectrum.

Most conservative

and liberal social scientists find working class
accep-

tance of inequality to be a predictable reflection of

working class support for most established political,
social and economic values.

Social critics, however,

view public acquiescence as more of an anomaly; therefore
it necessitates a more complex explanation than consensus

theorists require.

The paradox is amplified by two

central questions:

why have disadvantaged groups toler-

ated vast differences in material standards of living; and

why have they continued to participate within

a

political

system which distorts their economic demands and misrepresents their individual interests?
Radical analyses cite the role of the formative

structural context

— institutional

processes, power rela-

tionships, a conservative ideological environment

— in

repressing class consciousness and political unrest.
passes for tolerance of inequality is more probably

What

.
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complacency, a result of the system's ability
to sap much
of the resentment and cloud much of
the accountability
for deprivation.

In addition,

it is easy to overstate

the actual level of class acquiescence by
misinterpreting

signs of anguish and bitterness.

Yet, we cannot attribute

all popular toleration of inequality to the
manipulative

features of our political economy, to structural
repression or coerced compliance.

In leaving open the possi-

bility that feelings of deprivation and resentment may
increase, we acknowledge a voluntaris tic element in mass

acquiescence
The lack of overt antagonism between the classes
is in part genuine,

an authentic though unstated admis-

sion that, despite the real costs of inequality, on

balance the economic system delivers.

The frustrations

experienced in the political realm are softened and can
be accepted if the benefits arising out of economic

activities appear as fair compensation.

An extreme

statement of this position was offered by Werner Sombart,

writing about the America of 1906:
as the material condition of the wage
worker has improved and the increasing
comfort of his way of life has enabled
him to savor the corrupting effects of
material wealth so he has been impelled
to love the economic system which has
shaped his fate and to adajot his spirit
to the characteristic operations of the

—

—
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capitalist economy.
All socialist
Utopias have come to grief on roast
beef and apple pies.^
.

.

.

Even radical opponents of the stratification system,
who,

unlike Sombart, have no facile adoration of our nation's
economy, begrudgingly admit that the low level of working

class consciousness and the depoliticization of the issue
of inequality reflect popular belief

,

whether well-founded

or not, that improvements in one's economic condition can

and will occur within the present economic, social and

political framework.
politics.

This optimism undergirds consensus

The vision of a materially better future for

oneself and one's family helps justify
tion of stratification.

a

conscious tolera-

This vision and optimism is fed

by the economic growth that has noticeably improved the

living standards of each generation of Americans.

Its

subjective consequences are dampened resentment of one's
subordinate position in the economic hierarchy, lessened
class consciousness and class antagonism, and acceptance
of nonredistributive conflict-resolution mechanisms regard-

ing the allocation of material benefits and burdens.
short,

In

the patterns of economic and political conflict

described herein as consensus politics are maintained in
large part through the substantial benefits obtained from

economic growth.

.

82

The moderating influence
of economic growth
is
also Characterized by the
popular attitudes engendered
in a growth environment.
The role of our frontier
experience in shaping our national
character has been passed on
to growth, industrial
expansion and technological
development.
These factors ^e-r
set tne
the tone
^nn^. of
r.f a
.
society, encouraging a set of values, goals
and behavior patterns in
conformity with current political
and economic realities.
Of primary importance in this
regard is the recognition
and acceptance of the established
means by which one can
attain one's economic objectives.
The prescribed paths
for the eventual gratification
of material

desires-

individual economic mobility and
mutual prosperity through
group accommodation-are proven
(if far from perfect)

non-

redistributive mechanisms for economic
advancem.ent
But
both are dependent upon high rates of
economic growth in
order for them to remain as viable and
realistic aspirational possibilities. Their effectiveness
as a means to
higher living standards helps deflect attention
.

away from

more class-oriented, political, redistributive
strategies
and towards those patterns of conflict associated
with

consensus politics.
theme

Noam Chomsky clearly summarizes this
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The idea that economic
growth will
continue without limit has
been a verv
controlling
and
^mT^'"""/""'"^"
limiting
demands for redistribution
of
"^^^Ith. ... The notion
of limitless
growth could be employed to
consensus instead of conflictbring about
by overcoming the demands for
redistribution
of wealth, which would
certainly be
heard if one could not look
forward to
'"'^'^

ot^e^Lthod.?'

—

Economic growth provides the
disadvantaged with outlets
for directing their energies
which do not require

redis-

tributive adjustments.

Indeed, by working through these

outlets,

lower-middle and lower class individuals
help
legitimize the institutions of inequality,
the positions
of the higher classes, and the
processes of consensus
politics.
The following chapter will flesh out
these intro-

ductory comments.

Initially, the fact of material progress

must be established; some of the criticisms
and caveats
leveled against exaggerated claims of growth
will be
explored.

Next

I

will examine the two principal means by

which economic growth bolsters support for the
system or,
more likely, stems resentment of its inegalitarian
elements.
This involves an analysis of the impact economic mobility
and shared prosperity have on our consciousness of and

attitudes toward stratification.

To the extent that public

support of our economic system depends upon economic
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growth, the future of consensus
politics and, with it, the
future Of great material inequality
are likewise dependent

Growth:

Perceptions and Reality

Growth and Material Pro gress
"The idea of economic growth has long
been

part of American thinking.

a

basic

Our politics as well as our

economic system are largely products of
the material

abundance with which this land has been blessed.

The

ideological victory of Lockean liberalism and
the forms
of political conflict it portended were
definitely

"helped forward by the magnificent material setting
it
[Lockeanism]

found in the New World.

expansion is not unique to America.
cultural comparisons indicate

a

True,

industrial

Nevertheless, cross-

remarkable qualitative

difference between our average style of life and that of
citizens in almost every other industrialized nation.
This comparative affluence is readily translated
in the minds of most people into more sel f-evidently

worthwhile goals.
For many Americans, the pursuit of
happiness and the pursuit of money
come to much the same thing.
More
money means more goods
and thus
more of the material benefits of life.
National economic growth
means, it is supposed, greater wellbeing and a happier society.^
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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The expectation and assumption
is that economic growth
promotes happiness by continuously
widening the scope
of personal freedom.
By raising living standards
above
subsistence levels, growth releases
workers from the
demands of economic necessity. A
multitude of purchasable
goods and services frees man (and
woman) from many types
of everyday drudgery.
With time for leisure and options
for use of that time, the anxieties
and constraints

imposed by survival are replaced by the
choices and security of affluence.

Economic growth also promotes an uplifting of
the

collective spirit,

a

mood of confidence and pride which

permeates the social and cultural atmosphere of

a

nation.

Our humanitarian impulses are given more room to
flourish

when economic life is not
with life-or-death stakes.
others.

a

permanent, brutish struggle
We can afford to consider

Ironically, economic growth promises to solve

the problem of poverty without our having to become

humanitarians, without our having to sacrifice.
ingly,

Increas-

the answer to absolute deprivation in the United

States is perceived to be growth, raising the minimum

living standards of those most deprived to levels above
the poverty line.

The poverty programs of the welfare

state depend upon growth, not redistribution,

for success.

Specific policies aimed at helping depressed areas--tax

.
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incentives for investment, ,ob
retraxning, education

upgrading-assume general expansion
programs to bear fruit.

in order for these

It might even be argued
that

the growth of the public sector
(e.g., welfare policies
such as health care, mass
transportation, low- and mxddleincome housing) can only be
financed, or financed with a
minimum of political pain, through
the government's
utilization of its share of the economic
surplus,

its

increment of the growth over the previous
year's revenue.
Admittedly some of these claims are more
public relations
than description.

S

Yet,

the statistics regarding growth

do make a strong case for the reality
of economic progress

and hint at its influence on class
consciousness and

conflict
Caveats, Qualifiers and Doubts
The above argument is not without its detractors.

There are critics that dispute the degree, direction and

depth of our assumed affluence.

One set of attacks has

taken aim on the nature of our growth.

Our affluence is

viewed by some as imbalanced, supplying

a

material goods and consumer services and

surfeit of
a

scarcity of

less measurable outputs of affluence and well-being.

"Development goes beyond economics, politics, and technology. It raises basic questions about the quality of
life in society, the relation between goods and the

H
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good. "9

There are doubts as to
whether certain extensions of technology, certain
efforts to produce more and
different products, have in fact
increased the public's
welfare, or even individual
welfare.
The imbalance
between our obvious quantitative
progress and our equally
obvious qualitative failings
undermines the meaningfulness of our growth rates and
statistics on living standards.
John Curtis Raines puts it this
way:
"While
moving up in things, we have not moved
up
in spirit.

In a book entitled The_Amer
ican^Ju^^

the authors demonstrate that the
business elite slants
its self-evaluation of capitalism's
successes by ignoring
or playing down the qualitative side
of economic develop-

ment

.

The creed
concentrates on the
material and the practical in its
enumeration of achievements. Claims
that the business system has yielded
significant cultural or esthetic
gains are almost completely absent.
Spiritual and moral achievements are
limited largely to Freedom.
.

.

.

Traditional economics reinforces this materialist ethos
by emphasizing measures of national wealth and personal

income levels.

This "preoccupation with the production

and consumption of material goods and services contributes
to an increasing imbalance between the satisfaction of

material and nonmaterial human needs.

""'''^

In effect.
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material affluence has been

a

partial substitute for

those needs not met withrn
our economy.
The psychological and social disamenities
of advanced corporate
capitalism (perhaps indicative of
noncapitalxst industrialism,
too)

-rises

in mental illness and
violence,

a

breakdown

of family and community
ties-are justified by some as

temporary costs of

a

productive economy against which
our
increased material benefits should
be weighed.
Perhaps,
as these analysts would
contend,

this presumed trade-off

of nonmaterial for material
benefits is consciously made
(e.g.,

union contracts with sizable pay
increases but
no mention of safer working
conditions).
Yet,

it is

undeniable that such considerations
qualify our glorification of affluence by offering a set
of
needs that our

material abundance does not satisfy. To
the extent that
nonmaterial factors have not improved apace
with material
factors, quantitative measures of growth and
living stan-

dards overestimate the overall improvement in
personal
well-being.
A related form of imba lanced economic development
is in reference to expenditures in the public
and the

private sectors of our society.

While the latter is very

impressive, the so-called envy of the world, the former
is often ignored.

In three distinct areas of public spend-

ing our collective interests have suffered as a result of
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the lack of governmental
effort.
,

Public services such

as mass transporta tron
or support for the arts
pale in

comparison with private
expenditures for parallel services
(i.e., automobiles; mass
culture records,
books, and

television).

Public policies aimed at
broadening the scope
of citizenship welfare
rights (broad health care coverage,
publicly subsidized housing,
education) are ineffective,
inadequately funded, and often
diverted to benefit powerful political interests.
Finally, programs designed to
raise the standard of living of
the most underprivileged
strata, to alleviate the worst
consequences of economic
inequality, have not prevented the
formation of an almost

caste-like underclass.
idealized conception,

Somewhat redistr ibutive in its
the lauded

(and

feared) welfare

state does not supply very much well-being
to its clients;
"the main beneficiaries of services are
those who fill the

jobs of service provider s ." ^ ^

The public-private imbalance

IS especially stark v/hen we examine our
own efforts in

light of the more effective and better funded
public welfare programs in other industrialized nations.

We must be

suspicious of claims of affluence which rely primarily
upon measures of private consumption.

We should modify

once more our description of economic growth insofar as public goods and services have not expanded in like proportion
to expenditures for private material needs.
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Another caveat to the statistics
on economic growth
attacks the conventional wisdom's
claims that an increase
in real disposable income
necessarily involves a corresponding increase in living standards.
Perhaps we
should not

be too quick to :jump at the
assumption that, because of
economic growth, poverty and
deprivation are becoming more
relative and less absolute, a matter
of subjective perception rather than of objective condition.
Simple state-

ments about comparative purchasing
power or relative
affluence ignore "the historically specific
support systems within which each family strives
to meet its needs
for food, shelter, work, health, education,
transportation
and recreation."
Christopher Jencks' observations on
the styles of life and consumption patterns
demanded of

individuals in

a

given time and place illustrate this

point.

The goods and services that made it
possible to live on $15 a week during
the Depression were no longer available to a family with the same "real"
income (i.e. $40 a week) in 1964.
Eating habits had changed, and many
cheap foods had disappeared from the
stores.
Most people had enough money
to buy an automobile, so public transportation had atrophied, and families
without automobiles v/ere much worse
off than duriiig the Depression.
The
labor market had also changed, and a
person without a telephone could not
get or keep many jobs.
A home without
a telephone v/as more cut off socially
than when few people had liolenhones
and more people "dropped by. "IS

.
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This is especially significant
for society's lowest
Strata
The cost of participating in

a

social system may

go up faster than increases
in one's income

constant dollars).

(measured in

The available goods and services
to

meet unavoidable biological and
social needs are not
fixed; they change with changes in
technology and culture
Options once purchasable when real
income was lower are
priced or structured out of the market.
One's higher
salary now must be applied to a new and
more costly set
of alternatives.
The conclusion some have reached is
that "the workers' social standard of living
tends to
stagnate, to worsen, even if their individual
standard
of living
power)

(expressed in terms of monetary purchasing

rises. "^^

A related observation concerns the

hidden labor costs in achieving present levels of real
income.

Very often

a

family's life style depends upon

the availability of overtime or part-time work for the

chief breadwinner and a separate job for another member
of the family.

Wives are entering the labor market not

out of choice but out of necessity.

Crude statistics on

family income hide the increasing time working class

people must allot towards maintaining their position;
the fifty to sixty hour week has returned (if it ever
left)

.

So

I

conclude with

a

warning against simplistic
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analysis.

At the very least, we
should be aware that,
irrespective of trends in real
income levels, the
effect of economic growth
on average livrng standards
remains an issue for separate
study.

The Argument Restate d
In light of these points a
straight-forward connec-

tion between economic growth and
consensus politics is
somewhat open to debate. The previous
objections, precisely
because they have so little currency
in people's awareness of their economic condition,
serve to illuminate
those values and interpretations which
are screened out
of the public's consciousness in
shaping its attitudes

toward growth.

The following discussion will explore

the biases of ideology and structure that
maximize the

moderating impact of economic growth on class conflict.
This analysis is imperative since it is not merely
high

economic growth but also the perceptual context within

which we view that growth that explains the role of affluence in deflecting redistributive demands.
Part of that perceptual context concerns the

definition of concepts used in evaluating our social and
economic life.

Criteria such as efficiency, affluence,

progress, and success are conceptualized primarily in

quantitative, materialistic terms.

The social structure
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fosters this bias because the
resulting set of perceptions and expectations tends to
implicitly justify the
operation of the economy. Quite
understandably, the
system encourages the application
of supportive criteria
in the public's evaluation
of the system.
Economists
and commentators overemphasize
aggregate measures of
growth (i.e., GNP), leading to a
likeminded public obsession with productivity statistics.
This is the heart of
the following comment by E. F.
Schumacher:
I-laving
established by his purely quantitative methods thaL the Gross National Product of a country has risen by,
say, five per cent, the economis
t-turnedeconometrician is unwilling, and generally unable, to face the question of
whether this is to be taken as a good
thing or a bad thing.
He would lose
all his certainties if; he ever entertained such a question:
CrowLli of GNP
must be a good thing, irrespective of
what has grown and who, if anyone, has
benefitted.
The idea that there could
be pathological growth, unhealthy growth,
disruptive growth is to him a perverse
idea which must not be allowed to sur-

face. 1^

The fact is that such quantitative definitions of growth

are the most publicized and accepted.

While there may be

serious deterioration or stagnation with respect to other
less quantifiable facets of our life (social justice,

community)

,

these failings are played down by the ideology,

and therefore are more than compensated for within the
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mass consciousness by real
real arowi-i^
growth

m
^

private and tangible

consumption.
There is an important auxiliary
consequence in
our conceptual bias towards
"tangible" outputs.

The so-

cial structure encourages

a

range of material demands

that is in keeping with the
strengths of the economy,
that is, with its ability to
provide a relative abundance
of consumable goods and services.
our society, styleof-life symbols have an immense
effect on self-esteem.

m

Advertising creates desires for these
newly produced and
marketed symbols, playing upon the
self-images of the consumer.
By persuading the public to demand
those outputs
which the economic system is prepared
and capable of
delivering, advertising diverts attention
from lapses
with respect to the intangible aspects of
our political
economy.
Issues of power, authority, participation,
etc. are difficult to deal with in typical
union-management

negotiations, difficult to resolve amicably within
the

procedural confines of consensus politics.

They represent

values which highlight perhaps the ultimate imbalance in

capitalist development.

Thus,

the materialistic ethic

is critical for the stability of the economy and the

dampening of class consciousness.
Ideological biases also influence one's self-definition, and this has ramifications for the way we perceive
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the economys success.

How an individual views
hiraself

is increasingly as a
consumer,

not a producer.

The

growing role of consumables in
shaping our psychologrcal
make-up partially explains this
shift.

Our way of consumption
necessarily
results in the fact that we are
never
satisfied
[since] our craving for
consumption has lost all connection
with the real needs of man.
Originally,
rne idea of consuming more and
things was meant to give man a better
happier
more satisfied life.
Consumption was
a means to an end, that
of happiness.
It now has become an aim in
itself. 18
.

.

.

Economic growth emphasizes man as

a

consumer.

The hierar-

chy and authority lines that are
ever present in the
productive sphere accentuate traditional
class differences
and may lead to class resentment.
But the consuming side
of individuals clouds those distinctions.
Robert Lane
has speculated along these lines:

"The more emphasis

a

society places upon consumption— through advertising,

development of new products, and easy installment buying—
the more will social dissatisfaction be channeled
into

intraclass consumption rivalry instead of interclass
resentment and conflict.""''^
This consumerist orientation, directed by culture
and structure along rather individualistic paths, encour-

ages

a

distorted sense of self-reliance.

The availability

of goods and services which augment one's private

life
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enhances the conviction that
collective problems (e.g.,
pollution or crime) can be successfully
evaded.
Consumerism and the ideology of
self-reliance it
spawns also make

one indifferent to the fate of
autonomous others. After
all, they couM take care of
thcmse 1 ves-unless they are
stupid or lazy.
The criticisms of economic growth
examined in this

section might weaken positive attitudes
toward growth only
if people could conceptually
step back and evaluate
economic results from a broader perspective
(with an

alternate set of values and criteria).

Yet,

given the

ideological screens through which Americans
perceive

economic expansion, this is quite

a

difficult undertaking.

The dominant point of view predisposes most
Americans

to

minimize the importance of these criticisms and
to rely
on future economic growth to rectify whatever
imbalances

and deficiencies past economic growth has caused.
We must,

therefore, restate the hypothesis with

somewhat more sophistication.

It is not economic growth

per se, but rather the kind of economic growth wo have

experienced, coupled with the cultural values and social

structure of the society, which makes us receptive to the

appeals of consensus politics.

Consider for the moment

that in many socJeties industrial expansion had exacerbated class conflict by intensify.!

ruj

demands and increasing
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expectations.

Past growth ".ade people
.ore aware of
their misery or at any rate
of the gap between actual
and
potential living standards ^ ^
perceptions of

deprivation and the politicization
of economic grievances
have enabled economic development
to become a catalyst
for a revolutionary
consciousness among middle and lower
classes.
But not in our society.
in
the United States

growth promotes not anxiety but
confidence in the future,
and thus the patience to wait
for future rewards.
Peter
Jenkins has discussed this point.
Growth is favourable to the democratic
habit because it makes it less necessary to insist upon instant gratification of wants or needs at the expense
of others.
The prospect of things
getting better confirmed by a consistent experience of things having got
better helps to contain relative deprivations within a more general social
expectation of progress. 21
The ideology which has shaped this response
to economic

growth is strengthened by the two principal
mechanisms in
our economy by which individuals seek economic
achievement

They help exploit the moderating side of expansion
and
repress its potential for social disruption.

The remain-

der of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of

economic mobility and shared prosperity.
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Th^^pportuniti^j^

.

One of the major underlying
assumptions of this
study is that inequality is
a source of social
instability Which functioning
societies are more or less
capable
Of submerging as an issue.
within our society the notion
of equality as an ideal has
been not so much submerged as

conceptually reshaped into
resulting redefinition is
on our way of thinking.

a
a

system supportive goal.

The

direct outgrowth of abundance

The ideal of equality has been

operationalized so as to mean the same
as equality of
opportunity.
This has entailed an imm.ense reduction
in
its critical and normative content;
"equality
came to

mean,

in a major sense,

parity in competition.

...

The

term 'equality' acquired for most Americans
exactly the
same connotations which the term 'upward
mobility' has
for the social scientist "^^
.

allowed people to speak of

a

This terminological shift

society of equals without

having to prove equality of condition.

There evolved

fusing of ideal and description.
The myth of equality held that equality
exists not merely as a potentiality in
the nature of man but as a working actuality in the operation of American
society--that advantages or handicaps
are not really decisive and that every
man is the architect of his own destiny.

a
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An image of a fluid class
structure beca.e our definition
of classlessness.

Because this image pervaded our
descriptions of
society we tended to ignore
class distinctions.
To point
out such distinctions, to deny
the belief in an open
society, was almost un-American.
Indeed, the "American
Dream" is built upon the assumed
opportunities
of an open

society.

The opportunity to succeed, to
be wealthy (for

that is what "success" has come to
mean) is theoretically
present for everyone.
The Horatio Alger rags-to-riches
stories provided the model for the hero
of our social
mobility passion play.^-^ And the happy
endings of most

movie and television story lines simply
update the theme,
reinforcing our striving for success.
ftovements built
on sharing the wealth found it difficult
competinq with

the well-cultivated belief that personal success
was

always possible.

In effect,

equal opportunity became

America's ideological egalitarianism, with the strong
cultural supports

a

cherished national symbol acquires.

Economic symbolism has

a

role to play as well;

"the ideal of freedom of opportunity depends upon a free

market to establish comparative value. "^^

To the job

market is attributed all the sanctity, givenness,

immu-

tableness of the consumer price market.

Laws of supply

and demand

are responsible

(Adam Smith's invisible hand)

—

.
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for the distribution of
positions and the rewards that
accrue to them. Thus, if equal
opportunity is interpreted more as description than
prescription, then

challenges to stratification are
irrational in addition
to being un-American.
The impact of the cultural em^brace
of the success
ethic upon the collective attitudes
and behavior of disadvantaged groups is not difficult to
gauge:

Class consciousness and class mobility
are the fundamental concepts of class
theory.
They refer to the two chief
dynamics of class structure. They are
also antithetical: while consciousness
is the indispensable condition for
the
formation of classes as politicized
groups and hence serve an associative
function, mobility keeps the classes"
demographically open to each other,
thereby promoting the diffusion and
fragmentation of internal ideologies
hence, mobility serves a dissociative
function in the evolution" of class
phenomena ^ "

Seymour Martin Lipset has statistically demonstrated the

validity of this statement using the hard data of voting
studies:

"perhaps the most important effect of mobility

on politics which should be noted is that the bulk of

the socially mobile

parties."

27

.

.

.

vote for the more conservative

Actual advancement is not

condition for conservative tendencies.

a

necessary preOften, perceptions

of a reasonable expectation of upward advancement (or
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the belief that one has
in fact advanced, whatever
the
reality of that belief) is
sufficient cause for political
caution.
Stated in general ter.s,
"There is an inverse

relationship between the degree
of openness of classes
and the intensity of class
"
con fl
ict

The degree of openness in
of economic growth.

society is

a

a

a

function

Stagnant societies tend to distribute

positions by se 1 f -recruitment (that
same class) but

.

is,

from within the

dynamic economy creates new industries

and requires new skills in greater
proportion than can
be acquired in a static class system.
n America,
the
r

processes of an expanding economy

.

.

.

have provided

constant supply of advantageous positions
to which
enterprising people could advance from less
favorable
a

...
beginnings."

29

New leadership positions attract middle

class competitors while their places can be
offered to

aspirants from still lower strata.

(Wo should not mini-

mize the effect the rhetoric of opportunity and
growth
has in encouraging individuals toward greater
occupational

achievement.)

Lipset and Reinhard Bendix have pointed

out that "a high degree of social mobility is
of industrialization and bureaucratization";

developments (related directly to
growth)

tlie

a

concomitant

these two

extent of economic

are the structures through which economic expansion

increases social

molri

I

i

ty

.

There aclmittodly has occurred
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major change in the primary
path of upward mobility.
The rise of the salaried,
dependent, white-collar middle
a

class has altered the imagery
of mobxUty,

entrepreneur expanding

a

from capitalist

privately owned and operated

company to underling climbing
the bureaucratic institution ladder. 31 Nevertheless,
economic growth continues
to aid aspirants in the
corporate hierarchy
as it had

opened business opportunities for
embryonic industrialists
one hundred years ago.

This is not to claim that the class
system is as
fluid and opportunity as available as
the dream
images

suggest.

It is at least partially true that
most mobility

takes place within "a social and cultural

'buffer zone'

between the middle class and the working
class proper. "^^
Marginal class fluctuations within this buffer
zone tend

to insulate each group and protect the
advantages of the

middle class while giving some appearance of
mobility.
Statistics indicate that our levels of mobility do not

greatly exceed those levels in other industrialized
nations.

At the heart of the issue is not differential

rates of opportunity.

Rather,

it may be necessary to account for
political stability by
the cultural value attributed to social
mobility.
[Because] social mo.

.

.

.

.

.

bility receives positive encouragement,
the existing opportunities for upward
mobility probably help to sustain the

'
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acceptance of the social and
order by the lower classes. 33^political
The proported existence of
great opportunity in our
economy legitimizes the economic
order.
Thus, public
perceptions of opportunity are the
focus of efforts by
those wishing to create support
for redistributi ve policies.
But while the left seeks to unveil
the truth behind
what to them is the myth of opportunity,
the weight of
the culture influences perceptions
in the opposite direction.
Pause upon the impact of publicizing
modern day,
real life Horatio Alger stories.

The humble beginnings

of a handful of our business leaders are
proudly heralded
as examples of the reality of the
American success dream.
In England,

the probability is that such a background

for its elite,

equally as uncommon, would be hidden in

the family attic.

In the same vein,

the existence of

the frontier as symbol of opportunity chances had
more
to do with relieving the mobility pressures of Eastern

laborers than did itsactualuse as an escape route.

Aware-

ness of its existence allowed it to have the same psychological function as a safety valve.

Despite the presence

of comparable rates of mobility in other, more class

divided nations, mobility has had
effect in the United States.

a

uniquely moderating

This is because of the

unique ideological context through which we interpret and
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respond to mobility.

For most, the ideal need
not be
proven for the M^erican Dream to
influence our consciousness.
"People care less about equality
of opportunity
than about the availability of
some opportunity ... for
all, however unequal this
distribution may be."^^ However
far from the ideal the true
mobility figures are, they

provide hope enough for most people
in their desire for
a materially better life.

Mobility and Political Attitudes in Three
Cases
Different individuals might be expected
to react
to mobility perceptions differently.
The irony
is that

rather diverse experiences of material success
in America
will mold quite similar attitudes regarding
political and
economic arrangements.

For three broadly disparate types

of people the existence of economic opportunity
provides
a

strong basis for collective support of consensus poli-

tics.

First

are the aspirants,

the hopeful and expectant.

Next, we will look at the partial success stories, those

who settled for much less than the dream promised.
there are the economic failures,

Third,

for whom opportunity

and mobility promises are threats to self-respect.

In

what ways does social mobility modify the economic demands
of these groups

(dampen class consciousness) or prevent

the collective expression of those demands

conflict)?

(inhibit class
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Th£__A^pirant£

We are all touched by
the Midas dreams that
the
success ethic spawns.
Yet, rational (and
politically
relevant) aspiratxon goals
are not of such fanciful
dxmensions.
Aspiration for the working.an
means raising himself
occupationally into the middle class
(through small business ownership, educational
upgrading in night school,

achieving supervisory or white
collar advancement withxn
the company).
This dream necessarily diminishes
consciousness of group interests and the
utility of group actions
at redressing economic grievances.
It [opportunity] breaks up
solidaristic opposition to existing conditions
of inequality by holding out to
the
ablest and most ambitious members of
the disadvantaged groups the enticing
prospect of rising from their lowly
state into a more prosperous condition.
The rules of the game remain the same:
the fundamental character of the socialeconomic system is unaltered. All that
happens is that individuals are given
the chance to struggle up the social
ladder, change their position on it,
and step on the fingers of those be-

neath them.^o

Economic groups are fragmented into competitors striving
to do better than others in the group, often at the
expense
of these others.

The debilitating effect

this attitude

has on class or group consciousness is obvious.
L.

Anselm

Strauss claims that the divisive individualism fostered

by the standard American success story is not in accord

.
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with the actual nature of
mobilxty in the United States.

Americans tend to forget, or
knowthat much of our mobilitynever
is collective rather than simply
individual
"movement.
Analytically, one
\: not
ought
to regard those individual
rises and falls as merely
individual,
because the respective units
region or town, profession or [industry
occupational group] have acted
collectivelv
behalf of their members. 37
•

.

.

.

m

Nevertheless, mobility aspiration
weakens class loyalties
because there is no realization of
the collective nature
of most mobility-women and
minority group members to the
contrary notwitlistanding
For those who do substantially move
up the career

ladder, changes in life style, attitudes,
leisure activities and residential areas result in
total or near total

breaks with the past.

The individual has been coopted

and within his new setting is taught

(socialized)

to

accept the values and behavior patterns of his
new equals

The saga of the nouveau riche has its complement
with
new entrants at each step of the economic hierarchy.

Because the individualistic mobility ethic is stronger
here than in Europe, the loosening of community and class
ties becomes an accepted sign of personal success.

Thus,

mobility has a far greater effect at weakening working
class loyalties in the United States than in other

developed economies with similar mobility rates.

Just as
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important, the skilled and
ambitious who become upwardly
mobile thereby are removed as
potentially gifted leaders
of the groups they left.
Lipset and Bendix refer to
this point in discussing the
ability of an elite to
absorb qualified newcomers without
undermining its own
privileged position.
Obviously this element of social
stability depends upon the degree of
mobility (and therefore economic growth) within the
system.
In an expanding, dynamic societv,
such
barriers to mobility as inherited rank
can be a fundamental cause of instability, since expansion calls for an
increase in the number of qualified leaders.
As long as the ruling group is
flexible it will allow ambitious and
talented individuals to rise from the
lower strata; yet an ever-present tendency toward the formation of an aristocracy tends to restrict such individual
mobility in any society.
If the restriction is sufficiently tight, it can
provoke discontent, which may result
in efforts by members of deprived groups
to achieve collective or group mobility,
sometimes through a struggle to supplant
the dominant group.

Mobility effectively removes many of these leaders from
contact and identification with the underclasses.
as the above quotation indicates,

But,

adequate levels of

cooptation (without massive and dangerous downward mobility)

depend upon the existence of economic expansion to

create a certain rate of growth in the absolute number
of middle-and upper- level positions.
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Yet, to re-emphasize my
concern with perceptual
as opposed to purely
factual descript rons this
real and
,

Objective form of cooptatron rs
not the only type which
weakens class consciousness and,
thus, prevents class
conflict.
Individuals who feel relatively
deprived but
aspire to higher station often
identify with the groups
they hope to someday join.
The dominance of middle class
values in the working class
consciousness attests in part
to the expectation that
advancement has or will soon come.

Such distorted self-images are
the subsLance of claims
of false consciousness.
"We are in danger ... of identifying with the dreams beyond us and
so voting against
the place we really are."^^ Social
mobility contributes
to two types of false consciousness:
that of an individual
who identifies with a higher class to
which he unrealis-

ti^ly

aspires; and that of a skidder who identifies
with

the class from which he has irre\^sjJ3ly
fallen.

It is

the nature of an economy like ours, which
effectively

merchandises hope, that the words

"

unrealistically" and

"irreversibly" used above are subject to intense debate.

Misrepresented class position is almost
dynamic growth-oriented society.

a

certainty in

a

A careful assessment

of one's true status is psychologically difficult for

those who are not self-evident successes; all the more in
the United States,

a

nation v/hich preaches the gospel of

classlessness and opportunities for all.
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This cooptation of the
ambitious and optimistic
effects not only class consciousness
but also support
for redistrxbutive demands
as well.
Louis Harz words,
"the dream of new and greater
wealth doubled the desire
to protect wealth rn
general.
a society that prides
itself on the opportunity all
indiyiduals have to achieve
riches, the lure of this promised
reward is often sufficient to impede attacks on those
who have previously been
rewarded (the wealthy).
if people are willing to accept
the probability of deprivation in
order to preserve the
admittedly slim possibility of enormous
wealth-a life-aslottery mentality-then the resulting
distribution of

m

•

m

rewards, while not popular, might be
considered fair.

Aspirants implictly acknowledge the validity
of this line
of reasoning through their political and
economic biases.
For them, mobility appears to offer
a

a

more immediate and

more realistic route to securing personal economic
goals

than class unity and the possibilities of redistributive

politics.

Partial Mobility
For those who feel partially successful in the

opportunity race, who believe they have achieved some
upward mobility in exchange for their ambition and abilities, who contend that the system has delivered for them,

though perhaps incompletely, support for consensus politics

-

.o.e soliaiy foundea.

upon gratitude and
,

a

This ..oup.s support
is ..sed
sense of obUgation,
not unli.e the

emotions of „any i™igrants
who, coding to ^„erica
penniless and Often persecuted,
were appreciative of
any job
they were given.
Consequently, they have
been among the
most supportive of the
economy s mobility/opportunrty
ideology.
Those who have had limited
success in advancing themselves have not
been coopted in the
•

same sense

as the aspirants have.

They have not been raised
to

a

new class or strata; the
mobility they have experienced
will not dramatically break
down past ties or cause them
to reject past values.
Their perception of success and
advancement stems from basic
evolutionary changes in the
job structure which have made
certain forms of mobility
more possible and which simulate
mobility
for those in

a

basically static class condition.

The ability of the

system to deliver in the eyes of
these individuals is
also a function of rates of economic
growth.

Industrialization that has proceeded beyond
the
initial stages (i.e., those stages
which Karl Marx thought
typified capitalism) results in
transformations in the
job structure conducive to the
expectations of the oppor-

tunity myth.

In terms of occupational categories,

this

development takes the form of more white collar
and service jobs and less rural and assembly line

positions, the

Ill

-

tne 3ove„.entaX sec.o.
as

a .a,o. e„plo,er,
a„a
the differentiation
of the iabor fo.ce
„„.eh increases
the n™.er of ,o.s
re.u.rin, so.e tecHnieai
and professionskiils.
occupational and income
changes have brought
a vast heterogeneity
to the labor force.
.^vanced
specialization has „ade for
finer drstinctions of
status
and a multiplication of
occupational worlds, '"l
.

.

.

One result of this
development is to complicate
the Claims of inheritance
in the face of the
training
these new positions de„,and.
'The process of specialisation makes exact occupational
inheritance increasingly
unlikely..
Much more importantly,
advanced specialization makes partial mobility
more Ukely, and this will
engender almost the same
deleterious impact on class

«

consciousness as results from the
full mobility sought
and experienced by aspirants.
Cued to be aware of mobility, we become sensitive to
it and tend
to inflate the

true value of even minor
occupational improvement.
Because
the range of one^s expectations
is narrow and tied to
one's original place on the economic
hierarchy, these
slight indications of personal
progress have much of the

psychologically gratifying effects large advances
would
have.
The creation of minor career ladders
within
a

much

larger hierarchy postpones frustrations
and extends the
mobility expectations of individuals. Opportunities
for

:
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advancement increase while
at the sa.e ti.e the
rewards
for each advance become
less meaningful.
Morris Rosenberg summarizes the political
consequences of this development
It has been very plausibly
suggested
that a large number of minute
rank
differences in a bureaucratic
hierarchy
IS likely to discourage
unity among
workers for two reasons:
first, members tend to view one another
in terms
of superiority-inferiority
instead of
equality; and second, workers
on an
equal level feel antagonistic
and
petitive toward one another on the combasis of their struggle to obtain
the
next slightly higher position.
In both
cases consciousness of class unity
among these people is undermined.
Rather than feeling united against
a
common class enemy, they feel mutual
distrust on the basis of their struggle against one another.

The actual extent of advancement is
small, but the impact
on class consciousness is substantial.
The attitudes
and behavior of those individuals
climbing this attenuated

career ladder exhibit the same divisiveness
as would be
expected from the fully upwardly mobile.

In addition,

the

probability of some advancement ensures that the ambitious,
now rewarded, will hold

a

sense of obligation towards

the system as it is presently constituted.
the feeling goes,

"If

I

After all, so

can make it, so can you."

To some degree, partial mobility of the sort

described above is simulated mobility.

It is the magnifying
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of this Slight amount
of improvement whrch
makes the
position attained seem more
prestigious, higher on the

authority hierarchy (but not
nearly as much progress
.n
terms of the measurable
quality of income) than it
really
is.
our economrcally dynamic
society has various

means
of simulating mobility,
thereby inflating one's true
class and station. An often
cited example is the raxse
in title whrch implies
an upgrading in position
without
any commensurate difference
in career chances, income
levels or work responsibilities
(e.g., private secretary
reclassified as administrative
assistant). The upgrading
of manual into non-manual
occupations simulates mobility
into the middle class and thus
moderates loyalties to

working class groups.

A parallel development is the

professionalization (through degree programs,
professional
associations, technical journals) of
previously nonprofessional job categories. ^5 But with this
trend has also

come a proletarianization of many white
collar occupations.
The assembly line operation of large offices
(rows of
desks, routinized work) attests to the blending
of white

and blue collar— the "buffer zone" discussed
above.

Mobility is often built into the job itself.
phasing" for middle class posi tions

,

"Age

and the promotional

privileges of seniority for factory workers

(as well as

school teachers) artificially induce mobility expectations.
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More deserving aspirants
are somehow delayed as
others
Slowly rise to the top (or
what is assumed to be the'
top) of their respective
ladders without competition
from newcomers.
Slight mobility, even that
which IS normany expected as a result of
institutionalized recognition
of increased experience and
skill, is mobility nevertheless, with all its psychological
ramifications. Also
to the point, advancement
through a bureaucracy rather
than through business entrepreneurship
creates vague and
undetermined signs and steps of
progress.
Uncertainty
about career lines allows people
to confuse dead-end
positions with "grooming and seasoning"
posts.
Blocked
mobility is often given other rewards
which belie the
actual prospects of the individual.
When the signs of

stagnation can be misinterpreted as improvement,
then
mobility perceptions will invariably
outdistance reality.''^

Finally there are other forms of mobility
which
can substitute for or give the appearance
of actual

advancement.

Basic changes in residence— farms to cities,

cities to suburbs, Europe to the United States— or
even

geographic movement in and of itself can easily be misunderstood and inflated.

The assumption that change equals

progress works here as well, with consequences on the

potential of class unity;

"in

.

.

.

blue collar occupa-

tional groupings (v/here geographic mobility is not
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intrinsic to the job,, such
mobility is probably a
,ood
xndxcator of the weakness
of class co^unity "^8
The
most frequently cited
surrogate of mobrlity is
education
Hrgher educational opportunity
sustains the beliefs in
increased social and economic
opportunity.
However, higher
educational attainment does
not guarantee upward
.

mobility

more likely, the stress
we place upon education
tends to
justify the superior position
of the educated.
To some
extent, therefore, the belief
in education acts as an
intermediary obstacle, insulating
class divisions while
diverting lower class strivings
towards .system supportive
processes. Educational success
becomes not only a necessary condition for economic
success, but quite often a
substitute for it.
"Thus, many mobility studies
based
on a set of broad occupational
categories probably underestimate the extent of psychologically
and socially relevant mobility. "''5 For the partial
success
stories,

the

structured simulation of mobility and
opportunity (itself
a result of economic growth),
while not reflected
in

statistics, is

a

major source of support for the economic

system and, therefore,

for consensus politics.^"

The Failures
In

discussing the attitudes of the partially success-

ful we are also confronting the issue of the
political
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consequences of partial failure.
Gratitude is easy
enough to understand, but
why have these drea.ers
not
been highly frustrated
and highly animated wrth
the .eager
lengths their an.bitxons and
str.vrngs too. the.P „ow
can
a society, which
emphasizes opportunity so
.uch in legitimizing its drstribution of
material rewards, deal effectively with the feelings of
those who have had hardly any
gains from the opportunity
promised them? The
first

reaction to this critical
question is that
of aspirants feel, justifiably

a

large number

or not, that some improve-

ment in their relative situation
has or will inevitably
occur.
Admittedly, this is not equivalent
to the rags-toriches stories of Horatio Alger,
although th_at dream dies
hard for many Americans.
However, more feasible
and

attainable goals eventually motivate
our conscious behavior;
one's position and life chances modify
one's expectations.
Not surprisingly, achievements within
these reduced
parameters may elicit magnified feelings of
accomplishment
and therefore mobility.

Reference groups for skilled

workers are most frequently other groups within
the working
class, not relatively better off mid-level
office personnel.

Continued comparisons with less affluent members of

the same class result in heightened satisfaction for
those
at the top of the manual working class ladder.

Obviously

it is more satisfying to meet traditional aspirations,

to

]

nevor to b. atta.inod.

1

7

Relative .l.pri v., t Lon is Ko,n
ot

.""derate,

stable .levels due to the
selective perceptions
and narrowed ranye of
comparisons disadvantaged individuals employ.

Simulated mobility,

lowered aspirations nnd non-

threatening reference groups do
not soften the pangs of
failure for many An.ericans who
have nc^vor known even

partial achievement: and mobility.

Ironicany,

it

is

the

emphasis on the success ethic which
insures that these
feelings are not transformed into
anger towards and i-ejection of the economic promises
(and mechanisms) oT mobility
"the American culture tells its
members:
'achieve,'
•compete,'

fellow

'be better,

men';

it

smarter, c,uicker,

short,

'be unegi.,,!

.

•

richer than your

" ''^

This appeal

individual achievement operates in conjunction
wi

t

tor

the

li

belief that sufficient opportunity to succeed
is available
within the present economic system.
Consequently,
when

expectations are not met, individuals hold

responsible

in

account

anxieties, sol fr-doubt s

incj

,

thcMiiseives

tor lack of mobility.

The

frustrations and humiliation

associated with tailure are the distorted mirror images
of those emotions (gratitude and obligation) associated
with upward mobility.
ity

.

.

.

"The notion of equality of opportun-

places rcsi)Ousi

lii 1

j

ty on

t

lie

individual

tor

.
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socxal failure while
attributing successes to
the institutxons."
Because the psychic and
social price of failure
is so high, people
tend to inflate their
own success and
clai. „ore self-satisfaction
with their position than
is
actually experienced. The
attempt to deceive others
as
to one's own real econc.ic
condition leads people to
believe the rhetoric of
opportunity more and thereby
to
place blame lor failure more
scjuarely on their own
shoulders.
To avoid the emotional
traumas of failure

a whole
host Of excuses, rationalizations
and psychological outlets are employed.
Upset and Bendix point to two common
patterns which help soften the
pains of internalized
blame

(1) transvalucit.iona] rc-litnon,
which
teaches thah the rjood rathc^r t.han the
rich will be rewarded in an afterlife;
and (2) a high degree of chil
d-centeredness that encourages parents to seek
satisfaction in higli aspirations for
their children when their own personal
goals have not been achieved. 54

As to the former pattern, many individuals
minimize the

importance of class distinctions.

The belief in social

equality allows the disadvantaged to take refuge
in the
well-refuted myths that the rich are not happy or have
more ulcers and mental worries or have
homelife.

a

less satisfying

The playing up of working class satisfactions
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and the minimizing of
benefits associated with
wealth
are attempts to shift
vaiue priorities, although
not in
so institutionalized
a fashion as a
transvaluational religion.
The minimizing of the
importance of class differences reduces frustration
by claiming that the
prize is
not always worth the
effort.

Lipset and Bendix' referpnrp
j-ej-erence -t-o
to the promise of
intergenerational mobility is vital
in understanding how
failure is dealt with in system
supportive
ways.

The

promise of success, indeed the
whole American Dream itself, has never been denied
-merely delayed and then
renewed.
Through one's children, hope
breathes eternal
for the American Dream ^s
dreamers.
Whether stressing
educational attainment, artistic or
sports talents, beauty
(which improves one's chances of
"marrying up"), or business sense, the parents' raising of
a child expresses
those qualities which are thought
to be translatable into
economic success.
The impact of this form of mobility
on
class consciousness may be less tlian
that of other more
directly (personally) experienced forms;

but as a mechanisn-

for perpetuating the sense of
opportunity, even after the

final distribution of positions and rewards
has occurred,
it is effective enough.

Resignation, in one of

a

number of disguises, is

the most common reaction to failure for those who
have few
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realistic defenses and strategems
to fall back on.
Many,
recognizing their relative
economic situation, try to
gain maximum psychological
advantage out of their acceptance.
The most typical reflection
of resignation is
apathy ("the race is over, the
pressure is off"). Another
related attitude stems from the
admission of individual
responsibility for one's disadvantaged
position; the
corollary notion to this admission
is that wealth and
high station are earned.
Thus, workers who accept a
paternalistic relationship toward their
superiors take
comfort in being guided by a seemingly
natural elite."

Identifying with upper class life styles
and personalities
is a vicarious substitute for real
mobility.
In addition,

the economically and socially disfavored
can participate
in the spirit

(if not the substance)

of national growth

and power, gaining satisfaction through
identification

with the perpetually victorious home team—
the United
States.
a

The hope for intergenerat ional mobility is also

form of vicarious mobility.

While these reactions may

be less than adequate personal substitutes for real advancement,

they are nevertheless effective politically in

inhibiting resentment and moderating frustration.
An additional aspect of the resignation-acceptance

response to failure, one that is the most telling of all,
is the prevalence of gambling as a means of achieving
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upward .obxlity for those
with no other realistxc
possibilities.
Gambling is, of course, a
method of reKindl.ng
hope in the success ethxc,
but it also reflects a
view
many people have towards
their economic fate.
inclined to think that
deserves,
rewards are primarily productsthat
of one's
talents and industry,
secondarily the
consequence of luck, and only
in'small
part the function of
properties of the
social-cultural structure. 56

a^m^r
^t^^^I
a
man gets
what he

A:.other's economic success,

if interpreted as the
result

of chance happenings, is
less threatening to our selfrespect than if it seems to be
an indication of his merit
and, therefore, our relative
lack of merit; "the goddess
of chance, as of justice, is
blind, "^^ By dera tional iz ing
the processes of mobility operating
within society, by
minimizing the rule-governed nature of
the opportunity
contest, the public also depoliticizes
mobility, putting
the "rules" beyond the bounds of
human understanding or

collective control.
is

This final psychological strategem

perhaps indicative of all the mechanisms by
which

individuals deal with economic failure within
the confines
of consensus politics.

"It is this tendency for the under-

class to throw up symbolic systems which explain
their
life situation in secular, non-political terms which
is

perhaps the most important of the 'safety-valves'
taining stability in an inegali tarian society]. "^^

[main-

For
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the vast majority of
A,„erlcans unable to
fulfill the
promises of the American
Drea., some combination
of
resignation, rekindled hope,
and psychological defense
e^lains the generally moderate
nature of their reaction
to their disadvantaged
condition.

All this is not meant to
deny that unrest exists.
Ideological claims of opportunity
and mobilrty unbounded
inevitably conflict with the
awareness of upper class
privileges and a partially closed
class system.
Expectations evoked through the
culture's socialization process
are never totally met, and
the gap between prom.se and
the perceived reality represents
potential political tensions.
AS long as the gap is not too
large, as lono as
economic growth ensures certain
"adequate" levels of
class fluidity or partial advancement,
then the ideological supports wiJl be effective in
lessening these tensions
By enlarging perceptions of mobility,
the society tries
to align aspiration to achieveirent
Failing that, numerous factors protect the legitimacy of
the economic system
by diverting blame, providing personal
outlets and psycho.

logical defenses to deal with failure, and, in
general,

promoting attitudes and behavior patterns which
depoliticize failure and insulate inegalitarian distributive

arrangements.
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Vet,

it is undeniable
that the rhotoric
cannot

totally explain or excuse
the reality; the gap
is too
Wide to be fnliy bridged.
Por ,„inorUies,
especiaUy,
the syste. .s ri„ed
in very transparent
ways.
Speeches
proclaiming equal opportunity
and the rewarding of
n,orrt
can^t cover over the obvious
ease with which people
iron,
upper Class backgrounds
can n^intain tl.eir

position or the ob.dous

Obstacles confronting
disadvantaged individuals
.n their
guest of higher station.
„e „ight therefore expect
,„ore
instability in consensus
poUtics were it not for an addition mechanisn, supplementing
the moderating influence
of
Ability. Chapter III now turns
to an analysis of this
factor and of the means by
which it, too, bolsters the
Stratification status quo.

Shared Prosperity

gjlM£dJ^£2sperjJ^y_an^^

Deprivatio n

The ability of economic growth
to mitigate class
consciousness and thereby to preserve
economic inequality
is not solely a consequence of
the effects of growth on
levels of economic opportunity and
social mobility.
The

American Dream of economic affluence
continues to dominate
working class consciousness even after
expectations of
mobility have been dashed.

Economic growth

provides the disadvantaged with another
alternative route

1

syste..

-

a

2/1

in «-„„„„,i„,

substitute for ..uallty or
inco.o.

growth,

there is hope,

differenbials tolerable
"•'-c.
.

anc,

"^^^

So lony as there

that .a.es larcje i„co,„e
iiniii-r
UnliKo

w..
mobiUby
aspirations,

wh.ch Offered possibilities
of afiluence only to
the
extent that individuals
struggled as individuals
to n.ove
fro. their wor..n, class
or .uMle class situations,
the
alternative path to a bettor
material existence evolves
out Of a person's
self-definition as part of tho
wor..n.
or middle class (or at
least a clear se.n-cnt of
those
classes).
Optinn.sm about the future
stems from the hope
that, as a member of an
economic qroupinq, one will gain
in real wages and living
standards as the nation grows;
being part of the whole, one will
bo able to share in the
general prosperity of the economy.
Expectations of
shared affluence, as with
expectations of individual
mobility, are somewhat overstated.
But conceptually and
concretely these expectations operate
to minimize class
consciousness and mitigate class conflict.
The high standard of living enjoyed by most
Americans, coupled with
belief that the nation's economy and
therefore their own
economic situation will improve over time,
helps deflect
'

attention from the inequities of the stratification
system,
thus preventing Lhe presentation of
redistributive demands
which threaten consensus politics.

.

12.

There is

,

basic objection u,
.oasurinc, national
weu-.einc by reteronce to
increases in average
liv.n,
standards.
The "economic abundance
thesis" is "based on
the notion that absolute
rather than relative
deprivation
the primary source of
labor radicalism.""
.

-

Thear.u-

-nt

raised against this
assumption needs to be
explored
and in son,e way refuted
in order to continue
to maintain
the connection between
growth and acquiescence.
While economic growth
promises to meet our physical and psychic needs,
it may be the case
that only red.stributive policies can truly
deliver.
Richard A. Easterlin
examined data fro. thirty
separate surveys relating
happiness and income." within
all societies, as individual
income rose so did measures
of individual happiness.
However, raising the income
level of all had little or no
effect on happiness levels.
For example, between 1940
and 1970 the united States
experienced a 60 per cent
increase in real income, but
according to Easterlin 's
surveys, there was no appreciable
change in overall levels
of perceived contentment,
security, satisfaction,
etc.

one explanation of these findings
is that evaluations of
one's material well-being arise in
a cultural context of
expectations regarding what is the norm.
Admittedly,

Americans in the 1950

's

through 1970

's

have generally

enjoyed higher levels of real wages than
past generations
ha ve

12

6

But this IS no consolation
at all,
for their needs have
been shaped in
this society today.
There is no
standard of adequacy
forhn^.r^^^^^"''"^
for
housing, diet, medicnl care,
education, entertainment, etc.
What
feels adequate is inescapably
dependent upon what is available
to others
the society. o3
'

m

The fact that deprivation is
comparatively and contextually determined does not make
it any less grating.
The
connection in the public's mind
between relative income
or position and images of
worthiness (or worthlessness)
is not erasable through the
mechanism of shared prosperity.
One can make the argument that
even within a context of
,

increasing general prosperity, inequality
will inevitably
foster envy, frustration, humiliation,
and deprivation.
It is significant that high rates
of economic growth tond

to inhibit the achievement of equality
oE condition— that
is,

it widens the absolute gap between income

groups— even

as it promotes prosperity among society
as a whole.

relative deprivation has been increasing.

Thus,

The import

of this line of reasoning for consensus politics
is clear:
to grievances arising out of stratification, only
economic

redistribution can respond.
This argument, powerful in its logic,
to implore than to explain.
the context of

a

tends more

The truth is that, within

consumerist, materialist, individualist

perspective, imj^rovemen ts in living standards and real wages
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.

do have a moderating
influence on class consciousness
and Class conflict.
Relative deprivation .ay
affect social and personal happiness,
but the reality of material
abundance as discussed above
and the ideological supports
for our economic system
prevent the easy transformation
of unhappiness into social
discontent.
The perception
of affluence, like the
perception of mobility and opportunity, is in large part the
consequence of the conceptual

screen through which we interpret
our economic situation.
To understand why feelings of
relative deprivation have
not led to redistributive economic
demands we must examine
the way in which members of the
working class view their
economic circumstances relative to
those of other groups
in society.
The relative deprivation thesis ignores

a

form of

mobility which is perceptually meaningful for
low and
lower-middle class people. The accumulation of
savings
and possessions, even if in conjunction
with

a

similar

development by one's neighbors, is not without its
benefits
"Entry into the propertied sector of the working
class
was

...

an important form of social mobility. "^^

Clearly

what is occurring is that the worker is using his economic

situation at an earlier stage as his current reference
point.

This comparison implicit in "goods mobility" leads

us to believe that individuals might sense an improvement
in their situation over time and gain satisfaction from
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such progress, the Easterlin
data notwrthstanding.
"a
man who can buy his own
house, or a new car, will
feel
that he has moved up in the
world even if he has not
changed his occupational posi
^
t ion "

'

.

An additional factor often
overlooked by those who
belabor the relative deprivation
argument is the unclear
nature of most material inequality.
Differences in con-

sumption styles have to a great
extent been narrowed due
to overall increases in wealth:
the emergence of mass production
during the past half-century has
caused
such a redistribution of highly
valued
prestige symbols that the distinctions
between social classes are much less
immediately visible than they were in
nineteenth-century America.
66
.

.

.

Qualitative differences aside, the distribution
of, say,
automobiles or television sets is egalitarianizing
in
its impact on people's perceptions of
injustice, plenty,
hope, etc.

In effect,

an affluent

society— by this

the idea of "goods equality" in
I

do not mean to imply that

such equality actually exists— is

a

second aspect of the

classlessness myth as introduced in the discussion of
social mobility.

A leveling of the ownership of material

possessions, consumption equality of

a

sort,

is compensa-

tion to the working and lower-middle classes for
ued lack of political and economic leveling.

a

contin-

Karl Marx

129

might be correct in predicting
the
(downward occupational mobrlity)

£roletariar^^

of the independent

middle class.

pating the

However, he was obvxously
wrong in antici-

paui^ation

Of the working class.

.

(downward consumption mobility)

And it rs our self-xmages
as con-

sumers, not producers, that
are most dominant on our
consciousness.
The reality of inequality
and relative
deprivation must be placed in this
context.

A further point on the goods
mobility argument concerns the distinction to be made
between types of goods
and services.
The drstrrbut ion of the latter
(health,

education, recreation) and some
elements of the former
(the quality of food, clothing
and shelter) is highly
inegalitarian.
But it is also relatively invisible.
'

Upper class luxury items

(jewelry, multiple dwellings,

numerous high-priced automobiles) lack
relevance and
function for most Americans.
Such expenditures appear
frivolous, to be envied without resentment.
The relative deprivation that does surface
is deeply
felt.

However, its structural roots are not apparent.

Jealousy, rising expectations and demeaning comparisons
are interpreted not as products of our economic system
(via inequality,

advertising, etc.) but as elements in

human nature, the signs and pains of striving and ambition:
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average people are not able
late their personal problems to transinto pubto discuss then at
level.
lever''?r
iheir world of complaints that
and
enthusiasms is denied the
means by
the interpersonal
woiTd and place that world
world
the
wider structures of society.within
67
The unhappiness that relative
deprivation gives rise to
is directed away from
displeasure with the economic
system
and instead is transformed
into frustration with oneself.
One final qualification of
the relative deprivation
thesis alludes to a point made
earlier.
The reference
group we use to evaluate our own
level of affluence in
large measure determines how
we view our economic circumstances.
Thus, control over our perception
of which group
to compare ourselves to is

a

critical factor

ing economic and political
stability.

m

maintain-

Promoting the use

of lower class reference groups
(e.g., comparing our
standard of living with citizens in India)
helps to heighten
our perception and appreciation of
goods mobility and
thus encourages a false consciousness
of the true range
of wealth and income levels in our
economy.
But we need

not go out of our national borders to be
confronted with

reference groups worse off than the average American.
The Negroes have formed a distinctive
American proletariat, with he lowest
incomes, the most menial and subservient tasks, and the lowest social prestige ... of any group in American
I:
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existence of this large,
r.TJ^'. ''u^
relatively
homogeneous, easily identil
fiable and exploited group
has meant
that every white American,
even the
lowest paid laborer, possesses
a certain social prestige which
raises him,
at least in his own view,
above the
level of a proletarian 68
.

As has been often demonstrated,
the concept of relative
deprivation is intimately and
inseparably associated with
the concept of reference group.
Society can minimize the
former through careful manipulation
of the latter.

The relative deprivation thesis
states that shared
prosperity does not mitigate against
redistr ibutive politics because it does not solve the
problem of invidious
distinctions.
This argument has merit, but, stated
in
its extreme form, it ignores the
ideological supports and

perceptual screens which have successfully
defused the
class issue in American politics.
The mass of Americans
have long ago been denied the conceptual resources
necessary to understand and evaluate the social
morality and

personal consequences of stratification.
It became difficult for workers and
farmers to define their opposition
to elites, for the separateness of
elite and mass was obscured rather
than clarified by ideological developments.
[Thus] the philosophy of
economic expansion had entrenched itself as the popular answer to American
problems [of inequality and deprivation] 69
.

.

.

.
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Most people, products of

.

very effective
socialization

process, do not possess
the ability to evaluate
their
personal circumstances
duces tree
fre^^ r>f
k
of the
biasing influence of
the dominant ideology.
fact, the ideology of
shared
prosperity not only minimizes
the disruptive impact of
relative deprivation upon
our attitudes toward the
stratification system. As the next
section demonstrates, it
also creates a highly
system-supportive framework for class
interaction while at the same
time encouraging working
class
compliance with economic arrangements.
•

+

m

The Ideology of Sh a£ed__rrospf^r
ity
The continued strength of
consensus politics

hinges on the continued prosperity
of the nation's economy.
To the extent that this prosperity
is more reality than
rhetoric,

there exists the possibility of labor's
progress-

ing within the boundaries of the
existing social and

economic structure,

"thereby lessening the attraction of

those political appeals propounding the
inevitable deterioration of living and working conditions
under capitalism."

Given this perspective, a good dose of political

caution is quite justified.

The worker who believes that

he has a stake in the future is not

a

ready target for

redistributive politics and the unknown consequences such
a

change may entail.
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worker has won a
of ba^i^
basic economic security position
and reasonable expectations he has
cons3derab?v
more reason to be
conservative on social issues than the
middle-class
executive or professional man.
For the workingman,
everythinq could
be jeopardized by radical
change. 71
.

The national goal of
economic growth dampens class
consciousness while the behavior
associated with gaining
one's share of the growing
economic pie mitigates against
class conflict.
The remainder of this section
explores
each of these tv;o themes.
Our cultural and social obsession
with economic

expansion plays

a

major role in inhibiting the
growth

of class consciousness.

The following discussion examines

the highly conservative implications
of our concern with
growth.
While I do not want to yaply that this
position
has totally persuaded the disadvantaged
sectors of

society into acquiescing in their fate,
it has had and
continues to have an impact. To the extent

that the fol-

lowing line of reasoning influences class
attitudes and

perceptions, it serves to diminish the ability of
deprived

groups to think in terms of group antagonisms and
redis-

tributive demands.
Tlie

primary assumption in the shared prosperity

thesis is that economic growth is

unites all economic groups,

a

a

social goal which

national project that ought
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to consume our collective
energies and loyalties.

Economic
growth has historically led
to economic integration
and
interdependence.
The trends of economic
rationalization
(e.g.,

division of labor, large-scale
organizations, hierarchical authority structure)
cause a blending of talents
and functions for all groups
in society.
Each segment,
so the argument goes, is
part of a larger organic unity,
the economic system, and must
be dedicated in function
and attitude toward one common
goal, the preservation and
growth of the economy.
operating with that objective
in mind (or in being constrained
from obstructing that
objective) we improve not only the
whole but also its

m

parts.

Like the mutually beneficial relationship
between
parts of an environmental system, the
economic system
profits from its own, naturally evolved
symbiotic processes
of interaction.
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" guides as
well as legitimizes the economy.
The doubters of this

American Business Creed need only look at the
outcome-

affluence and opportunity— in order to reinforce
their
wavering loyalty.

"Both the material and the non-material

achievements are explained by
link with the System:

rigid cause-and-ef f ect

the achievements flow from and

validate the System, and the
together." 72

a

tv/o

are inseparably bound

The normative implications are obvious.

praise the shared affluence stemming from our growing

We
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economy, thus unavoidably
•jxy suDoorfino
supporting ^-i
the economic relat lonships which supposedly
contribute to and are such
an
integral part of economic
growth.
In accepting the
collective goal of economic
growth,

working class groups co^ait
themselves to the economic
givens upon which future
prosperity is premised.
inequality may not be wholeheartedly
embraced as part of the
natural way of things, but it
is a central aspect of the
economic order and, as such,
probably is indispensable
to the overall functioning
of the system.
if,

as is

claimed, American business is
responsible for our growth,
then to successfully attack
business privileges, including
of course the wealth that accrues
to business leaders,
is to somehow weaken the ability
of the economy to continue its climb.
Likewise, such sacred economic tenants
as property rights, the free market,
minimal government

involvement, and managerial authority are
accepted, if
only in part, as sharing credit for past
and future

economic growth.

Belief in this ideological framework carries with
it the perception of very conservative class
interrelations
as part of the economic givens.

textile workers revealed

a

A survey among New Jersey

surprising tendency to invoke

the standard defenses of social stratification in explain-

ing the inevitability and desirability of the class system.
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in reviewing so.e of
the responses to their
questionnaire,

the authors concluded
that "The members of
different
Classes are thus seen to
serve complementary needs
of the
society and of each other.
This almost feudalistic
acceptance of inequality
parallels a highly paternalistic
notion of class roles.
Dichotomous views of society,
long thought to be connected
to levels of class consciousness (i.e., the rich vs. the
rest of us), also reveal a
strong paternalistic streak
(smart vs. fools, the intelligent or educated vs. the masses^^).
Feelings of obligation
and inferiority toward the
economic elite (or its corporate representatives) undermine
the growth of radical class

consciousness by offering

a

more conservative self-defini-

tion of economic roles and
responsibilities.

Partnership rather than paternalism
describes
the class relationship for others
seeking

the shared gains

of economic growth.

Creed is

a

This aspect of the American Business

central theme of corporate public relations.

For example:

How have we achieved all this [progress]?
Through the American kind of teamwork! And
what is teamwork?
American teamwork is managers that pays
[sic] reasonable wages and takes fair
profits.
Our teamwork is labor that produces as
efficiently and as much as it can that realizes its standard of living ultimately
depends upon how much America produces--that
expects better wages as it helps increase
that production.
.

.

.

—

.

.

.
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The •teamwork" theme stresses
the common interest both
labor and management have
in the goal of growth.
In the
process, this appeal overtly
tries to minimise class
consciousness by ignoring the reality
of economic antagonisms and conflicts of interest.

Continuing this argument, workers
are said to have
a stake in and responsibility
for the economy through
their partial control of

a

major element of economic

success --productivity.
The rise in real wages in the last
few
decades
has not been due to any
direct influence of labor unions on
wages.
IS the rise in the total
product
Itself, however, especially the
product
per man_.
which has been the major
factor in the long-run increase in real
wages o
.

•

.

.

.

.

•

.

'

Productivity and teamwork explain
ing economy.

a

beneficently function-

Politicizing the system by demanding gains

over and above productivity increases may
result in

specific victories but with deleterious consequences
on

long-range class unity.

"While the power to strike can

redistribute income in favor of the members of particular
unions, it cannot redistribute income in favor of labor
in general at the expense of capital in general. "^^

claim is made that such gains as are

vv?on

The

by that method
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undercut the viaMl.ty and
future growth of the
industry,
occupation, factory, region,
etc.
Thus, worKer concern
with wages is often rightfully
directed at improving the
employer's ability to pay.
An additional consequence
of the ideological per-

spective presented here has to
do with the prevalence
Of the work ethxc.
Work at all levels of the
occupational
hierarchy is ennobling, performing
a necessary function
for the economic system.

We should take pride in that

function and do the best job we
are capable of doing.
More importantly, we should remain
loyal to the larger
unit upon whose success our own
success rests.
The work
ethic evolves out of expectations of
mutual progress,
paralleling the success ethic 's expectations
of social

mobility.

The implicit promise is that if we do
our job,

we will grow with the company,
etc.

region,

industry, nation,

The extent to which this promise mitigates
class

consciousness is

a

function of the actual economic improve-

ments that have been experienced.

The recent decline in

the effectiveness of the work ethic is

sionment.

a

sign of disillu-

Hard work seems to go unrewarded while others

succeed despite a seeming lack of worthiness.

Even so,

the ethic has a conservative impact on the class conscious-

ness of segments of society.

Acceptance of the goal of economic growth tends to
force an acceptaiice of conservative decision-making
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processes.

Once the coi^itn.ent has
been made to the
goal, the values of technical
effeciency and rationality
provide the means by which
the ends can be achieved.
But these values depoliticize
the conflict.
"Politics
and rationality are considered
antithetical to each other.
The developmental process is
characterized by the replacen^ent of politics with
technology ^8 Deference to
expertise
becomes the order of the day.
Consequently, worker involvement in the carrying out of
economic growth policies
is discouraged as counterproductive
interference by

untrained layman; it signifies the
threatened interjection of conflict in what is basically
an issue of objective technique and scientific
administration.
However,

this view, if conceded by disadvantaged
groups in society,
is not without an important impact
on the possibilities
of class conflict and redistributive
policies.
The

engineering approach to the goal of economic growth
is
inherently biased in favor of consensual strategies.

As

Clark Kerr observes,
The experts help settle the inevitable
conflicts of interest on the basis
of facts and analysis, and also with
an eye to preservation of the existing
system, rather than on principle except
for a general attachment to the concept
of a reasonable and balai\ced society.
In this regard any structural criticism of the economy

which would spawn redistributive demands is rejected; such

14 0

an analysis is ideological
and Utopian (not objective
and scientific) and thus
dangerous .n its potential
i.pact,
The working class, not
privy to the "knowledge"
of the
experts and denied the conceptual
tools to challenge
their biases and assumptions,
defers its judgment.
Once
again the vision of a mutually
beneficial prosperity has
impaired the class consciousness
of disadvantaged groups.
They have been led to believe
that class

considerations

are irrelevant to certain areas
of decision-making.
As
a result they have in effect
disenfranchised themselves.

Teamwork, an important aspect of
the ideology of
shared prosperity, is more a slogan
than a statement of
interclass relations. The actual
substance of this relation is predicated upon the ability
of economic growbh
to provide mutual benefit.

In the absence of common

interests, the ideological invocation of
the teamwork

theme is

a

screen to cover actions beneficial to an
elite

and harmful to most others.

The following statement by

David Potter compares European and American
perspectives
on the appropriate moans by which improvements
in one's

standard of living can be achieved.

With not surprising

bias he notes the effect of economic growth in shaping

the American proclivity toward class cooperation.

ence and abundance has
given

a

characteristic tone to American
as distinguished from the

€Xjualitarianisin

Afflu-
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ment of others; but TNmerica
has conceived
without taking from others.
Hence EuronP
the relatlonsh?r
between the various levels
b^tren'thf
of society
without assuming a class
struugle- but
ai?er' these
rela^Ho 'h'
relationships
without necessarily treating one class as the victim
or even in
othei"'"?,'^

r^"^'

^-^ntagonist of an-

°ften assumes
imnll\-^T
fixed; that most of the
potential wealth
converted into actual
^T.^ti''^ft^.^^^'^
wealth; that this actual wealth
is already in the hands of owners;
and, there"""^^ '''^'^
ornnA
group Ito secure more is to wrest P^^^On or
it from
some other person or group,
leaving that
person or group with less.
The
American mind, by contrast, of
ten' assumes
implicitly that the volume of wealth
is
dynamic, that much potentia.l wealth
still
remains to be converted; and that
diverse
groups for instance, capital and
laborcan take more wealth out of the
environment
by working together than they can
take out
of one another by class warfare. ^0
.f'^^^P^^^

"^^"^^

—

We may object

(I

do,

at least)

accuracy— the comparison

to Potter's descriptive

is not as clear-cut nor as non-

manipulative as the above quote implies.

Yet,

an important

point has been raised regarding the mechanism
by which

mutually beneficial arrangements are reached.

A standard

analogy is often made comparing the situation in
which two
individuals fiercely battle over division of

a

fixed

economic pie with the situation in which conflict over the
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PXCS division

<the .ssue of relative
shares,

is subsumed
by cooperation in
enlarging the pie (economic
growth,,
thereby ensuring a larger
absolute piece for each.
This
conceptualization of the above
distinction in Potter's
statement is the gist of
most arguments favoring
the
n^oderation of redistributive
demands.
The potentiality
Of Shared prosperity
via economic growth
makes class conflict counterproductive.
"A politics of compromise
has
flourished in this atmosphere
as one person's gain has
not been another's loss.-^l
^he next section I want
to examine this theme from
the point of view of game
theory to see what light such
a perspective can shed
on
the stability of the
stratification system and the lack
of redistributive politics.

gM!eJ2lgory_^s_j^monstratio

n^^he

Theory

of Shared Prosper ity

The dichotomy in perspectives
which formed the
basis of Potter's quotation above is
explained

in game

theory as the difference between two
types of game situations.
In two-person, constant-sum (also
called zero-sum)
games the sum of the payoffs going to
both players is
always the same, and what is at stake is
the shares or

proportions of the total each side will receive.
of interest is inevitable, cooperation is
useless.

tagonism is built into the game.

Conflict
An-

An example follows:
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Player li

Player

a

b

^

-I'+l

+1,-1

B

+1,-1

I

Each player chooses

a

strategy, player

I

a

row and player

II a column,

and the cell that is selected
from the conjunction of these strategies
determines the rewards or
penalties for that round. The first
number in the cell
represents the payoff for player I,
the second for player
II.

Obviously, in this game, indeed in
all zero-sum games,
when one player progresses the
other by definition
regresses.

Potter's perception of European class
politics

takes this form.

Classical Marxian analysis also believed

that the interests of the classes
(players) were diamet-

rically opposed.

Therein lies the problem for radical theorists.

They have been forced to admit that productivity
increases
have allowed advances in real wages.

Economic growth

has enabled capitalism to avoid the potentially
explosive

antagonisms inherent in constant-sum games.

The ability

of the system to legitimately promise gains for everyone
"is precisely the aspect of capitalist economics emphasized

by those who wish to direct attention away from the
'class struggle.'" 8 2

The social and economic flexibility

possible in an expanding economy reflects

a

partial
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coincidence of class interests
i-crests.
sum (non-zero-sum)
a

Th«
The ^two-person, positive-

qame
jamc IS
is thorc.Fr.vtherefore more appropriate
as

descriptive tool.

The positive-sum game can
be structured to become
conducive to a search for
collective strategies (behavior
preculuded by constant-sum
games)
Maximizing one's own
return often involves an
awareness of the other player's
interests.
Therefore, the strategies of
bargaining,
.

negotiation and compromise, so
prevalent in the political
system, are integral aspects
of games of
this variety,

making them useful lenses through
which we may analyze
class interaction. The following
example demonstrates
the point:

Player II
a

Player

Player
B,a.

I

A

-1,-1

B

0,+3

b

+3,0

I

+2, +2

will prefer outcome A,b while Player II desires

If each aims for his most advantageous
outcome,

the result. A,

a,

would leave both worse off.

However,

the players can reach an agreem.ent to accept B,b,
maximiz
ing their total pay-off and insuring a fair reward for
each.

The process of reaching

a

satisfactory agreement

is abetted greatly if certain conditions are absent and

14

5

others are present.

Por instance, while
pure cooperation
not a necessary goal
for the par ticxpancs
,

it is

undoubtedly true that intense
feelrn, of envy and spite
are irrational and
inappropriate attrtudes.
Ga.e players
must somehow curb their
rivalist mentality in order
to
profit from the game's
cooperati vist
structure.

Also,

assuming the ability to
communicate wrth an opponent,
the
possibility Of making binding
agreements lessens problems
of distrust and greatly
facilitates the recognition of
complementary interests and the
search for accommodative
strategies.
Sociologically speaking, tension
is reduced
by the existence of both a
community of interest and a
mutually beneficial outcome.
It is possible to solidify
this relationship

(and

to make the game more realistic
in terms of the analogy
I am developing) by
introducing a third perhaps hypothe-

tical player against whom the
original players align in
order to maximize their total pay-off.
if nature-the

physical environment in which the economic
system oper-

ates-is viewed as the third party, then

a

coalition of

labor and management (or capital) vs.
nature for the

purpose of increasing material growth as much
as possible
would cloud still further the perception of
distinctive

antagonistic economic interests.

For theorists seeking

to explain the low level of class conflict
in an environment

Of high economic growth,
the accommodative
strategies
associated with two-person,
posrtxve-sum games offer a
touchstone from which an
explanation can evolve.
Such an explanation must
also take into account
the inaccuracies and
omissions found in the theory
of
shared prosperity, deficiencies
whrch game theory is
quite adept at reflecting.
What we need to understand
is
the mechanisms of game play
in a less idealized context.
Inequality, among other factors,
ought to somehow be in-

corporated in the game in order
to determine the extent
to which the theory of shared
prosperity is merely a
justificatory ideology or an idea with
descriptive merit.
What first must be examined is the
game's schedule
of pay-offs.
Those used in the previous example
are not
indicative of the actual game-like
situation between
labor and management.
Look at the following as an illustration of a rather different two-person,
non-zero-sum
game.

83

Player II
.

Player

a

b

A

1,2

3,1

B

0,-200

.

I

2,-300

The usual assumption behind most games is that the power
to follow a rationally chosen course of action
eliminates

the factor of coercion.

The above example, however.
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demonstrates that bargaining
leverage and. therefore
power considerations, are
a function of
pay-off

possiMli-

ties.

While Player II would
prefer outcome A,a, the
threat of Player I selecting
strategy B forces II to
comply With his opponent's
demand that
be agreed uoon
The potential of such a
threat will lead to an
exploitive
rather than a fair division
of the spoils; feelings
of
injustice and resentment could
potentially arise as if a
zero-sum game were being played.
In terms of real-life
examples of similar types of

interaction, labor's demand for
a fairer distribution of
the total product may lead
management to institute counter
strategies (factory lockouts,
strike breakers, capital
investment directed to other regions
or nations) wluch
harm the workers much more than
management.
Redistributive demands handled in this manner
deteriorate the
union's position, encouraging labor
strategies in keeping
with consensus politics and economic
inequality.
point
of fact, the labor movement has
gained in strength

m

as it

started to gain respectability and "play
the game."

The

best possible labor strategy, the path
of compromise and

bargaining within the context of economic inequality,
still
may not be a pleasant option.
Yet. the institutionalization of conflict, often singled out as an indication
of

consensus politics, might best be interpreted as the

14

bearudaing acceptance

^^^^

8

labor of the ..^rn^
skewed

Piy_-^f PossibiUties.

ror other „,ore disad-

vantaged segments of the
economy, businesses
bargaining
leverage is even greater and
thus the relative rewards
are
even .ore i.nbalanced.
At this pornt the
psychological
distinction between zero-sum
and non-zero-sum games is
highly blurred. The basic
form of a positive-sum

game
can in this way hide elements
of coercion and exploitation,
belying the oft-stated accommodative
nature of the game.
The concept of bargaining
leverage is critical in

understanding how the rewards of
the game and of prosperity (economic growth) are shared.

simply

This factor is not

reflection of pay-off possibilities;
other elements
of the game situation enter the
picture.
Witness this
example.
a

Player II
a

Player

b

A

-2,-2

4,1

B

1,4

3,3

.

I

If each player aims for his most advantageous
personal

outcome, they both will end up with the worst
collective
result

(A, a).

The anticipated compromise solution (B,b)

.seems to be the most rational and

fair choice if communica-

tion and negotiation are normal procedures of the game.
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However, imagine that
Player

pay-offs Of -2 While Player

I
1

II

is quite
IS
nni^o able
ki
to afford
is equally unable
to

tolerate that outcome for
any extended period of
ti.e
economio terms. Player I
is wealthy while his
opponent is
poor.
This set of circumstances
(discussed under 'utility
theory, in the parlance of
game theorists, allows
Player
I to continually
choose strategy A, forcing
II to play
strategy b or face the
"financial" consequences.
In
Short, the context of inequality
allows the economic elite
to maintain its strategy,
even at a temporary

m

loss,

in

order to force the working
class to comply with a less
desired outcome. The issue at
hand is not so much the
maximization of one's rewards as
it is the long-run
conflict over power, dominance and
submission.

Other elements of the economic game
help clarify
the actual role that differential
power plays in determining the "sharing" in our shared
prosperity.
The vast
interdependence of the economy has effectively
removed
games with nature (i.e., farming, fishing,
extraction
industries) as viable personal options.

For all intents

and purposes you must play within the
economic system for,
as the saying goes,

"it's the only game in town."

Once

you have decided to play, the possibility of
side payments

represents a means by which seemingly redistributive
results can be transformed into nonredistributive ones.

.
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unions Who conclude
favorable „a,e agreements
with management rarely protest the
corporation's raising of
prices.
Finally, games rn which
one player does not know
the actual
pay-offs give major advantages
to the other player.
A union may hesitate
about being too militant
in its
demands upon being told that
the company will fold
(or cut
back on personnel) if those
demands are not moderate.
Business, knowing the true
size of the economic pie,
can
underestimate its ability to pay,
thereby giving
the

appearance that some union goals
are unattainable.
The
power of information is one of
a number of factors
putting
into question the inherent
justice of the positive-sum
game
How,

^

then, can the theory of shared
prosperity main-

tain its validity?

The reason is that these games and

their real-life counterparts do
represent means by which
opposing groups in society seek to
benefit from economic
growth, if not in equivalent amounts,
then in proportion
to their relative leverage in the
game situation.
Once
the rules and context have been
formulated, play proceeds
according to plan; the outlines of the game
fairly well

determine the long-run behavior of the players.
style of play (accommodative) is as much

a

Yet,

the

tribute to the

perception of the game as it is to the game's true nature.
If the structure of rewards becomes skewed even
further
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toward economic elites, if
the gains from playing
the
game do not compensate for
the felt injustice that
may
be brewing below the surface,
then non-accommodative
behavior will become the norm
rather than the exception.
The game will approach the
zero-sum ideal type xn terms
of
the psychological attitudes
it engenders.
What prevents
this escalation of antagonism
is the fact that economic
growth has provided a large enough
pay-off among deprived
groups to justify continuing to
play the
game.

It is important to realize that
the rewards,

in

game theory and in real-life, are
individualistic and
quantitative.
Our consumerist cultural biases
allow the
game analogy— and the processes of
economic growth-to

function as

I

have described.

Giddens makes the same

point in summarizing this section:

union-management clashes involving
[issues of economic distribution] are
principle reconcilable in a way in
which those over control fof the workplace] are not.
For v/hilc at any given
point in time there is only a fixed
amount on the income 'cake' to be divided
between wages and profits, over an extended period the size of the 'cake' can
be increased, and hence wage increases
can be exchanged against productivity
agreements, etc.
In the long-term, such
a process can only operate ... if
there is a continuous rise in real incomes; but this is exactly what has been
achieved by the capitalist economies in
the 20th century. 84

m

Economic growth evokes

a

spirit of shared prosperity and

.

152

promotes a set of procedures
which institutionali.e
conflict within the bounds
of current distributive
arrangements.

Conclusion
Most people recognize the
central role economic
growth plays in molding our
spirit as a nation and our
outlook on its future.
"Every optimist speaking
about the
future of American society,
heralding its potential if not
its actual accomplishments,
assumes some version of national
P£ogress."85
merchandising of hope, as with most
products on sale today, is directed
toward filling basic
structural needs along with personal
desires.
A 1975 New
York_^imes survey sought to measure
"confidence, expectations and aspirations" during a major
economic downturn.
The results revealed that the lessening
of previously high
levels of optimism had a marked impact
on the acceptance
of traditional ideological supports
for the economic

structure
The survey
showed that a growing
segment of the public had doubts about
the doctrines it grew up with--that
things will get better, and that, if
they v/ork hard, they will get the things
in life they want:
new home, a better
job or other things deemed necessary
for a completely fulfilled life. 86
.

.

.

The maintenance of belief in these and similar system-
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supportive "doctrines"
xncs rec^hc
rests r.r.
on m
the continuation of
economic qrov/th
Thic IS 4-i
This
^ owrn.
the pivotal feature in
our
nation's make-up.
n

c-

But is all this history?

it may be argued that

we can no longer take for
granted our ability to sustain
the growth rates consensus
politics requires for stability.

This self-doubt reflects an
expanding sentiment in the
society, but it is still a
m.inority position.
A report
published by the Committee for
Economic Development
succinctly summarizes the dominant
attitude among those
endeavoring to perpetuate current
arrangements:
"Factors
which promote growth should be
encouraged.
Policies
and activities that can be identified
as retarding growth
should be opposed. "^^ The tone of
security that we sense
behind this statement harkens back to
an earlier era in

American political, economic and social
life.

Hew research

along with domestic and international
developments have
undermined that security for many Americans.
Now as

never before,

a

cloud hangs over the economic future of

the United States.

While confident spokesmen may propound

the inevitability of permanent prosperity, an
increasing

number of social and physical scientists, interest
groups,
critics, and economic and political leaders, equally

secure in their evidence, envision

a

our nation:

formidable problem of

"Ahead lies the

.

.

.

different fate for
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a world in which
growth .ay encounter
ecological bar-

rxers on

worldwide scale, bringing
the need for new
political and economic
arrangements for which we
have no
"^^
precedent.
a

The conflict is thus
joined.

The issue then bccc.es
Which side has the weight
of evidence.
But that analyses
oversimplifies the matter.
a debate so crucial
to
the social and political
future

m

of the United states we

Should be made aware that

a

mere weighing of evidence
is

insufficient.

The risks are too great,
the consequences
too immense, for us to
ignore the possible in a
quest for
the probable.
The following two chapters will
examine the

limits-to-growth controversy.

Their aim

win

be to see if

there is enough merit in the
no-growth or slow-growth
predictions to warrant an examination
of the potential
impact such a plausible development
might have on the
future of our political system.
To err on the side of
optimism (continued growth) rather than
caution threatens
to do a disservice to future
generations who would have
welcomed our thoughtful handling of
their world.
'

CHAPTER
THE LIMITS TO CROWTH DEBATE:

IV
THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

int roduction

Limits to growth-the concept
is as current as
todays headlines but has a
tradition of relevance that
goes back to the droughts,
floods, epidemics and wars
of
primitive societies. The notion
of limits to growth has
flourished and faded in every era.
Ours is no exception.
The image has been reformulated
and updated by
numerous writers, the most widely
quoted of which are
the authors of Th^_LinutsJ^^^^
They state their
position succinctly:
"if the present growth trends in
world population, industrialization,
pollution, food

'

production, and resource depletion continue
unchanged,
the limits to growth on this planet
will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years.
This conclusion

seemingly sanctified by computer print-outs,
is not without its detractors.

many times before.

The cry of "wolf!" has been heard
Yet,

this flippant and oft-stated

retort to the limits to growth position does not
confront
the issue on its merits and, therefore, does not
effective
ly dispel the modern-day Malthusians.

After all, in the

fairy tale the wolf did eventually arrive.
155

So the
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intellectual confrontation
era to see whether
thrs

n,u3t

ti„,e,

take pU.ce anew in
each

unUke

the past, the warn-

ings and fears are
justified.

Chapters iv and V review
the various aspects of
the limits to growth
debate.
After sketching the
outlines
of the controversy, this
chapter explores the evidence
regarding the two .ost
frequently cited threats to
future
industrial expansion.
These
are the li.its to our supply

of necessary raw materials,
especially energy resources,
and limits to our (and the
environment's) tolerance of
industrial effluents.
in ci.j.fc;i.r,
effect
tvemi<=
Liends v/ith respect to
some of the phy,sicai xnputs
(natu.ral resources) and
physical outputs (pollution) of
our economic engine are
causes of concern.
Chapter V focuses on other major
elements of the limits position
which bears examrnatxon.
Developments in the human environment
take the form of an

evolving complex of economic,
social-psychological and
political-managerial problems that also may
have

tive impact on long-term growth
rates.

Thus,

a

nega-

in five

specific areas the battle has been ioined.
My organization of the material into
five distinct

areas of study should not obscure the inter
relatedness
of the topics addressed.

A full analysis can be achieved

only by examining each aspect of the debate in
its rela-

tionship to the others and by appraising their collective
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influence on economic growth.

Dennis Pirages alludes to

the connections among these
separate concerns:

-Political

conflict is conditioned by
both physical and social
environments. The physical
environment
places
constraints on economrc and,
indirectly, political possibilities.
Physical environmental conditions
establish
parameters within which social
developments take
.

.

.

.

.

.

place.

The physical context structures
our social development by
biasing our options and eliminating
certain alternatives.
In a similar manner,

the human environment-economic,

political and social decisions and
behavior-will influence developments in the physical
environment.
Funding
of energy technologies is a case
in
point.

In short,

the

fate of our nation's economy cannot
be adequately discerned without systematically integrating
the diverse

elements of the debate.

The conclusion of Chapter V will

take up that task.

The Outlines of the Controversy

Extremist Rhetoric
First we must define the primary elements of the

controversy.

But this is a difficult task given the ever-

changing nature of the subject matter.

The issues get

recast with each book, each teach-in, each television
special.

The strategies employed by the debaters further
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Cloud the top.c.

While scientific vindication
beco.es
the stated objective of
the combatants, in reality
.any
proponents and opponents of
the limits to growth thesis
stereotype their oppositron,
present stacked alternatives,
and then portray their own
position in terms of cliches
and aphorisms.
Doomsday paranoia battles
growthnv-..ia,

blind faith balances out blind
fear, leaving the public
both anxious and unenlightened.
There is
some inner

need on the part of those scholars
most involved in the
controversy to establish or refute
every point of the
thesis and to do this with a degree
of self-assuredness
not in keeping with the evidence
or the topic.
The appeal
to pessimism based upon the
by-now shop-worn phrase of
environmental protectionists, "if current
trends

continue," is as subject to doubt as is
the professional
optimist's claims of inevitable salvation
through technology.
Few seriously feel that this nation can
and
should blithely ignore current environmental,
social and

economic crises; "full speed ahead" is the slogan
of the
lemming.
(ZEG)

Yet, on the other side,

is an equally narrow slogan,

or realism.

zero economic growth

equally without vision

The preliminary goal of clarifying the issues

is thus obstructed by the extremism and overkill of
the

debaters' rhetoric.
And yet, there is method in the madness of this

style of confrontation.

Extremism provides some tactical
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advantages in spite of its
factual inaccuracies.
Environ
mentalists are wary of the
low social and political
impact Of less strident or
sensationalistic presentations
The supporters of increased
economic growth receive the
public's attention every
single day.
Politicians, corporations, advertising firms
and our public ideology
continually extol the material
success of our economy.
The

costs of such growth are rarely
mentioned or are grossly
underestimated while the more
tangible benefits invariably get more than their
share of publicity.
In this
context, extremist rhetoric can
instill the social awareness and create the political
clout needed in the battle
for a moderate but effective
policy response from government.
This has been a common approach
in the formation
of other political movements.

There are, however, disadvantages
to this style of
political confrontation which may outweigh
its tactical
benefits.
It stifles rational deliberation,
offering
policy makers no guide to the subtlety
and complexity of
the issues.

Doomsday predictions of the future are coun-

terproductive in other respects,

too.

They tend to

overwhelm many listeners, undermining people's ability
and

determination to deal with specific and curable problems.
Excessively gloomy forecasts also deflect our attention
toward long-term obstacles and away from more immediate

-

3
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opportunities.

Environmentalists de-..phasize

the potential positive impact of
sub^ectxve factors such as
human
ingenuity, cooperation,
social and psychological
flexibility, thereby foreclosing
possibilities for improvement.
On the other hand, their
opponents tend to take the
adequacy and benificence of
these variables for granted.
Finally, ecological hyperbole
plants the seeds of dis-

illusionment if "bad science" by
some analysts weakens
public faith in the many valid
and well-substantiated
points of the general hypothesis.
The common justification [of
the
doomsday rhetoric] is to say that
it
IS necessary to exaggerate
to get oeople
stirred, to get things done.
But people
are easily anesthetized by
repetitions
and there is a danger that, in
spit^^ of
Its achievements so far, the
environmental movement could still find
itself
falling flat on its face when it is
most needed, simply because it has
pitched its tale too strongly,

Thus,

even in terms of its political utility,
extremist

rhetoric is suspect.

We have to go beyond the popularly

held half-truths, to cut past the rhetoric,
and approach
the central issues in the limits to growth
debate.

Crisis Perceptions and the Need for

a

"Futures" Awareness

One way to grapple with the issues presented in the

controversy is to explore the conception of "crisis."
Although the word "crisis" is much abused, in this context

»
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it is far from
meaningless.

The perception of

a crisis
situation in the human
environment „U„ht be
well-founded
on evidence, but at
heart it is a subjective
evaluation,
very much dependent on
one's time perspective.
Most
people cannot think very
much beyond the problems
in^ecliately facing them.
Their identification with
i

i-

i

generations,

to-come is weak.

There is, therefore,

a

limit to the

degree of •'anticipatory
decision-making" they can be
expected to make. Crises
telescope our time framework
by
bringing the risks and
options of the future closer
to
the present.
Crises shock us out of the
parochialism of
routine existence.
In noncrisis circumstances
we have a highly short-

term perception of the future,
demonstrated by our understanding of growth, sacrifice
and investment.
In general
terms economic growth involves
sacrificing present
consumption by diverting resources
toward investment in
order to increase future consumption.
Thus investment in
new power plants, automobile assembly
factories, roads,

and the like are expenditures for
growth.

Yet,

benefits

from such sacrifices are not long
in coming; our investments promise relatively quick dividends,
and these

dividends usually imply an advance in living
standards,
not merely the maintenance of current
life styles.

radically different view of growth requires

a

A

longer time
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perspective.

PoUow.ng this new U„e of
reasoning „e

would continue to sacrifice
present consumption-•now
defined in ter,„s of decades
or even c,e„erations-by

y-l^^
£--i£ces

in the Ereservatron
of ou_r enistina stoo.
o_f
in order to guarantee
..ini.al levels of future

consumption.

Yet,

since „e consistently
discount the
long-run future, we are
unable to pursue the type
of
sacrifice that is inherent
in such
a

understanding of investment.

conservationaUst

The crux of this difference

is differences not in
time perceptions but rather
in

perceptions of

a

crisis regarding future levels
of consump.

tion.

Examrning the historical record,
most observers
can anticipate that future
generations will be materially
better off than „e currently
are; thus, long-range sacrifice involves an inegalitarian
redistribution of wealth
(and well-being) from the
poorer present to the richer
future.

Yet,

intergenerational redistribution of wealth
can be justified as egalitarian
if we envision a drastically reduced living standard for
the citizens of
the 21st

century.

As

I

have implied, the objective of our
invest-

ments may be not only to increase future
consumption
levels but also to insure that future economic
decline can be
averted.
This is what the time framework
is all

about— the

plausibility of the limits-to-growth argument and
the
realization of the crises which surround that
argument.

1
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Progrowth advocates see lif^i^
little unique in our
present predicament. The
calls for intergenerationa
redistribution as discussed
above .est on very uncertain
grounds and, given past trends,
the likelihood
t-fc^fa

is that

the future will be better,

not worse,

than the present.

What environmentalists see
as i.m.ediate threats to
society, growth advocates
perceive as vague and very distant
constraints on permanent industrial
expansion.
It would

be foolish to turn our car
to the left now because

passenger suspects that there might
be
three miles hence.
Yet, we can

a

a

bend in the road

use the same analogy to

make the opposite point.

'

It would be wise to slow down

now in response to our rider's
warnings, especially given
(1) the high and increasing speed of
the vehicle (rate
of growth and pace of change),
(2) doubts regarding our
ability to handle any necessary shift
in direction
(complexity,

interdependence, limited knowledge),

(3)

the

wobbliness of the car as it currently moves
(environmental,
social, economic and international problems),
and

high risks associated with

a

(4)

the

lack of caution (disaster).

It is still possible for people
to recognize a crisis

even though there is little immediate
and personal contact
with the crisis events.
We need not wait to see the mush-

room clouds before we comprehend the
dangers of nuclear
warfare.
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A "futures" awareness
and the realization
of a
crisis situation will orf-m- t,k^
occur when people
seriously perceive

a

connection between the
short-run concern over
the .uality
Of their l.ves a„a
the lon,-ran,e un.erest
rn the survival of their society
and species.^ We are
involved 1,n
a series of events
any one of which
-

can be vrewed as

a

crisis-point for any nu.ber
of individuals.
without at
least some elements of
a crisrs mentality,
we would

not
be disposed toward the
positive actions which crises
encourage.
such a case, we would be
heading further and
faster down the road, fearing
t.he hypothetical turn
instead of watching and
perhaps preparing for it.

m

Narrowing the_Jdea_o£j^lniUsj^^
The preceding examination
of crisis perceptions has
served to clarify some of the
issues arising out of the
limits debate.
Further understanding can be
achieved
by interpreting the crisis
of growth as a matter of
definition.
This interpretation is not
self-evident at
first glance.
Certain limits-to-growth spokesmen
are

quick to condemn growth as such.
brings things down to basics:
Pollution.

Garrett Hardin's formula

Population X Prosperity =

Others have refused to label our ecological

problems as an avoidable by-product of
the growth process;
rather, the assumption is that increased
growth
will
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invariably worsen the
pUys.oal ana social
environment
Many have accurately
countered this stance by
noting
that zero economic
growth (ZEG, or the
so-called stationary state is no solution
because it does not assure
us

Of ecological balance,

the real goal of growth's
critics.

The general attack upon
growth per se is part of
the
extremist rhetoric and
strategic maneuvering that
were
discussed previously.
The posturing of pro- and
anti-growth forces hides
the real question we must
face, a question which is
at
the same time more complex
and more personal than
we may
have anticipated.
Does OUR current mode of
growth maximize the potential of our
economy, our society and our
environment, or are we in fact
systematically minimizing
that potential now and for
the future? The limits-to-growth
debate should be viewed as a
search for the answer to that
question, as the following quote
makes clear:
The cutting edge of the environmental
movement today is
.a demand for
change.
People are opposing what we have
called "growth" and "development"
because
that IS the only way for them to
express
their concern at this stage.
It is a
holding action, yes; but in reality
it is
a demand for new goals and
new directions.^
.

.

Directions and goals are at stake,

not,

as some might imply,

the existence of the economic, productive
side of life:
"the issue of growth vs. no-growth is a sterile
debate
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that distracts attention
from the more
luuj (_ importantimportant concerns
of 'what kind of growth?'"^'

The focus of tho controversy,
the object of so
much ridicule and
"a do£pn=;o
<ictense, is„ economic
growth as defined
and sought in the United
States.
Being the „K,st prosperous nation on tho earth,
we exemplify both the
promises
and fears of growth.
wTin.
in truth,
i-m^-h
^
J
our reputation does not
fully accord with the facts,
at least as to recent
history,
other nations, notably .apan
ar>d the Soviet Union,
come closer to the paradigm
case than we do.
many
respects they are more willing
than the United States
to sacrifice their mineral,
ecological, and human
;

m

m

resources in order to promote
industrial development.
However, our reputation is
deserved enough.
When critics
decry growth they are nob denying
the desirability
•

of

growth in social amenities (e.g.,
feeling of community,
social justice, excellent health
care); they are not
ignoring the broad range of economic
arrangements which
allow for material prosperity at
various levels of environmental impact.
Limits-to-growth proponents see the

American model as synonymous with the dominant
productive
mode of industrial society.
It is growth in
this sense,

in perhaps the only sense we have come
to understand,

that requires limitations.

Likewise, defenders of growth

are implicitly using that same model, or
else they would
be demanding the institutional and ideological
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transforations long advocated
by the other side.

Crowth
has proceeded in this
country as a result of a
co.b.natron of factors and forces
which for all intents and
purposes prevent any major
reversals of form.
So it is
quite realistrc to initially
define growth in terms of
the American example,
knowing that alternative
definitions
do exist but that their
present economic, political,
social, and ideological
viability is highly questionable.
Within the confines of our
political economy, the separate ideas of limit_s to growth
and a radically dif_ferent

dMil^ition Of growth are equivalent.

Economic growth as

exemplified by United States
industrial expansion will
be the focus of study for ttese
chapters, the lens through
which we can evaluate the many
facets of the limits-togrowth hypothesis."'"^

Central Them es of Cliapters IV and V

Three major factors weave through the
following
analysis.

Together they constitute the primary themes

of the controversy.

The first stresses the impact of

technolog y on the strength and direction of economic
growth.

Besides examining the promised potential of

technology,

broadly defines to include economic and

political-managerial skills
its successful application,

,

I

discuss limitations on

including the conceptual

168

biases-the tech„o,.„gical

.3 oppo«c., to the
ecological

Porspective-which reduce the full
utLM.ation of technology in ..olvin, the
Uilem.as

su,:.„„,ku,k, cjrowth.

The second overarchi,,,
element, the EolU_ical
variable,
also has been broadly defined.
It encompasses the attitudes and activities of a
multitude of .roups, institutions,
individuals, and nations in
the exercise of political,
economic, or social power.
"i-x
Poliiir-- can bo viewed
ioi.itj.cs
as botli
a resource and an obstacle.
Thus, we can note the pos_sible contribut.i.on of public
policy toward maintaining
current growth rates, and also
the p robable impact it may
have given the constraints of
ideology, institutional
procedures, power relationships, and
the various circumstances surrounding the policy-making
process.
The final
theme, the role of time, provides
the drama to this issue.
If we afford ourselves the luxury
of endless deliberation,
we will have discovered that events
have overtaken us.
1

1

.

The quickening pace of change--geome trie or
exponential

growth— allows

us little opportunity to pause.

Time for-

ever threatens to turn problems into crises,
to transform

remediable harm and danger into
disaster.

i

rreversib.1 e damage and

It therefore creates extreme pressure on our

technological, politicaJ. and psychological capacity to
cope with new and ha^^ardous circumstances.

Tlic

working

out of these three themes in our society will help create

.
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the context for political
Dolif-lo-,i change.
The direction we take
as a nation in confrontinq
the thr^^fc.
T:ne
threats ,to growth will by
and large be the consequence
4ucncc or
of th^
the intermeshmg of these

elements

Natur al Resources

The most easily conceptualized
element of the
limits to growth argument is
the depletion of natural
resources, especially those
resources involved in energy
production.
The 1970's have made us aware
of the increasing use (and waste) of
nonrenewable raw materials.
Even
hard-nosed progrowth economists
admit that there inevitably
are limits to resources in our
finite world.
Yet, that
truism skirts the important questions
of what those limits
are at a given time with a given
technology and within a
given political context.
The issue is basic, for natural

resources are the food our economy needs
to sustain our
life style.
This is no more true than in our appetite
for
energy.
The signs of our affluence, the consumerist
dreams of our future, are somehow plugged
into our energyintensive econom.y— clothes dryers, color televisions,
second
and third cars, and the single-family dwelling.
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An nbundance of
energy has bornmo

synonymous with

a

hi^^

sUltrTlf

inaced, a correlation
gross national product between the
and total u S
energy consumption is
often ci^ed as'
econon,if g^^^th
arpenSr'on"'
^'^^'^'^'^ supplies of
energy?7

The correlation has
remained strong because,
until recently, energy costs have
risen more slowly than
labor costs,
thereby encouraging technological
developments which
substitute „,achines for workers.
However, in gearing our
economic growth to energy
production and resource consumption, we have become more
vulnerable as a nation to one
of the physical constraints
of our environment,
the finite

supply of raw materials.
Recent events underscore our
vulnerability.

Cut-

backs, dislocations and general
hardship followed the
1973 Arab oi] boycott.
The absence of self-sufficiency
in this vital area of our economy
had a debilitating

social impact on our national confidence
as well as marked
the start of a seemingly long-term drag
on growth.
Higher
prices for the necessary imports of oil and
natural gas
and the resulting huge trade deficits
reconfirmed what one

observer had pointed out

a

year before the boycott:

Energy 'Joyride' Is Over."^

provided by the harsh winter

"The

Additional verification was
of 1977.

Natural gas cutbacks

and massive worker layoffs revealed that imbalances in
our
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distribution system can lead
] ead
to ^-u^
the same harmful consequences as actual resource
shortages.
Our energy economy
operates without a large
energy cushion, and thus
we are

quite unable to deal with
temporary unexpected events.
Our dependence on foreign
suppliers for natural
gas and low-sulphur oil
(the most environmentally
sound
fossil fuels) as well as for
many other crucial raw
materials is a primary source of
such unexpected events.

Economic growth requires security
of supplies and of prices.
However, the vagaries of
international relations, potential
cartelization and price increases
on specific resources,
and the political weakness or
unfriendliness of the governments of raw material supplying
nations work against
needed economic stability.
Such artificially-induced
shortages can also be attributed to
the market power of
multinational corporations over the
availability of raw
materials, especially fuel.

In either case we will suffer

from the uncertainties of resource
supplies.

Assuming the

adequacy of global reserves, we still must
address ourselves
to the separate issue of domestic sufficiency.

Technological and Economic Responses
The general fears of resource depletion discussed

above have not dampened the optimism of many analysts.

Scientists of assorted disciplines, but most notably

^
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economists, .eadily see
solutions wh.ch would
avert and
postpone, until the
indefinite future, li.its
to growth
based upon thrs problem.
indeed, the mechanisms
to
initiate these solutions
are for the
une most part
n.r-^ automatic.
.
They are (l) the desires
-t-o ror
for pi
tn-nf-i^
,i
of It which
inevitably encourage certain economic
actions and
-^nri
discourage others, and
(2) the cues supplied by
the price system which
change the
direction of profit-seeking
activity.
Scarcity
•

i

in the

face of increasing demand
can best be handled by
raising
the cost of the item, thereby
distributing it to those
who desire it sufficiently
to pay the higher price.
More
importantly, other actions are
then promoted which would
help alleviate the problem
further.
In the real world, rising
prices act as
an economic signal to conserve
scarce
resources, providing incentives
to use
cheaper m.aterials in their place,
stimulating research efforts on new ways
to
save on resource inputs and making
renewed exploration attempts more
profitable.

Thus,

the flow chart of economic adaptation
to resource

scarcity is quite simple.

Price increases prompt develop-

ment of technological mechanisms to
reduce costs.

Techno-

logical feasibility plus economic profitability
of new

scarcity-avoiding processes will result in either
increased
supply or reduced demand for the resource.
Inevitable
technological advance, private market incentives,
and the

allocative function of the price system insure that
the

173

impact of resource scarcity
^J-t-y wd
ho temporary
wiii be
adjustment
and long-term sufficxency.
The followrng optxmrstic
1

1

+-

projection is the consequence
of the above analysis:
^''^^

millennia to
come we
Tn"'-^^^''^
can continue to develop
the
mineral supplies needed
to maintain
a high standard of
living for those
who now en,oy it and to
raise it ?or
the impoverished peoples
of our country and world. ...
Our experience
justifies the belief that
these pro^^^"^^^^ expansionrhav^
dL'.en^^/"'
dimensions beyond our knowledge
and
even beyond our imagination
aranv
^
given time. 10
'-''^

Yet,

in light of the
well-publicized concern expressed
by
i^any over the threat of
resource depletion, such an
opti-

mistic forecast and the economic
analysis which supports
it ought to be seriously
examined.
Specifically, what is
the effectiveness of the
scarcity-alleviating activities
which are encouraged by higher
resource costs?

Conservation is the most immediate
response to
higher prices.
it implies not only doing with
less of
the metal, fuel, etc., but also making
less do the work of
more.
We are all too familiar with the
calls for energy
conservation directed towards consumers:
home thermostats
set at 60-65°, gas-efficient automobiles,

unnecessary lights.
equally important.

turning off

Industrial conservation efforts are
The usable-energy-to-waste-heat ratio

of most electric generating pov^er plants is
40:60.

For

174

the average auto.nobilo
the ratio is 10:90.
such inefficiencies are indicative
of the waste existing
in our
economy and the opportunity
for effective conservatron
efforts.
Stretching the usefulness
of natural resources
is common P
practjcp
cLicc.
Tooo tm is
Less
needed in
+.

^

the tin plat.ing

process; equal levels of
structural support are
achieved
with less steeK
There probably ...s enough
flexibility in
living patterns and productive
processes to reap sizable
cutbacks in the use of scarce
raw materials without
significant reductions in living
standards.

There is some doubt regarding
the extent to which
short-term, voluntary and
individual conservation steps,
taken in response to the
continual pressure of high energy
prices, can lead to more basic
changes in living patterns
and consumer demands.
Can there be a transformation
to

an environmentally sound life
style without recourse to

collective-that

is,

political-actions?

According to

a

recent study, Sweden uses 60 per
cent less energy than the
United States in producing one dollar's
worth of GNP.

Standards of living are comparable,
but conscientious use
of public policy (subsidies, taxes)
has brought about
a

different, more energy-efficient mixture of
goods and

services in Sweden.

Americans have more appliances, cars

and television sets, and eat more red meat—
all indices of
a

very energy-i ntensj vo economy.

Swedes, on the other hand.

,
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have .ore second ho.es,
better public transportat
:ion
health and education
systems, and .ore efficrent
energy
otilrzation rates for
productive processes and
consumer
durables (e.g., resource
extraction and refinement processes, the paper industry,
electric power generators,
gas mileage of cars, ho.e
insulatron).
The authors of
the study confirm the point
made rn the preceding paragraph:
"The most important variable
affecting energy use
and energy efficiency is
the relative price of energy
with respect to other resources ."

'

•

However,

the study also emphasized
"the institution-

al and social factors"
which direct the economic and

technological response to higher
energy costs.
Higher
prices alone will lead to individual
conservation (or, xf
you will, increases in individual
energy efficiency), but
only collective action can promote
the life style changes
and conservation-conscious culture
which would maintain
living standards in the face of
increased resource scarcity.

In order to encourage the most
economical use of

energy in the society as

a

whole, we must recognize the

political along with the technological elements
of conservation.
But our economy and our ideology are geared
to
high levels of resource consumption.

Imparting

a

conser-

vationist mentality onto our "cowboy economy" will be
deeply
resisted as President Jimmy Carter has discovered.

The
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conservationalist aspects of
his energy proposals
have
received the roughest
treatment.

Thus,

we are limited in
the technological adjustments
to scarcity which we
can
expect given the social
sociril and
-.nri
economic constraints on
political change.

conservation is only one of
three types of activities
encouraged by higher resource
prices.
Another is the quest
for additional sources of
the scarce
material.

This takes
three forms-exploiting known
but previously uneconomical
ore deposits, searching for
new reserves, and recycling
the resource by reprocessing
it from various waste products.
Economists make much of the effect
of price increases

on
the application and effectiveness
of each of these approaches
Low grade ore would be an economically
viable reserve if

price rise covered increased extraction
and processing
costs.
Likewise, even though more sophisticated
equipment
a

is being used to search for new
ore deposits, with propor-

tionately less success (more exploratory
wells drilled for
each productive find), demand and price
trends still make
these efforts fruitful.

Research has been directed toward

better discovery methods, improved mining and
metallurgical
processes and, in general, increased cost-effectiveness
of resource production.

flis

tor ical ly in our country

resource depletion has not been an inhibition on economic
growth.

"Techniques for exploration for and extraction of
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.etals see. to have Kept
ahead of scarcity.
'^^^he promises
Of future advances
cannot easily be discounted
given the
degree of past successes.
Yet, however .uch the
economists
and technicians underscore
their achievements, it
would
do well to restate a
.a,or truism of the
limits-to-growth
thesis:
mile price increases and new
technology can
transform unavailable (offshore
oil) and unprofitable
(low yield deposits) mineral
concentrations into useful
reserves, they cannot increase
the deposits themselves.
TO those interested more in
maintaining the world's
stock of resources rather than
in promoting a growth flow
of goods and services, the
natural response to resource
depletion would be recycling. The
fact is that, excepting
for fossil fuels which are
burnt, most raw materials are
not used up or destroyed.
Rather, they are transformed
into a new form and transported to
a new place.
The
economics of recycling concerns the effort
we wish to
expend to reconcentra te the resource.
Many industrial users
of raw materials are attracted by the
savings recycling
offers.

An especially significant incentive is
the increase

in profit to be achieved by reducing energy
costs;

it

takes 40 times more energy to process one pound
of aluminum

from buried ore than from recycled material.

Again,

economic feasibility is the necessary signal for an expansion of the recycling industry.

Tlie

usefulness of the
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-rap

iron ana steel ,atheri„,
...t .„ the nation's ,un.
yards is another case
in point.
Xn the event of

scareUy-

rnduoed price increases
of foreign and domestic
ores
recycling offers a readily
available alternative supply
Of needed iron and steel.
The eKa.ple of viewing
junk
yards as potential reserves
of raw materials highUghts
an ironic element of the n^7o•r:3^^
Lne overall environmental
problem.
Pollution can sometimes be
defined as "a resource out
of
place.
For instance, commercial
and residential wastes
can be reprocessed to help
generate electricity, produce
synthetic gas, provide fertilizer
for agriculture, and/or
become a source of metals,
glass, paper pulp, etc.
"

As

refuse and sewage treatment
costs rise and the prices
paid for these alternative
uses increase this form of

recycling will become more cormnon.
examples,

Yet,

despite these

recycling has severe limitations on
its ability

to solve the scarcity problem.

Its utility varies from

resource to resource, and it cannot deal
with increasing
demand except in a secondary way.
Most importantly, it
does not d_irectly address itself to our
most pressing concern energy supply.

—

The third means of avoiding resource scarcity
is

through the substitution of
a less

a

more plentiful material for

abundant and therefore more expensive one.

Substi-

tution technology does not merely buy time; it seeks
to
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solve, for t.e ..o.U-te..
,utur.
Of depletion ana risin,

critxcal resource and
upon grind to a

tl>e

,east, t.e p.o.Xe„

.00.0.,.,, Justifiably

wheels of industry will
there-

lialt:

materials do not 'run out'
for all
out for

maLfn^i

^^'-y

"marginal use,

'^-

and the

precisely the one
^or^wh^ih'^'^
'\^^tisfactory substitute
can be
bp ?o
found as the cosb of
the original material goes up. 14
Plentiful aluminum can replace
copper wxring as copper
becomes too costly.
still further down the
technologxcal
road, even more available
silicates (refined from common
sand) are being tested for
use in electronic circuitry.
The preservation of a given
resource stock
for xts own

sake-that

is,

above and beyond the incentives
for hoarding

provided by the price system-may
be more wasteful than
rational in light of this
technological response to scarcity.

The growth of the petrochemical

industry is in

large part the consequence of
the growing substitution of
oil-based synthetics (fabrics, plastics,
etc.) for goods
based on metals or animal and plant
products.
Other such

developments can reasonably be expected
to continue.
should not quickly dismiss these
anticipated

We

fruits of

technology,

for to do so ignores historical precedent
and

overlooks our most precious and unlimited raw
material—
liuman ingenuity.
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Resources don't exi q+- nm-ni
then.
What':.rca 'rf 41ou"cl"'
.

.

.

learns Lo extract and
to use
needlessly
aboit'
usTno^t^"'-''
°"
'^<^-=°">-ces and
robCina the
robbing
?hr?^°'
future.
i think that
if
the future is not capable
of inveniinq
^'
then the human Odyssey
is over. 15

This observation,

from

committed environmentalist,
is
meant to minmuze
expectations of social and
economic
collapse sterling from this
concern.
it is
a

not intended,

however, to deny any and
all economic consequences
of
resource depletion.

T he Specia l__C ase of En
ercfv

A special case-indeed the
most important case-of
substitution technology has to do
with energy.
with
enough of it we can mine the
seas, desalinate water, purify
our effluents-cheaply and
painlessly.
But without enough
energy, we face an enormous
problem of economic and psychological restructuring.
Energy is the lynchpin
of our

life style.

The insecurity of relying on foreign
supplies

forces the United States to look
inward, to find domestic
sources of fossil fuel.
if, as projected, world oil

production will peak around the year 2000,
we will be under
intense pressure to develop alternatives as
quickly as
possible.

Indeed, increases in oil and natural gas prices

are even now having

a

disproportionate influence on

a
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host Of .elatea industrxes-the
so-caUed ripple effect,
in our energy-oriented
economy the prices of so
many
goods and services are tied
to the cost of this
basic
commodity.
Obviously, our present as
well as future
economic well-heina
r-oi-i^r. on
Lemg relies
a resolution to this
most
central of problems.

The factor of time places
our efforts in sharp
relief.
Because of a fast doubling
time in energy use
(e.g., electricity demand
doubles every seven years),
time
delays in formulating and
implementing responses threaten
to make our technologies
obsolete as soon as they are
initiated.
We need to buy time via
conservation, new
sources and more efficient conversion
ratios until we can
develop the energy resources of
the future-fusion and
solar power (in its many forms).
However confident one
may be about our technological
ability to develop these
alternatives (and I personally am quite
confident)
few
,

claim that either energy source can
become

a

major con-

tributing factor for at least 50 to 100
years.

possibility of
very real.

a

Thus,

the

generation or two of great sacrifice is

We all must recognize that the hardships of

the short-term future (the next 50 to 100
years) might be

severe enough to bring on

a

to what is perhaps only

temporary physical condition.

The issues then become

a
(1)

permanent political reaction

the technological and political
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prospects of domestic
substitutes fo. foreign oil
and
.as, and
the
variables that w.Ul
,2)
determine the severity
Of the co„,ing economic
dislocations brought on by
the need
for stop-gap measures.
Three alternatives present
themselves, each one
with serious flaws which
wUl l...it its effectiveness as
an energy source for
the immediate
future.

The first is

our oil Shale reserves in
the mountain states.
A great
deal of research has gone
into creating an economically
feasible method of extracting
the tar-like petroleum
product, but two problems
remain, probably on a permanent
basis.
First, for most probable
extraction methods, producing one barrel of oil requires
the processing of one and
one-half tons of rock and the
use of large quantities of
water.
The localized reclamation costs
of utilizing this
resource, if added onto the investment
capital (as it
would have to be if huge tracts of
land were to become
possible vast wastelands), would make
the price of the
fuel prohibitive unless other
sources became equally
inflated.
The second and related reason is that
local

constituencies from shale-oil states, seeing what
resource
development did to Appalachia, may band together

and resist

environmentally unsound extraction techniques.

At the

very least, resistance would delay commercial
plans, raise

reclamation and side-payment costs, and block the
availability
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of some Shale oil deposits
for political reasons 16
The
second alternative energy
source, sur f ace-nuned coal
reserves found
n,any Western states,
.s prone to exactlv
the same objections as is
the exploitation of shale
oil
deposits.
These objections notwithstanding,
the above

m

•

mentioned resources might very
well be utilized.
Nevertheless, there will be a social
cost that might make the
Whole project unprofitable
to the nation but lucrative
for
the extracting corporation.
This dichotomy between natioi-ial
and corporate
interests is no more appearent than
in the present conflict
over our third temporary energy
resource, nuclear (fission)
power using breeder reactor technology.
By being able
to create its own fuel from
previously unf i ssionable
uranium isotopes, the fast breeder
reactor appears to

solve the resources problem in much
the same mystical way
as alchemists sought to overcome
the gold shortage, and

with the same mesmerizing attractiveness.

It is true that

this method of producing energy is not cost
efficient in

comparison with present generating plants using
fossil
fuels.

This will probably change, however, as technologies

are developed to improve heat-to-energy ratios,
to reduce

down time of nuclear power plants, etc.

objections to "going nuclear" remain:

Yet,

four strong
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threat of sabo?^r

'^"<^l»ding the

Of atomic weapons)?

o°n3truotion

«di^:etiereas::f ofi!:

''^^^--^ °^

generation process.

^"^1

Each of these objections
represents serious, highly
complex
and perhaps unmanageable
risks.
As to probabilities,
even
a supporter of the
breeder reactor is forced
to admit that
•There will, no doubt, be
accidents with radioactive

materials; there may even
be occasional major
accidents,
perhaps even disasters
To fully handle the four
objections listed above (some of
which are beyond our technological and social capacities
presently) would require a
major increase in capxtalization
and operating costs.
If
the nuclear power industry
could buy adequate safety for
its plants, the impact on
energy prices would drastically
reduce the economic viability of
such a power generation
process.
Government support (e.g., taking
responsibility
for waste removal and storage)
would improve the corporate
profitability of the venture by merely
passing on costs
to society as a whole.
Perhaps, as some would say, it all

depends on how much safety the consumer
is willing to
purchase or the taxpayer is willing to
subsidize.
This
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choice ignores the fact
that we will have to pay
for
inadequate safety eventually;
given the dangers posed
by nuclear technology
the cost „ay be .any
times the
benefits achieved if we
mini.i^e or ignore the above
objections.

5^1^_l2litical Variabl.

Our three short-term energy
sources are not truly
adequate to the task. We can
expect some level of hardship over an extended period
of time due to fossil fuel
scarcity and rising energy prices.
And whatever the hope
of the future, the development
of fusion and solar power
are too distant to diminish
the psychological and political impact of long-term economic
dislocations. This is
not to claim that the limit to
growth position is accurate
I have discussed only
in passing the political dimension
to the problem of resource scarcity.
I want to conclude
this section by reviewing the political
variable, its

ability to soften or accentuate the anticipated
dislocations,

to direct technology down certain paths
while

foreclosing the pursuit of other options, and to
lengthen
or shorten the lead time for the development
of a safe,

clean, and economical energy source.

Economists and other technicians generally believe
that the adjustments the economy will be forced to make
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can occur gradually,
allowin, us adequate ti.e
to evaluate our present policies
and plan for the future.
The
price systen, is the .ost
effective „,echa„rs„, for
preventing collapse.
Resource scarcity, as
reflected in higher
prices, encourages attitudes
and behavior patterns
(discussed in this section,
which insure the next
generation of its share of raw
materials.
this

m

v.-ay

the clain,

of the future can be
weighed against the demands
of the
present.
However, the price mechanism
is at best an
imperfect defender of the
future's interests.
We have a
highly self-centered time
orientation, a now" mentality,
which seriously overemphasizes
current consumption and
production.
Our private desire for the
good life, whether
we can afford it or not,
prompts us to downplay the consequences of actions as they will
affect us five
to ten

years hence.

Therefore, we really should not be
expected

to sacrifice consumption dreams

for generations yet unborn.

The corporate sector is no less
guilty of chronological
myopia.
It may be economically wise to
exploit a resource
for immediate and certain profits
and then to reinvest
those profits in other ventures.
Appalachian coal is a
tragic case in point.

The clash between private and public

interests is not fully rectified by the price system.
In addition, the sensitivity and elasticity
of prices is open

to question.

Can prices respond soon enough, or is there

187

an inevitable and
costly ti.e lag which
leads to

spasmotic dislocations
rather than gradual adjustn^ntsP
unaided, the price syste.
.ay faulter in perto)rniing the prophylactic
function growth's advocates
envision
for it.
Observers such as economist
Henry c. Wallich have
proposed a set of public
policies which will "strengthen
the price system for its
job of conserving resources.
It would contribute to
internalizing the resource-depletion
cost Of growth.
governmental programs can
be designed to promote
recycling, tax wasteful
technologies, protect selected ore
deposits against present use,
or in other ways counteract
the effects of our tendency
to stress present demands
above probable future
needs.

Prudent politicians and
administrators, after weighing
the costs and benefits of
these suggestions, might very
well initiate policies along
these lines.
Yet, prudence
is not the forte of our
crisis-prone policy-making

process.

We have promoted the discovery
of new sources at the

expense of other options-recycling,
conservation, etc.
We are now even more dependent on
fossil fuels, more unable
to ease into a non-energy-intensive
mode of living.
As

this section has attempted to demonstrate,
price increases

will encourage various social and
technological responses
to resource scarcity, but this says

Uttlo about

the

degree of scarcity, the size of the price increase,
and
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the .a.nituae of the
saerlaces that alX those
responses
entail. v,e shoola not
assume that poUt.cs
„ni suceeea
the pains of adjustment,
especially ,iven
the faot that publxc
policy, attuned to a
gtowth economy,
had helped to shape
the current dilemma.

" -^-"9

In fact,

politics,

through its selection of
alter-

native policy approaches,
will most probably
allocate
rather than reduce these
adjustment pains.
Political
solutions to resource scarcity
may demand une^u^ sacrifices, reflecting the
unequal distribution of
political
power.
For example, governmental
efforts to raise raw

material prices directly,
in hopes of encouraging
societywide conservation, continues
apparently voluntarrstic

decisions regarding consumption
patterns.
The ideals of
consumer sovereignty and managerial
prerogative (as to
investment and product design) are
preserved.

Yet,

this

legally noncoercive approach
ignores the coerciveness of
the marketplace; the cost of fuel
for heating forces some
families to endure home temperatures
of 50-55 degrees
while more affluent individuals have
little economic impetus
to change their energy usage
habits.
Pricing policies are
inherently unfair because they require
the lower classes
to sacrifice more than the wealthy
(in terms of marginal
utility)

in order for the nation to conserve
resources.

An alternative tack might seek to prohibit
certain typos

.
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of goods and services
rather than Merely .ake
such purchases more costly.
^on, the vast array of electronic
gadgetry we can find so.e
ite„,s that are clearly
wasteful
even though such waste is
affordable by a segment of the
population.
TO ban these and srn.ilar
goods and services
would address the notion
of cffrcient resource
utilization in a more direct way.
But more importantly
it

limits the privileges of wealth
and thus allocates social
sacrifice in a different way.
its balance between
different policy alternatives, the
political system will
determine which groups bear the
brunt of the negative
economic consequences we can expect
from resource scarcity
problems

m

Another possible role for government
is to promote
investment in resource-related ventures.
The economy
is being encouraged to do three
things in response to
scarcity:
conserve, increase sources and develop
substitutes.

These efforts are contradictory in the
sense

that success in one area

(substitution for instance) will

have a negative impact on the economic
viability of the

others (recycling, new discovery techniques,
conservation).
It is evident that a corporation will be
very hesitant

to make a large financial commitment in a
promising tech-

nology if the possibility exists that parallel developments elsewhere will prevent it from turning

a

profit.
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in order to maintain
a broad attack on
the scarcity
problen, the federal
government will be required
to guarantee investment and
create a climate of security
withrn

Which corporations may
pursue their research and
develo.n-ent free from financial
risk,
without this governmental
help (and assuming that
the government does not
shoulder
the task itself) the lead
time for technological
developments will be greatly
lengthened, and consequently
the
dislocations which we endure will
be longer and more
severe.
The need for financial support
is most clear in
the technology surrounding
fusion power.
The government
is forced to support almost
all the research in this area
because its vast expense makes
investment prohibitive
for the private economic
sector.

help we would have little hope for

Obviously, without such
a

long-term energy

source.

Our final political variable
is the most difficult
one to anticipate.

What are the international implications

of resource scarcity, especially as
it applies to our

economic prospects?

What factors are relevant to our

global economic position vis-a-vis the energy
crisis?

In

terms of our economic strength compared to
other capitalist

industrialized nations

v;e

would be in

a

far better posi-

tion to withstand the pressures of the energy
crunch.

have alternative domestic energy sources while other

We
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nations are

™„re dependont upon
foreign supplies.
This is true not only
with respect to Eossrl
fuels but
cnlso concerning basic
raw materials generally.
Yet,

„,uch

xn three respects we
would be hurt by a general

tightening of the resource
.arket.

Pirst

while domestic
substitutes can be found,
foreign reserves are presently
cheaper and purer. To extract
and refine our own would
entail increased energy
,

use and increased social
cost,

m

effect, we have exported the
social costs of resource
acquisition.
There would be intense political
battles
and price inflation resulting
fro.n being forced to
become
more self-sufficient.
The second and related point
concerns our own special dependence
on a resource-intensive
econoin.ic

system:

The American economy, b,y virtue of
its havinq become accustomod to
more
spend l.hri ft ways than .uiy ot-lior
country
the world, may \yv. in for a more
extensive and uncom f or ta h o revision
of its life stylo than those whose
per
capita consumption of oil and minerals
has been more modest.

m

1

We will suffer less than others in
absolute terms, but the
economic hardsiiips we do experience may be
more severe

relative to past level of adequacy or expectations
of
future affluence.

Finally, we should consider the inter-

dependence of the developed world's financial structure.
National economic catastrophe cannot be easily localized
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w.thin natxonal boundaries
s.nce the .nter.elationship
ar^on, the Western
economies has „,ade every
natron „,ore
vulnerable.
The bankruptcy of Italy,
the weakest Western
economy ,not altogether
unUkely If oil prices continue
their Clin*), would expose
the internatronal monetary
syste. to severe financial
strarns.
Political responses
to these concerns
could take many different
forms.
"

Per-

haps the most dramatic
scenario is resource
imperialisminsuring the availability
of adequate and
economical
supplies of resources via
military means.
Even without
so extreme an eventuality,
it is still true
that the

actions of other nations and
our foreign policy reaction
to the evolving international
situation will be influential factors on the
limits-to-growth issue.
On balance, what does the
factor of resource
scarcity contribute to the
debate? To what extent does
it validate the limits-to-growth
position? It goes without saying that the unknowns
in our analysis (especially

regarding the crucial factors of
technology, time and
politics) allow for various possible
projections, but
believe that some cut-back in our
growth rate, some

I

economic belt-tightening, is the most
plausible conclusion
that can be reached.
Economists hope that price increases
on raw materials can avoid this outcome
but
they are

ignoring an economic truism:

"in the absence of other

•
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events,

a rise .n the

prices of depleting
resources acts
to reduce living
standards throuc,,, a
rise in the cost
Of Xivin,...^0 „^
^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
<3-posable incce, or
inflationary deficit spending
s.nce
federal .oney will have
to be funncled to
methods of
alleviatrnc the drslocations
of scarcity (e.g.,
subsidies
for investment rn
research on substitute
energy sources,.
Finally, investment funds
will be increasingly
devoted
not to consumer-oriented
enterprises but to goals and
services related to our
resource problems-more money
for reclamation of the
land, for discovery,
extraction
and refinen.ent technology
research, for recapitalization
to transform the United
States into a less
energy-intensive
-society, and for energy
as a more expensive factor
in
the productive process.
It is also reasonable to
assume,
based on past precedent, that
government action will
Intensify the negative impacts
of resource scarcity for
n,any people in the United
states, if not for the nation
as a whole.
We are facing choices regarding
the nature
and depth of the adjustments that
we must make.
Perhaps
most significantly, we also are
facing a gnawing insecurity
about our future and our ability to
cope with it.
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Environmental
gig^^^g the Ar gumpn_f

Sharing the headlines
with the energy crisis
is the
increase in poliution.
The expansion of the
industrial
sector Of our economy is
the source of „,any
contaminants
Of the air, water and
food.
Admittedly, the connection
between growth and pollution
is not so unicausal•an

undeveloped society can suffer
from water-borne di,sea
ses
and an affluent society
can direct its growth
toward
improving the quality of its
environment.
However,

the

connection between level of
industrialization and environmental deterioration has some
historical credence, giving

Plausibility to the warnings of
dangers ahead if current
t£ends_ continue.
Extrapolation of trends
which forecast

environmental disaster place the burden
of proof upon
those who seek to deny the causal
relationship between
growth and pollution.
Yet not so long ago pollution was
an excellent

example of a non-issue, and not without
good reason.
The
environment has a natural capacity to
cleanse and regenerate itself, to break down wastes and
dissipate them harmlessly,

to incorporate man's activities into
an ongoing

ecological balance.

The air and water are renewable

resources (as is the soil with a longer time cycle)
and can
theoretically be used without ever being used up.
Cybernetic
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self-regulatory

mechanisms .i„l„,ize the
effect of our
intrusions onto the
environment by encouraging
corrective
responses.
"The system
^em IS
js stabilized
-i-;.hni.by its dynamic
self-compensating Pprot^ertiPQ
operties. "21 mv
This comforting analysis
not totally true
however-not for all types
of pollutants nor for all levels
of pollution nor
-Y

,

.

•

-

for all areas

Of the nation and world.

Our reliance on the
regenerative
capacity of the environment
can lead to overreliance
for
the cybernetic mechanisms
are not infinitely
effective:
"In general, sel f
-maintaining systems are
self-adjusting
only within limits.
Once outside these limits,
pathological possibilities exist "^^
Effluents
high concenLrations or of a type that
cannot be safely absorbed
by the
environment threaten to bring
us to these limits all
too
quickly.
we will be forced to endure
an obvious deterioration in the quality of our
lives and/or be forced to
,

.

m

tolerate reduced growth rates
in order to reverse the
worsening pollution situation.
The most serious pathological
possibility concerns
hazards to our health. A proponent
of economic growth
arrived at the following analysis of
the health effects
of air quality.
A comparison of the death rates in
American cities in 19G0 has shown that
with a 10 percent decrease in pollution
and jujrticles in the air we reduce the
death rate as a whole by more than one
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half of a pGi-cont.

Decreasina m.^

rea^^-,
five years,

ta""'

three and

^et, while this sounds
quite o.inous i„ itself,

environmentalists sense

„,any

even broader health dangers.

A„

overconcern with immediate
economic rewards at the
expense
Of ecological values
win lead to behavior which
reduces
the carrying capacity of
an area by for instance
ruining
the fertility of the soil
or destroying the available
freshwater sources.
Different forms of pollution
pose
different threats, some of them
easily remediable and some
of them not nearly so.
In the absence of action
to reverse
pollution trends, the situation
win worsen (very quickly
with respect to certain areas
and certain types of contaminants)
Our desire for basic environmental
amenities
will eventually force us to
come to grips with pollution
in more effective and perhaps
in more growth-inhibiting
ways than we previously have. That
awareness may come in
.

response to visions of imminent ecological
catastrophe or
as part of a gradually evolving
choice between the quality
of our environment and the quantity
of our material possessions.
People who support limits to growth see
the choice
clearly enough given present levels of
pollution.
What
they fear is that tlie longer we postpone the
decision to

: .
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lx.it growth an. the
longer „e choo.e to
pollute, the
-re aa„a,e will .e acne to
the earth, s oarry.ng
capacU.
an. the steeper will
,e the price we .ust
pay to avo.a an
ecological catastrophe and
to reconstruct the
ecological
balance

The Counteraranmpn^

Economists, as we .ight
expect, deny the connectxon
between growth and pollution
uxun.
Rathor they view pollution
Kather,
as an inevitable
consequence of an imperfection
in the
price system which allows
an individual or company
to treat
the environment as a free
good or service, passing

the
real cost of environmental
deterioration onto the rest of

society
There are not enough clearly
defined
property rights in the environment
[people] cannot easily extract
a payment from anybody
who wants to
use [an environmental resource]
up by
polluting it.
Hence the costs of pollution are not usually borne by
those
that are responsible for the
pollution
and are borne, instead, by the
•

•

.

;

victims.

The marl^et mechanism has not been
adjusted to charge for
the loss of air and water quality.
In the past, because
these resources were renewable and man's
influence on the

available supply was infinitesimal, we
could treat them as
virtually unlimited.
However, current users of water
(e.g.,

industrial polluters)

severely restrict the ability

.
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Of others to use it
acco.din, to their own
needs <swi™.n.ng downstream of
the factory,.
while still renewable
xt is now limited xn
any one place at any
one point .n
time
The solution is simple:

resource by taxinq
ly pollntinn ^5
POi.iut.ion.

place
^,

a

price on the

,

This approach or others

like it would help lower
effluents in two ways.
First,
this tax will encourage
the development and
application
of pollution-reducing
productive processes. Technology,
spurred on by economic incentive,
would be put to work
finding ways of reducing
contaminants in order to reduce
the tax costs.
Second, in the event that
technological

innovations were not forthcoming
or proved to be too costly,
the pollution tax would be
paid and passed on to the consumer via higher prices. Thus,
effluents ^uld decrease as a
result of lessened consumer demand:
The consequences would be that
the
price of their [the polluters'] products v/ould have to be increased,
less
of them would be consumed at those
high prices, and the aggregate extent
of operation of these industries
would
be contracted, leading to some diminution of pollution by that route. 26

An added consequence is that charging for
the use of an

environmental resource highlights the inevitable
trade-off
that occurs between growth and pollution.

It is probably

true that in every industrialized society some
price

(in
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te™s Of environmental

damage, ,„.3t bo pa.,
to „a.ntain
^ .iven stne o. U.e.
..,e„ise, to purchase a
h.gher
level of air ,.alrty
entails sacrifices
elsewhere.
Put
this liyht. the extreme
demands oE some ecologists
would necessitate a
degree of sacrifice
which many of us
are presently not
wilUng to undergo, "our
objective is
not pure air or water
but rather some optx^al
state of
pollution
that will yield the
maximum possible
amount of human satisfaction.""
„e cannot ignore the
notion Of marginal utility
however much we desire a
totally
clean environment.
It would be foolish
to treat auto
emissions so that they are
purer than the atmosphere
they
enter.
But „h:, le the case for
optimal pollution levels
is indisputable on its
face, it ignores the basic
question:
What costs and risks are
we presently incurring
(or can anticipate in
the future given current
trends) as
a result of effluents
in our air, water and food?
without
evidence on this score we can
hardly be expected to take
.

.

.

'

collective positions regarding
adequate levels of pollution and tolerable reductions
in growth rates.
If the issue is making a
clear choice as to growth
vs.

pollution trade-offs, the nature of
the problem
becomes evaluating the pollution threat.
This is difficult to do because of the complexities
associated with
monitoring the effects of contaminants. The
search for
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appropriate standards is
perhaps U,e
for technology in the
pollution

„,ajor initial

tield.

d-Xing With suspected
t.c

tas.

..^he proble,,.

in

or real poison rs
to frnd a reaUs-

.no effect,

level below whrch
nothing happens, and a
frank effect, level above
which poisoning takes
place "^^
Between is the range of
insidious da.age, the
long-tern,

harm resulting

fro„,

chronic but low exposure.

Much of
the argument and confusion
surrounding the pollution
issue
centers on delineating and
examining this intermediary
range.
As we might expect,
disagreement abounds as to
the environment-health
relationship. ^9 This being the
case, the risks of further
pollution remain unclear,

consequently, decisions about
the growth-pollution tradeoff will follow historic
inclinations and power pressures

rather than vague and disputed
evidence.
here, as with resources,

Our tendency

is to emphasize present consump-

tion while minimizing future
dangers.

We have become

tolerant of pollution, unmindful of
its hidden costs.
But
just because our consciousness has
become desensitized
to the dangerous effluents around
us, it does not mean
that our bodies have also become
desensitized.
.'The widespread belief that we canadai>t or g^t used
to anything

constitutes one of the main difficulties in
evaluating the
impact of pollution
and in studying the mechanisms
of its effects."'" By systematically downplaying
.

.

.

the
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costs Of pouution,
,y favor.n, the growth
side of the
trade-off. „e a.e paving
the way for a .ore
drastic
reversal of economic
growth rates once the
actual nature
of the ecological
problem becomes
known.

Yet,

in many areas we
have overestimated the

dangers posed by pollution
y pollution.

Too much stock has been

Placed in the extreme charges
of some environmentalists,
and this has prevented
an adequate assessment
of the
costs of pollution. Many
scientists back up the
economists, notion of optimal
pollution levels by noting
that not every human
intrusion onto natural
processes
is somehow harmful to
the system, dangerous to
our health,
and destined to get worse.
In analyzing the strength
of
the case, we must attempt
to sift out those problems
which
are so gradual in developing
and/or so easy to reverse
that they primarily serve to
underscore the seriousness
of more basic environmental
threats.
have mentioned the issue of waste
disposal
previously, citing it as a potential
resource which, with
proper economic incentives, would
become an asset rather
than a hazardous liability.
Thermal pollution can be
viewed similarly.
Shellfish production has increased in
estuaries warmed by industrial waste
water (sanitized so
as not to include chemical, metallic
or radioactive
I
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substances,.

TMs

is not to sa,

u.t

such uses

inevitable ,or all places
a„U un.er ai: conditions,
or
that these poilutnnts
will not
not- cause
r^-.u«o .localized
,

no controls are imposed;
however
nov;ever,
,

daniaqe

U- seems
.
it
probabJ e that

the normal operation o,
the economic systc,
the uti.T..atio„ of «o,„e
wastes.

recycling.

i.f

win

o„c„„r„

This is the io.ic behi nd

We would bo confronted
with

a „,uch larger
garbage disposal proble,™ i£
economic, did not dictate
that some by-product,s
(woodchips fro„, lu.ber mills,
and
son,e discarded materials
(the lead in car batteries,
should be viewed as resources
rather

than wastes.

Other assumed dangers can
be discounted even more
certainly, at least for now.
Take Ihe relationship between worldwide economic activity,
especially the burn,n,
of fossil fuels, and temperature
changes.
First, the

evidence is mixed, with some
scientists predicting warming trends, others anticipating
cooling effects.
Second,
unlike the life-threatening dangers
of chemical poisoning,
the temperature changes (and their
consequent impact on
the human environment) will be gradual,
easy to monitor,
and in the realm of a growing
inconvenience."''^
Indeed,

given the normal cyclical temperature
patterns that have
existed for thousands of years, man's impact
will remain
small and perhaps even beneficial.

situation may be,

a

Whatever the actual

deep concern with

case of misspent energy.

tliis

"problem" is

a
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A.-ther area of overconcern
.s
catching topics as
eutrophicat.on

wUh

such headline

of water, oil

and traditional

for„,s

of urban air pollution.

true that local
situations

,„ay

spiUs
it is

require extreme poUcies

preventing damage to fresh
water supplies.
But it
is equally true that
we have often overreacted.
Phosphate
detergents have absolutely
no impact on the oxygen
deficiency of salt water,
nitrogen levels being the
controlling factor.
opposition to the principle
of ocean
dumping of .sanitr.ed municipal
wastes is also based on
ignorance of some environmental
facts of life.
"Properly
used, the ocean offers
man a practically unlimited
resource for waste assimilation
at a reasonable cost.
Even more to the point is
the response we have to oil
spills,

leaks, etc.

Our interest i„ preserving
fish,

birds,

plants and coastal beauty is
perfectly justified,
but we should not inflate
the actual impact of accidents
like the Torrey Canyon oil
tanker breaking up off England
in 1967.
Four years later no trace (visual
or environmental) of the accident could be
discovered.
Indeed,

bacteria help
nutrients.
stations)

decompose most typos of oil into plant

Easily pursued remedies (off-shore pumping

not

only minimize the threat to the coastal

ecosystem posed by oil spills; they

can also be a

positive

benefit to the economy (utilizing larger and
more cost-

.
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efficient tankers, reducina
educing the need for
.
elaborate dock
facilities, etc.
.

)

What has been ignored
\ar^n^'r^A by
u
environmental extremists
IS the regenerative
capacity of the environment.
Its

ability to recycle
renewable resources,
to break down
some pollutants into
harmless substances and
to disperse
others to harmless
concentration levels.
.o doubt this
capacity can be overstated.
the past, high concentrations of certain pollutants
(carbon monoxide, sulphur
dioxide, particulants.and
some air-borne metals
such as
lead) alone, with climatic
conditions which worsened
the
situation by prolonging
these high concentrations
(e.g.,
temperature inversion) were
more than the self-purging
mechanisms of the atmosphere
could handle.

m

However,

reversing this trend has not
been difficult, let alone
traumatic.
Air quality in most American
cities has
noticeably improved with respect
to combustion-related
pollutants, probably because of
the use of low polluting
fuels and the addition of
antipollution devices.
other

improvements can be obtained by
situating polluting industries in comparatively clean
locations, thereby allowing
the national cleansing power of
the ecosystem to have
maximum effect. All in all, puj.lic
policies encouraging

anti-pollution technology, pursued through
profit-seeking
n,ar)cet

activity and

ul

ijizing the regenerative capacity

.

Of the environment
promise to achieve levels
of optimal
pollution for many effluents.
„„„ever. the real menace
to our health an. to
eoonomie c.rowth is more
insidious
than the above examples,
as the following
section demonstrates

Three Cases
have chosen to discuss
three distinct pollution
problems, not because they
constitute the only real
threats
to our health and well-beiny,
but because they are the
.-St illustrative of the nature
of environmental deterioration and the forces that
prevent easy reversibility.
The
first is the environmental
damage stemming from agricultural activity.
The recent improvements in
agricul tural
yields and especially the envious
productivity of the
American farm are the result of a
basically free market
system (agribusiness notwithstandin
and modern agriculq
tural technology.
The intensive and extensive use
of
I

)

irrigation,
crop farming

fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, and
single(for cost-efficient,

capital-intensive

mechanization) has contributed to the
productive success
of the industry.
Yet, given the competitive nature of
the business, farmers must accept as
much of the new

technology as they can afford.

The technological-economic

imperative is that the immediate benefits of the new

.nnovations or a.ricuUu.e
ou...,h any ,on,-te.„,
..3.3
and dangers.
...„-,e crcu^stances
that .o3t fa.„,3rs fi„a

the.3ezves in
they

„iu

They

stm

aUow

the.

XUtle e.oico

a3 to whether

use the latest teeh„o.o,y
that is „aae
operate in their own
.est,

avaUahle

short-ter. inter-

ests."

The economic situation
insures that the future
w.n be sacrificed for the
present. The fear of
financial
insolvency is
sufficient to prevent
individual farmers
fro. weighing the
individual benefits of
technoloay
against the potential
environmental rishs.
Personal
survival is paramount.
within thrs context of
structural
incentives and restraints
we can begin to appreciate
the
pollution problen, which modern
agriculture presents.
What are the potential
environmental risks which
niodern agriculture is
forced to incur., one has to
do
with the use of chemical
fertilizer.
it is undoubtedly
the best short-term investment
a farmer can make.
Lvon
with high applications and
rising fertilizer prices, the
marginal increase in yields
covers private costs. But
there are public costs to consider
too, costs which are
both increased and hidden by
the in^i^vate productivity
of synthetic fertilizer.
On this score two facts stand
out.
First, the higher the application
of cheap nitrogenbased fertilizer the more, proportionally,
that cannot
be absorbed by the plants.
Run-off from rains pours
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nxtrites into streams,
reservoirs and ground
.ater
reserves, raising this
pollutant to dangerous
levels i„
so.e cases.
Second, nitrogen
iertUi.er obstructs and
reduces the natural lertiiity
fertilitv of
ot the soil (by
destroying
the soil's nitrogen-fixing
bacteria,, thus requiring
ever .ore reliance on
che.ical fertiUzers and
therefore
strll .ore run-off.
Significantly, the use of
pesticides
tells a Similar story.
ddt is an effective.
eco„o„,ical
and comparatively safe
means of ridding farms of
destructive insects.
Its responsibility for
increasing yields
(and, in some third world
countries, of dramatically
,

reducing the incidence of
insect-borne diseases) is
unchallenged.
But, as environmentalists
have repeatedly
demonstrated, the pests build up
a resistance to the
previous dosage-more accurately,
resistant strains of the
insect multiply and domunate
the colony-and the biological predators which helped
to control the pests'
nun±,ers

are killed off.

Thus,

to achieve similar results,

ever

higher applications or more poisonous
variants of the
pesticide must be used. The polluting
effects of chemicals such as DDT must be viewed in
light of their ability
to change the environment and thereby
to encourage
further pollution in the future.
This is the meaning of the concept
"technological
fix."

"Like an addictive drug,

fertilizer nitrogen and
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synthetic pesticides
oo litomiiw
.
iiteraily create
increased demand
they are used; t:he
buyer becomes hooked. "^^
Technological developments,
once accepted, cannot
be reversed
"cold turkey" without
nearly proh.bltrve
political
consequences and/or economic
costs (recapitalization
costs).
We thus require further
techno o.ica
fixes
merely to maintain our
economic "hJcjU." This ironic
cycle-the dancers ot technology
leadrn, to an increased
dependence on technology to
have it save
•

-

1

1.

us from the

dangers it has created-is
what makes this type of
pollution process so threatening.
In a sense, other aspects
of agricultural pollu-

tion are related examples
of this same point.
One crop
farming, overcropping, and
other aspects of poor husbandry
have depleted the soil of many
vital nutrients, reguxring chemical fertilizer to
compensate.
They also simplify
the environmental system of the
Farm, preventing natural
balances from holding down insects and
weeds.
This

prompts the use ol pesticides and
herbicides, again in
increasing amounts.
Finally they lead to the erosion
of the topsoil, while technology
tries to compensate

through the application of still more
chemicals.
the claim that

agricultural

As to

the current envi roniDontal impacts of

practices are not great, we ought Lo focus

on the process of worsening environmental damaqe,
not
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forces bohi.K, U,e ,rob,.,„

,„^,,„

^^^^

pollution so niynificant.
Farmers,

WUI
Of

„.u„

U,o,„

society in „encrn,. ar.

lower yieWs, prevent
the

fa™

,„achino,.y.

ruin of many.
y

(a
lA

.o.st

co.t-eiacient u.e

and probably n.sult
in the financial
...
fnrfhorUirthor conscHiuonco
would bo the inLor-

national furor fhat would
bo raised by overpopula
tod
and underfod Third World
nations.)
Tho fact is that

operate our farms as if
thoy wore
extraction invosfmont because

a

wo

short-terrn resource-

we allow our fanners no

other viable alternative.

The various kinds of pollu-

tion that results from
such an orientation inCerforo
in
very basic ways with the
natural regenerative, cybernetic
capacity of the ecosystem. when
we decide to halt the

pollution progression and to
resurrect some of the
ecological baJances we had previously
been so effective
in destroying, the cost may
be high.
We have an environmental debt to repay. ,7ust as fhe
addict
must go through

painful period of withdrawal belore
he can rebuild his
life, we may have to face reduced
agricultural productiva

ity in order to avoid further
dependence upon the

technological fix.
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threat. a„a

-•^e

pollution

,

so.e places the
reality of water
fresh water scarcity,
is . second r.portant

and illustrative
e.a.ple of environmental
deterioration
More than any other factor,
the avrlaMlity of
water
aeter.rnes the ultimate
population capacity of a
.eo.raphrcal province... ^ The
need for water for
industrra,,
agricultural, recreational
and residential purposes
has
grown greatly rn some
areas of the country,
outpacing
the ability of the
enviornment to replenish this
renewable
resource.
addition to overuse per se,
there are three
related pollutron problems
which reveal the centrality
Of this concern.
One has to do with the
i„,pact of varrous types of run-off
practices which increase the
saline
content of fresh water sources.
This is a notably difficult situation to monitor as
to individual responsibility,
and, therefore, it is
especially difficult to control
via traditional economic
incentives.
The immensity of
this problem is demonstrated
best by recent trends: "As a
result of man.s activities, since
1914 the total salt
content of the Ohio River has increased
by about 50 percent and that of the Colorado by nearly
100 percent.. '^^

m

By the year 2000, current projections
indicate that salt

concentrations would approach the upper limits
recommended
for human consumption.
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A second way i„

conta™.nated ste.s

..^^^^^^

fro„,

^^^^^ ^^^^^

excessive pu„pin,

.round
.he fixture o. salt
water „it„ .resh in
under.rouna roc. .or.at.ons
results .ro.„ t.e lessened
pressure
Of the latter upon
the for.er after
pu.pin,.
.iso because of excessive
pu.ping, we have been
forced to go
lower and lower in our
effort^,
errorts to increase supply;
in
effect, we „ine for
water as if it were a
nonrenewable
mineral deposit, and
extract a poorer ,uaUty
resource
besides.
..„e have, by our
heavy withdrawal of groundwater, contributed to
the lowering of water
tables,
salt water intrusion
into fresh groundwater,
and depletion of groundwater at
rates faster than it can
be
water.

;

.

.

naturally replenished.""

.

Thus, we are involved in
parts

of the country (e.g..
West and Southwest) with an
absolute limit to growth; we
are approaching it rapidly,
the possibility of substitutions
or new sources is slight,

and the build-up of another
environmental debt (replenishing an intolerably low water
table) is a very real
prospect.
The dynamic forces maintaining
this process
are in large part those associated
with raodern agricultural procedures (and the economic
incentives which
rationalize these procedures).
Finally, as discussed in the previous
section,

demands for more resources and increased
reliance on
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domestic sources will
require the use (pollution,
of
more fresh water.
within the context of
the growth
ethic we will have little
choice but to pay for
these
resources with socrety's
consu.ptron of poorer quality
and/or higher priced water.
There are also the political
imperatives for growth which
encourage residential
and

industrial expansion before
adequate public support
facilities (e.g., water sources,
sewerage treatment
capacity) are provided.
Given the acceptance of the
growth ethic, there will be
bitter resistance to water
utilization policies which
threaten future economic
expansion. And yet we must
expect a radical breaK with
past attitudes and behavior if
we are to solve this
pollution problem:

'

This country has reached a point
in its
history when water will have to
be conserved and managed like other
economic
goods.
Large inve.stments will be required if mounting demands are to
be
met, and much more systematic
schemes
of management for whole river
systems
will have to be devised and applied. 38

When we recognize that water resource
management will
amount to controls on growth, we can
appreciate the role
this pollution problem will play in the
limits debate.
The final area of environmental deterioration

I

will focus on concerns the group of modern
pollutants

which cannot be broken down or transfoirmed by the
self-
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Cleansing and sel f -regula
ting .echanis.s of the
ecosyste.
These nonbiodegradable
chemicals are proliferating
in
amount and variety-fro.
the manufacture of
plastics,
other synthetics, agricultural
sprays,

food additives,

etc., as by-products in
the production of other
goods or
in nuclear power
generation.
They pose an unknown cumu-

lative danger to the air,
water, animals, plants, soil,
food, and eventually to
our own health and well-bexng.
Modern contaminants make the
task of determining the
costs of pollution all but
impossible.
For instance,

while low levels of

a

chemical may cause no ill effects

(short- or long-term), two chemicals
at low levels may
reaction with each other in some way
to magnify their

separate carcinogenic, mutagenic,
pathogenic or teratogenic
properties.
This process, known as synergism, is
especially difficult to monitor when new
variables
(chemicals)

are continually entering the environmental
equation.

Other aspects of chemical pollution are equally
serious and equally fraught with measuring problems.

Chemicals and many types of metal pollutants interact
not

only with each other but also with the environment.

They

are combined, concentrated and/or changed in largely

unknown ways.
a

This creates

a

built-in time lag between

given quantity of effluent and

danger.

a

related ievel of health

Because of the ongoing nature of these environmental
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processes conta.xnant levels
of certain che.xcals
(e.g.,
DDT) will rise naturally
in sprte of actions
to reduce
the original source.
By the ti.e public
policy responds
to the health danger,
a charn of environmental
events
will have been set xn
motion which would inevitably
worsen the situation.
Such time delays

tend to be little

understood, and thus our
present perceptions of pollution's risks are similarly
uncertain.
Time delays, sometimes of as much as 30 years,
also occur between exposure
to a pollutant (asbestos
fibers) and the observation of
adverse reactions (asbestos-related
diseases)
Compounding this measuring problem is
the fact that chemical
pollutants often increase one's
susceptibility to common
illnesses rather than cause their
own clear and pollutionspecific maladies.
AH this is by way of indicating the
.

obstacles to an adequate assessment of
the aggregate
health hazards of our chemical society.
Our ignorance
then becomes the greatest danger of all:
"when
we add

misunderstood chemicals to our ambiance, we put
ourselves
in the position of not knowing what
symptoms to expect,
in addition to the usual problems of cause
and cure."^^

The inform.ation on pollutants is confusing and

contradictory (often depending upon who is funding the
research)

However, our ignorance of this matter has

.

not evoked

a

caution commensurate with the risks involved.
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For the .est p..t the
onus of p.ool .e.ains
on the public
to demonstrate danyer,
not with the company
to prove
safety.
^s to technological
assessment and environmental
impact analysis-a critxcal
evaluation of the impact of
technological innovations
before they are operationalized-we have achieved some
success on thrs score,
noticeably in the SST controversy.
„„„ever, the testing of
every new chemical for
complete safety before it is
marketed or discharged as waste
is extremely costly; .t
entails investment in testing,
increases time delays and
tends to discourage chemical
technology.
This would
have an immediate impact on
profit and growth rates and
would be strongly opposed. We
can realistically expect
that the nature of this problem
will worsen for some
time to come, resulting in very
conscious increases in

health-related aspects of quality of
life.
This final point on the worsening
nature of the
pollution problem bears repeating.
To ignore the hazards
of pollution in order to maximize
short-run material

wealth is not to ignore the standard-of-living
consequences of elevated pollution levels.

quality what we gain in quantity.

We will pay in

Eventually, the price

will be so great that major sacrifices
will be required
to reconstruct a balance betvreen our
environment and

our style of life.
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?J}e_Polj^tic^^
An analysis of the
p.obable response of our
society
to environmental
deterion
ut.x xora tion
r^..
u
must
-'oi, a-ticxuae
-.^^
inr-iur^n an
awareness
Of the pouucs or
poucy .ak.nc,.
i-

i

,

,3
inseparable
element of the pollution
prognosis.
The decision of
Choosing between preserving
environmental quality and
promoting economic growth
is obviously and
unavoidably
political.
That is, factors of power
and self-interest
will enter into the
process, competing with
(and perhaps
dominating, impartial analysis,
the weight of scientific
evidence and the public interest.
„y strong suspicion is
that, given the current
milieu regardin<, growth

and the

context within which such
decisions are made, there will
be a gap between what
economists say
could be d_one and

what in fact

V/ill
ri^J_:t.

hn rlnno
HPJl?.'

rnu-;^

This IS

tlie

crux of

i;

.

j.

Mishan's observation:
debating the foreseeable future,
It IS not the potential ideal
that
economists believe they could realize,
In

not the brave words of government
officials or corporate executives,
that are agenda, but the political
likelihood of significant reductions
being made over the jicxt two decades
each of the familiar forms of pol-

m

lution.'^^

Our politically determined policy
response will also re-

flect developments in other areas.

emergency,

In a

continuing energy

for exam.ple, we may be forced to return to
the

^
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-re

economical and available
suppUes of fuel ,h.ghsulphur oil, coal, „it.
negative impacts on a.r
,naUty
The argument that „e
must give up an increment
of environ-nt amen.ty in orUer to atta.n
a „.,„er liv.n.
stan.ar.
(the trade-off between
pollution and
growth,

persuasive within

„rU

rema.n

a

supportive political context
and a
pro-growth atmosphere.
short, our optimise
should be
tempered.
What can realrstically
be expected fro„, efforts
to control pollution?

m

Barry Commoner has argued
that there is a strong
connection between the profitability
of an industry and
the application of a mode
of technology whxch uses up
environmental resources:
"a high rate of profit
is associated with practices that are
particularly stressful
toward the environment and that
when these practices are
restricted, profits decline.
Technology has been
directed towards increasing this
process
because,

economic standpoint, any substitution
of

costly good will be

a

savings.

a

from an

free for

a

Conm.oner estimates that

since 1946 the technological factor-that
is, the increment of added pollution per unit produced
due to new productive processes

— accounts

for up to 95 per cent of the

aggregate output of contaminants in some Indus tries

.

^

We have been producing basic necessities at
comparable per

capita rates but with

a

more wasteful and hazardous
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technology (e.,., synthetics
vs. .ool and cotton,
determent vs. soap, fertiliser
vs. .ore land-ha.ves
ted acreage
has decreased-synthetic
herbicides and pesticides vs
n.ore

natural biological .ethods,
trucKs vs. rail haulage).
The profitability of
this new technology (aided
in large part by its
ability to pass on productxon
costs to
society in the for. of
pollution) and the political
.uscle
of the interests that
benefit prevent the government
from
imposing the economists' social
costs approach.
its
political difficulty was revealed
recently when auto
manufacturers sa.d they would be
unable to reduce emission
standards for 1978 engines as
required by law.
Given
the clout of the industry,
standards have been lifted.
Local efforts to i mpose anti-pol
lution regulations often
fare just as poorly.
Marginal factories which threaten
to close down because of the
costs of the stricter standards are allowed to maintain operation
while the local

residents pick up the tab in the form of water
or air
impurity, hazardous work environment, noise

pollution, etc.

The recent organization of an environmental move-

ment has prompted the passage of

mucli

legislation despite

the reduced-growth costs of anti -pol ution
policies.
1

Yet,

the degree of progress is very uneven, as we might expect.

Eliminating pollution is relatively easy for those industries in wliich the faulted technology is peripheral to
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the society.

s

economic structure
(determents,.

However
for so.e of this nation's
.ajor xndustries the issue
is
one of survival (chemical,
agricultural and auto industries,.
The likelihood and
effectiveness of legislative
action thus hinge on the
relative political power of
the
combatants.
Unwelco„,od environmental
trends may insure
that this balance will change.
We can assume that the
environmentalists will greatly
strengthen their political
position, and that the government,
spurred by a quickly

worsening pollution crisis, will
succeed in initialing a
policy response dealing with
environmental deterioration.
In such a case

the bill?

a

new question may be asked:

wto will pay

Even on this point politics,
pollution and growth

interact.

What is often ignored by people seeking

a

politi-

cal solution to the problem is that
a clean environment,

like many other socially valued objectives,
is distributed

unequally according to the political power and
social
position of various interests.
as a socia l cost,

and localized.

Though pollution is viewed

it tends to be selectively concentrated

We perceive the problem in its particular-

ized and isolated senses.

Water scarcity is not

a

para-

mount concern to New Englanders, nor are auto emissions
a

threat to rural America.

The health hazards experienced

by farm workers (picking in recently sprayed fields) or
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Miners (suffering fro.
.-..ac. Xung" disease)
allow us all
the luxury of lower
food and fuel prices.
Cerald Oarvey
notes that this situation
is not coincidental.

"^^^^^t allocation
of^Sr^'°n^
of
goods" and "bads."
often extertransfer
coi^r
/r^'^^^^^^^^^^y
costs and
benefits from one special
public to another, or from
society
at large to specific
privileged or
victimized groups. Thus
costs frequently fall not spill-over
on those
responsible-these often being the
°" wealthy, Ind best
abfe to
able
to'^f
defend themsel ves--but on
'°
°^
the
burdL!!?"'

It is clearly possible to
submerge the fundamental nature
of the pollution problem by
shifting social costs from a

more powerful group (region,
industry, occupation) to a
less powerful one.
Such political resolutions leave
the
target group qualitatively worse
off while the rest of
society benefits through increased
growth rates or

reduced environmental costs.
The conclusion to be reached is a
rather discour-

aging one for growth's advocates.

We are even less in-

clined to face up to growth's limits stemming
from environmental decay than we are prepared to deal with
the issue
of resource scarcity.
The elitist strain in the environmental movement will serve to deflect political energies
away from the more serious sources of ecological breakdown.

221

ou. eon..ontaUon

„UH

.Hose

problem. Which are
structured rnto our
economic syste.
Thrs delay rn our policy
response will
the
anti-growth impacts of
governmental actron since
envrron-ntal reclamation has proven
to be rncreasingly
e.pensrve
the more the situation
is allowed to worsen.
The political
variable, that is. the
role of differential
power, „iu
likely r_educe th_e
eHectiveness of efforts to shift
the
social costs of pollution
onto
industry.

Finally, we can

expect that the taxpayer and
consumer will be forced to
pay excessively for any
increment of clean air and water
that is achieved, thus
placing

a

ma^or drag on the growth

of real income.
It is not that economdc
and technological responses

cannot cope with the dual limxts
of resource scarcity and
environmental decay. But
coping
with these situations
is not the same as handling
them in stride.
The "solutions" the nation finally select
will demand a price in
terms of our standard of living and
future economic growth.
This, however, is not the only set of
problems that bolster
the limits-to-growth position.
Trends in our physical

environment parallel trends in the human
environment.

The

next chapter will focus on addition support
for the argu-

ment that economic growth will be greatly
reduced in the

America of the future.

CHAPTER

V

THE LIMITS TO GROWTH
DEBATE:

THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

Ijlt roduc

bion

Most Of the evidence
marshalled thus far in support
of the forecast of li^.ts
to growth has stressed
developments in the relationship
between the physical environment
and our economy.
These developments, so it has
been
argued in Chapter IV, would
inhibit growth by increasing
the cost of feeding our
economic engine-higher prices of
raw materials brought on by real
or induced scarcity-and
by increasing the cost of
alleviating society of the
physical disamenities of economic
activity-the rising
price of pollution control and
abatement (or of ignoring
the problem of environmental
deterioration)
it is easy
to see how such physical factors
may restrain growth
rates.
What has been insufficiently analyzed and
therefore
.

inadequately understood is the effect of human
(nonphysical)
growth.

factors on our ability to sustain economic

Specifically, domestic and international economic

developments apart from those already mentioned call into
question our expectation of future economic expansion.
Likewise, worsening social and psychological stress

potentially could weaken our collective capacity to
222
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maintain growth, even
given
.
ravorable outcomes
y ven favor-,hio
regarding
resources and P
pollution
lution.
linally, we cannot
dismiss the
crises confronting our
oolitiral c:...,
.juxicical
system and wliat this
portends for economic
growth
uwcn.
J
Thi. chapter
.
Thifa
explores these
three dimensions of the
human environment and
their
contribution to the arnT.T4-H
growth controversy.
it then summar4-

izes the conclusions to
be drawn from the
analysis of
Chapters IV and V.

Ec onomic D evel opments

This section examines some
evolving economic contradictions which have direct
bearing on the contention
that the united States will
face a no-growth or slow-growth
future.
The first trend concerns the
increased vulnerability of the economic system
to a ,ua ]or business downturn
as a result of the mechanisms
being used to maintain

present growth rates.

The argument can be made that

capitalism generally and our own
growth-oriented version
of capitalism in particular is
fraught with operational
inconsistencies, conflicting tendencies and
inherent

inefficiencies— contradictions in the jargon of
Marxist
analysis.

2
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?esu?.r

°' capitalism

produces
stmilLn"
simultaneously
the conditions
it fu^damenLTw'
^^^^"^ t^^^ successes
of capitalist
ot
c^^it^f
development create
situations which are
fundamentalto capitalism

ilsliTT^^

Two contradictions are
esoeciTiix.
n
especially illuminating
in revealing the basic weaknesses
of uur
our lorm
form nf
.
of economic development.
•

-;

The fi.st

concerns the claim that,
even within advanced
corporate capitalism, competitive
forces in the economy
compel the system to extend
rts productive capacity.
As capitalist development
continues, as companies grow
and industries multiply.
•

There is an ever -expanding volume
of profits seeking opi^ortuniti
es
for reinvestment.
Every time
profits are created, they must be
reinvested.
And reinvestment
means precisely creating more output, reducing costs (thus freeing
resources for employment elsewhere),
and expanding profits.
Then the
cycle is repeated.
This expanding volume of profits therefore
impels the firm to look for new
markets, search for new products
to be produced, and create more
output to sell.

-
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Ma.ntainin, the pront.bility
o.
ally no cause for ala..

investments .s usu-

.m a grow.,., econo.ny.

However
recent efforts to handle
the e_sca^,ting
expansionary
thrust of capitalist
productron have not and
cannot depend
totally upon the guarantees
whrch growth normally
provides
What is Significant is
that current policies
designed to
bolster profit rates for
investment capital offer shortrun success but inspire
long-range problems.
Two types

of policy responses

win

suffice to clarify this
important

point,

The economic need to
continue current rates of
growth and to avoid stagnation
and regression forces .ore
and more costs and functions
upon the government.
The state underwrites business
losses
sustained during economic crisis
Direct lending, indirect lending
via'
intermediaries, and loan insurance
guarantees socialize business risk and
create huge government liabilities and
can be guaranteed only by further that
private capital accumulation and
growthand hence more loans, subsidies
and
guarantees.-^
In effect,

the state has become the insurer of
growth.

To the extent that the government
is forced to make up

the difference between naturally engendered
growth (i.e.,

productivity) and the growth rate required to
maintain

investment and profit levels, the economy is involved
in
a

contradiction.

If that gap is small,

no major danger
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on the horizon.

6

However,

^^^^^^^^^
woula necessarUy
involve .nfi.t.on..,
aefi.U spendin,.
w.th excellent prospects
that „el f „e state
pro.ra.s
would be cut bac.
The deep and visible
.overn.ent
involvement in the economy
would weaken the legiti.acv
Of the state's role
as a neutral arbiter
or partner and
-y lead to the politrcization of the economy
(and perhaps
Of the issue of relative
shares,
Investment and profit
levels which are artifically
inflated through .ajor
political intervention and
stimulation are srgns of inherent danger in the economy.
Real economic growth had
enabled the system to avoid
confronting this contradiction.
But it is symptomatic of
a weakened economic
position that government
intervention has increased enorn.ously.
The temporary remedy of
Keynesian deficit spending has become a small part
of the permanent repertoire
of policy supports shoring
up our lagging growth rates.
.

Another means by which capitalism
stimulates growth
concerns the important question ot
consumer demand.
Improvements in our living standards are
not merely

consequence s of our economic system.

The demand for

a

better material existence and the economic
wherewithall
with which to back up that demand are vital
parts of its
successful functioning:
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A continuing general
imoroveMcnt of
is clependent'opon'risiacj

'/evoi: T""'
mass consumption which
increasingly
-^^^y-^y
transform the so-miir^.i
caiiGd luxury qoodq
^

:;o"a°tro:r P-''"-f,/i;^,consu.„cd;co'™!

-s.

be 3teadiiy'^l^?anI'co:^;;L™nS^:

mass market, through
advertising
broadening o£ insSi^entbuymg
buy^ncj'o^a'^
plans and personal
consumption 4
.

Advertising is

necessary institution in an
economy of
threatened overproduction; it
is part of the material
ideology which helps foster
consumer demand. t„ jou„
Kenneth Galbraith words,
"Production only fills a void
that it has itself created." ^
a

Credit buying is an outgrowth
of the intense consumer desires promoted by
advertising, but the expansion
of credit spending is a
dangerous trend.
The need to

encourage maximum levels of consumer
spending in order
to maintain returns on investment
capital has led to a

mortgaging of the future.

Personal consumption debt has

been increasing faster than after-tax
income-with no
sign of a slowdown.
This stimulation of the economy,
made necessary because the grov.th rate
does not by itself
sustain adequate consumer purchasing power,
buys prosperity as a speculator buys stocks on a
margin.
Consumer

debt makes prosperity tenuous since any sign of
regression

threatens to have

a

snowballing effect.

Our personal

consumption styles can be "devalued" by credit card
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companies .e.an.Ung that
3ust as a bank

n,ay

a .e>,.o.

pa, on the ,ri..,,.,,

force the liquidation
of stocks

bought on the ™ar,in-both
done in o.der to protect
the
creditors, funds. Slight
fluctuations rn growth rates
can thus have marked
repercussions on „ass buying
power;
the massive extension
of the credit .arket
allows us Uttle
cushion to fall back upon,
few options except for
.ore
borrowing for those who are
already overextended.
An economy that is touted
to require only fine
tuning is at the same time
more vulnerable to imperfections
in the tuning mechanism.
To the extent that
productivitvbased growth rates are being
heightened by a plethora of
governmental supports in order
to absorb rnvestment capital, to the extent that
the level of consumer demand
is
being artificially stimulated
by easy credit policies in
order to absorb surplus productive
capacity, the economy
reflects "softness" and vulnerability.
^

A second contradiction flows from
the above analysis but views the same general
problem from a totally

reversed perspective.
of the economy to find

vices,

Instead of focusing on the ability
a

market for its goods and ser-

it questions the capacity of the economy
to meet

the ever increasing economic demands of
the consumer.

The

effort to promote these demands through advertising,
media
images of the ideal American family, etc. runs the
risk

^
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Of heightening
frustrations anC resentment,
especraUy
so given the related
Ukelrhood of

de.and-pnsh innat.on

"or.in, to diminish real
wages.

m

pro.rsing afn.ence
and opportunity, our
system
L.t,iu
"is
1
1^ con-i-^^ni-T
constantly arousing

expectations v;hich
iiicn It
itnr-Vc 4-i
lacks
the current means to
fulfill
and is betting on its
abrlity to procure the
necessary
means by the very act of
stimulating people to demand
them and go after them. "
i

The issue goes even deeper
than this.
Our perceptions of the system's (and
our own personal) success
center upon the degree and
form of economic growth we
have experience in the past.
A new set of perceptions
with new criteria of success
and failure cannot be easily
substituted for our present values
and biases.
The impact
of growth reaches far beyond
the hardware of goods,
services and GNP to encompass a
way of thinking about
living, about each-other and about
ourselves-a state of
being and becoming. As a result of
past rates of economic
growth, the mechanisms the system
utilizes to foster continued development, and our psychological
commitment to

growth ethos, we have burned the bridges
behind us.
Changes in growth rates will become more
glaring, more
a

difficult to understand and assimilate, more
traumatic,
more threatening to status quo politics.

In short,

we

are more susceptible to the domino-like collapse
which

limits to growth might entail.
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-i!2E£°!!!S_of_Econora^^

we are currently in
an oconcuc decline
relative
to other developed
nations.
Various economies are
superior
to ours in measures
of industrial
productivity.' Our
competitive edge, based on
a prodigrous lead
in technological development, has
dissipated in a number of
areas
as America's technical
advances have been copied,
improved
and applied by our rrvals.
Our share of the world
market
for basic Items (e.g.,
steel, has declined.
Add to this
the investment-attracting
advantages of lower labor
costs
found in most other developed
and developing nations.
For these and related
reasons America's economy has
been
growing at a slower rate than
most of the industrialized
world although its enormous
economic base and therefore
greater absolute growth mask
this unpleasant reality.
The balance of trade deficits
we have been experiencing
and the concomitant devaluation
of the dollar are two
visible and shocking indications
of our weakened international position.'' We can anticipate
that as more nations
overtake us in per capita GNP (some
already have) a feeling of economic stagnation will set
in, simulating in

part the psychological effects of
no-growth.
But such

a

part of the story.

simulated crisis tells only

a

small

He need to look at various problems

associated with our current economic malaise and
how

tliey
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-y

effect lon.-te„, ,ro„u.
trends.
...^ p^tXe.s
oe.up,
our attention .u, this
section.
One ,„a,or 3i,n of
economic
troubles^ahead is a noticeable
decline in industrial
profits.
An important consequence
5
of this development
concerns the connection
between levels of pubUc
spending
and the strength of the
industrial sector.
in son.o

states (e.g., New York,
Massachusetts) an economic
retrenchment threatens to induce
severe cut-backs i„ a host
of
programs (or higher taxes on
already overtaxed citizens).
In an era in which
demands upon the government
have never
been greater, the prospect
of reduced outputs
is of ma:ior

political as well as economic
significance.
The primary consequence of
reduced domestic
industrial profits relates to
the investment decisions
of American-based multinational
corporations.
The shift
of capital from the United
States to foreign business

opportunities represents both
domestic economic decline.

a

cau..e and a result of

This nation's largest companxes

can prosper independently of the
economic fate of their
home base.
This is easily demonstrated by the
differential impact the oil crisis has on the
United states

economy and on the profits of major oil
producers.

However,

obstacles arise in our efforts to shape these
investment

policies to the needs of the national economy.

Multina-

tionals are not effectively controlled by the political
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^yste..

.ot on.y .0 ,.ev
exe.eise ..ordinate
poUtieaX
power an. thus can
o.s.ruct poUcies aesi,„ed
to .eseriet
their .reeuo. o. ac
U.on
^ u-ansnational
Character enable, the. to
eva.e la.s hy which our
econon,,
could reap so„,e spill-over
beneUts £ro„, their corporate
success.
As our laraest
^ryest firms
fi rn,.^ turn
increasingly outward
in search of higher
profits, the domestic
economy, dependent upon marginal
investments by secondary
companies,
will be drained of a part
of its reproductive
power.
A second symptom of
economic decline, as well as
the best indication of
the failure of economics
and business administration (the
business technologies) to manage
the economy, is our permanent
battle with inflation,
inflation is the hidden tax
of our economy, reducing
our gains in real income
(spending power) even as increases
in absolute dollars masquerade
as prosperity.
While we
have always had this condition,
recently it has become
qualitatively worse. The fear is that
unusually hiqh
price increases are now endemic to
the system, the result
of forces that are not easily
reversed.
.

There are different reasons given for
the new
inflation, each one reflecting an ongoing

trend that does

not bode well for our economic health.

A partial explana-

tion addresses the changing structure of
corporate

capitalism.

Major segments of the economic system are

^
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now dominated by
oligopoliqf
gopolistic or monopolistic
market
arrangements that immuni:.e
-G certain
industries from the
destabilizing and defl^f-i^
deflationary pressures
of free market
competition.
This condition
exists win
with respect to
^

^

P-e

Of

,

the

3e.vic3S, the cost o.

,s.on, ..o„ ^no'^Ues

investment).

Companies in these
Liiese. industries
indn^.v
can avoid the
inducements and penalties
penalties; of fiscal
and monetary
policies
They are therefore
free to charge higher
prices and
thereby get a leg up on
the inflation ladder.
.he redistributive effects of this
form of market power
be Obvious.

should
inflation has been bearable,
probably even

beneficial for some, as
income and wealth have
shiftcdfrom occupations,
industries and situations
the sphere
of competitive capitalism
which are more vulnerable
to
inflation's negative impacts
to those individuals who
can protect their investments
and insure themselves a
better market position.
Consequently, inflation has
created certain vested interests
who realize that demands
for a curb on inflationary
policies can be financially
threatening. '^

m

In this context it is important
to note that an

inflationary mentality makes it
politically difficult
to curb further increases.
An

HlM^AjL^^tory spiral is in

force; each industry or occupation
seeks a hedge against

.
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expected future inflation
by de.and.n, future
prices and
wages now.
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^
Object to not bern, in on
the last round of rncreases.
Short Of wage and prrce
controls (which have their
own set
Of technical problems),
the standard approaches
to reducing inflation cannot and
have not halted the spiral.
There is the strong
possibilrty that inflation
"is rooted in the rapid
rise in demand for goods and
services in all advanced
industrialized nations and
the
new demand from nonindustrial
supplier natrons that
their raw materials return to
them a bigger prece of the
economic action.
Increases in demand come not only
from the developed West (including
Japan) catching up to
our materialistic attainments,
but also from a new (15-20
years) group of middle-class
nations flexing their consumerist muscles:
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea,

m

,

Taiwan,

Nigeria, Venezuela, Poland, East Germany
and the oil-rich
Middle East countries.
Increased demand is especially

apparent regarding one very precious resource—
food

Population growth, changing diet patterns, U.S.
financed
purchases of farm products by Third World countries,
and
the limits of the Green revolution will combine
to apply

permanent pressure on our grain supplies, with
ing steady rise in prices.

a

result-

Similarly, as more nations

have industrialized and can afford to utilize the raw
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-terlals of

a

growing economy, and
as previously
developed countries beco.e
even .ore productive
and
wealthy, competition
and therefore prices
for the limited
supplies Of critical
resources will increase.

The issue
here is not whether there
will be enough food or
raw
materials.
Rather, it is whether
these items will occup.an enlarging part of
the famiiys and the
economy's budgets, thereby reducing
Luer purchases,
iourrh^c^oc
^ other
living
'

•

standards,

and productivity.
If we just focus on
this
L.Li±i, conn-hr.country, we realize that
a

demand-push inflation is the
cue reouit
re-nlt- r.f
of ^too successfully
selling the American Dream.
17p
vvu

are
aiL.

will inn even eager,
Willing,

to spend our way into debt
in order to purchase the

affluence which supposedly we
can already afford.
indeed,
inflation feeds on itself,
discouraging thriftiness,

economizing debt and thereby
promoting more demand.
Furthermore, for a large portion
of our population the
nature of our economic wants have
changed in ways that
prevent easy adjustments in supply.
for a car,

a

color television set, or

be fulfilled for most Americans.

m
a

the past,

hopes

dinette set could

However, recent demands

are more positional, requiring not
merely absolute but

relative increases in one's standard of
living.

But

we cannot all have the finest education
or medical

services, eat at the best restaurants, and
keep

a

live-in

.

.
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-id.

The .esu.U is t..t
pr.c.s for services
have
.enerauy scare, as people
are ,.ess wUtin,- ,o
ta.e on
certain service positions.
The a.enUies of middle
Of subservience.

Inflation is

a

'

si,„ that the difference

.n attitudes between
low and middle is not
what it once

was

Another future cause of
inflation, and one that
has ramifications far
beyond t,>e price index, is
the
increasing control of mineral
reserve markets by cartels
(perhaps aided and abetted
by multinational corpora
trons)
O.P.E.C. is undoubtedly the
„,ost prominent
example.

Thrs

pressage the growth of other
resource-based economic
alliances attempting to set and
maintain higher prices
for their raw materials.
Third World governments, pressured by or actually controlled
by an ti -American leftist
elements, desiring to get out of
debt to the industrialn.ay

ized West, and resenting the neocolonial

exploitation

of their land and people, will
view massive price increases
as an excellent vehicle for
both profit and revenge.
The
competition for raw materials has never
been more intense.
"The shift from traditional buyers'
market to global

sellers' market for

a

lengthening list of commodities

lespecially raw materials] is bringing

a

host of far-

reaching changes, many of which are still only
remotely
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-sea...

i-vitaMe

--^s ts not .o sa,
o.,

issues o. .,ove.e.U,„.„

ana a.vorc,ont econonac
neeas, u,a.
^3 even „.ainta.nabZe.
^t
,e.y least, H„„ever,
we shoulC ,.pe.t
-dividual governments to
.a,ce effective use
of t.eir

new-founa .ar,alnl„,
leverage, wit. a
consequent ne.attve
inpact fo. us on p.ioo
sta.lllt,, real Incon.e,
stanaa.,
Of living, and
economic growth.
This poinl: needs more
elaboration because it
encompasses the major
J
interna ti nn-. component
-LHcornationa
oT the
limits-to-growth position.
The claim
Claim 1,-1.
has kbeen advanced
that the United States
ut.o economy
econnmv has
h-.^
prospered
i
1.

,

at the ex-

penso of otl.er nations.

Willingly or unwittinyly,
they
have become adjuncts to
our own econon.y via their
subservience to the objectives
of foreign Investors.
The

response usually yiven, that
exports and in.ports are
relatively Insi ynif lean in
t
comparison with our domestic
economy, has been challengea
by Richard J. Barnet and

Ronald MiiUer.

Looking past aggregate aata
to rndicators

previously ignore, the authors
point out that our depenaence on foreign transactions
is much greater than is
generally recognised.
..jf all these

factors are considered,

some thirty per cent of total
United States corporate
profits can be directly or indirectly
attributed to overseass operations...'"
Thus, there is some well-placed
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concern as to whether
international developments
will
restrict our lucrative
activities overseas. ^s
.entionea
above, having lost the
lead in productivity
to other
industrialized nations, we
arc less li.ely to
achieve the
types of co.petitrve
advantages we obtained rn
our hovday
European countries have
sufficient investment
resources
to maintain (regain,
control over their economies.
Also

it would be foolish to
believe that the underdeveloped

nations will ever revert to
the more pliable, clientstate relationships that
typified an earlier era.
Their
demands and expectations have
taken a quantum leap, as
the following observation
from Business J^eek reaffirms.
"What the Third World is really
af teTITT^idespread

redistribution of xncome among
nations:
taking wealth
from the rich industrialized
countries and giving it to
the poor underdeveloped countries.""

if,

as some contend,

our affluence has been built in
part upon neoimperialist
exploitation of the rest of the world,
then this rise in

national and economic assertiveness

— the

end of imperial-

ism—is another cause of nation economic
decline, another
trend supporting the limits-to-growth
hypothesis

.

^'^

Conclusions
Taken in total, the ability of economic loaders
to prolong the growth of the business
sector is certainly
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economic condition which
continues to ,aeae
analysts
forecasts o. .„tu.-e
upturns cons.stenti,
prove ,rounaof the experts.

Perhaps our con.piex
and interdependent
economy is i„ a transition
perrod, developing the
conceptual and managerial
tools to n.eet co.in,,
threats to
growth (resource scarcity,
pollution, energy crisis).
But we also can anticipate
that the level of demands
and
pressures placed upon the
economic systen, wrll increase
and intensify, creating
the insecurity of a
permanent
transition period. The decline
of certain social bases
of support-subjective
resources such as belief in
the
work ethic or trust in
corporate activity -cannot help
but exacerbate the conditions
obstructing recovery and
renewed grov/Lh.
In assessing whether we
can manage our economy

and defuse the problems mentioned
above, we must take
into account the question of
time.
Specifically, will
all of these crises converge with
disastrous suddenness,
or, the alternate scenario, will
issues develop selectively and gradually, to be handled
incrementally, within
the confines of present economic
arrangements? Our tech-

nical skills in business management and
macroeconomics
are best nurtured in an atmosphere free
of panic decision

making.

Unfortunately, the former outcome seems more
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probable.

The policies .entionec,
i„ u>e beginn.n,
of
th.s section are intended
to counteract the
dangers of
excess investment cap.tai
and excess productive
capacity
AS a by-product they
have increased the
interdependence
of an already hxghly
complex political-economy.
This
in turn has maximized
the likelihood of a
simultaneous
domino-like collapse of
various economic subsystems.
The political variable
in this analysis lends
further support to the overall
thesis.
previous sections
I have argued
that we should not so readily
expect public
policy to remedy the shortcomings
of other social subsystems.
It is my conviction that
the governmental
response will worsen the economic
situation.
Inflationary
trends have been given enormous
impetus by deficit spending, a condition that promises
to continue at elevated
levels for the foreseeable future.
The political dynamics
of the budgetary process prevent
any other outcome.
Demands
for services and for expenditures
to relieve unemployment
are coupled with a rebellion against
more taxes; the

m

recent referendum in California cutting
the property
tax testifies to this last point.
In

addition, the imme-

diate political gains to be achieved by well-timed
tax

reductions or by expansions in

tlie

money supply--to

coincide with election-year politics

— is

an admission

that political action is based on short-run interests.

i

:4I

Recovery cannot ^..uur
occur It
i> lits
f^^
and st^^rt-^. 4-u
the insecurity
which instalDility
enaenrlor-c is
y engenders
not conducive to
investment and growth.
•

Microecononiic recover,,
^'^covery and growth
policies- that
tho.e polices u.t
ope„.e th,:ou,U speci...
p.o,„,„3
rather than through
i

decision.-.

reveal the Cistortin,
inauences oC the poiiUcaX
.he trickle-do„n
approach

stUl

Of raisin, growth rates.

policy reflects (responds
fore those groups

,„ost

sy.te,,,

proc.o.inate. as the .eans

.his is to he expected;
public
to,

poUticai power, and there-

influential are able to
channel

policy outputs toward
their benefit.
Yet, the validity
Of this method is
increasingly open to questron.
especially
9xven the rise oC multinationals.
The amount that in
fact trickles down to our
economy is declining as other
(foreign) opportunities avail
themselves. To the extent
that there is a distinction
between the welfare of the
top business elite and the
welfare of the people as a
whole, a large amount of
economic-turned-political

power
will be marshalled to further
the interests of the former
at the expense of the latter.

Long-range prospects are of course
difficult to
determine.
The confluence of trends presented
in Chapters
IV and V

my

or

nu,y

not lead business leaders to initiate
conpensating

adjustments after the individual problems
have been
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revealed.

Yet
Lt-L,

nni- ail
not
segments
eni_s nf
J
oi -i-h^
the economy are equally

adept at making
adjustments, or enu-illv
equally
control of
their economic destinv
estmy, "^k^
the new-found affluence
of the
working classes is very
vulnernhio .to economic
-^.y vulnerable
dislocat ions
(as is the welfare
state
^cat,e Itself)
the

m
.

>

m

inflation and unemployment
larly vulnerable.

livelihood Of

Thus,

^
^

twin forms of

Other groups may he
simi-

even for those who doubt
the

general economic collapse,
there should
be recognition of the
probability that certain
areas of
the economy will face
serious hardship.
Limits to growth,
even selectively experienced
pcxienced, n^,.
y
can a] so have major implications for the future of
consensus politics.
a

i

g££i^l__and_Psychologica l Stress

Sources o

fa cial

Distress

The current debate transcends
the simple issue of
the possibility of .further
economic growth.
It is equally
relevant to examine the
social-psychological costs that
are associated with a growth
society.
These qualitative
disamenities (or socio-psychological
pathologies) are
•

consequences of the operation of American
society as it
seeks and achieves material progress.

These costs, too,

should be placed on the balance against
which we evaluate
the desirability of growth.

To the extent that social

and personal distress-and trends
portend their worsening

24

"

3

^"t—- "

into question the
continuing benefits
Of current econo„,.c
,oai«. t.Us factor has
a „a,or contrrbution to .ake in the
ongoing growth controversy.
The socio-psychologioal
dimension is crucial as
-11 due to its connection to other
factors in the total
Picture.
The social manifestations
of growth s costs
are
reflected in a number of
ways:
the decUne of the worR
ethic, the weakening of
social cohesion, limited
social
adjustment to change-to name
three examples.
These
signs have quite obvious
negative

consciences on

tl>e

ability of national institutions
to meet the physical
challenges to growth. Societal
developments set the
context for attempts to fashion
a policy response to
pollution or resource scarcity.
The diminishing of our
social-psychological resources, of the
vital social supports
for collective action, complicates
political computations,
reduces the effectiveness of our
decision-making procedures,
results in the failure of proposals and
policies,

further

deteriorates political and economic systems,
and continues
the weakening of the public's faith in
the nation's
institutions.

The social-psychological concerns presented in
this section are more than mere compiicators of the
policy-

making dilemma.

Implicit in these concerns are

a

host of

problems that rer|uire separate political (and financial)
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attention.

Thus, the social
.nd psychological costs
of
growth not only set the
stage but p.ov.de a
portion of
the Plot for the economic
and

political dramas enfolding

today.

„e

™st

address ourselves to
these costs as
surely as we .ast face the
energy crisis because each
threatens to underline our
con.it.ent to economic growth.
'

£Htur^o_ck

by

Mvin Toffler

represents perhaps
the ™ost widely cited
atte.pt to illuminate the
signs and
causes of socially induced
psychological stress.
toffler
described many aspects of
current society (or trends
that could be expected to
predominate in the future) which
have placed inordinate strain
upon the emotional resources
of the average citizen.
Prin,ary among the sources
of
stress is the quickening pace of
change in a person's
social and personal world.
Imagine our being placed,

permanently and irreversibly, into an
environment sharply
different from our own. The attitudes,
values and behav-

ioral cues that made sense of
the previous culture would
be irrelevant in this setting;
indeed, the surroundings

themselves are in a constant state of
change, thus preventing us from taking security in a new
set of values, new
cues, new definitions of rationality.
The transience

in our lives is compounded by the

diversity of choices we confront and the plethora
of
information available upon which we can base

a

decision.

24:

-t,

the „.Uitu.e o.
pe.3o„aX

-creasea

t-n

..eeao,,,.

opUo.. .oes .ot represent

.o.

our a^ass.n, o.
.acts a r.n.oOf increased
knowledge.
Information overload, as

Br.no Bettel.oi.
i„,pi.es, leaves us
no .etter off regarding how „e Should
proceed:
..[it, rs not a
question of
the amount of information
.ut whether it can be
used constructively. Whether it
is understandable

as a whole.
We must fight against
the delusion
utjiusxon th-,t
that H,
the more information „e have, the better
we are..." .,ow, then,
to explain
feelings of ignorance in
the face of the knowledge
explosion.
I believe .t is
a matter of ideological
incongruity.
The information does not
fit neatly into
.

.

the conceptual

categories of the past:

the facts do not conform.

The
more rational explanatory
framework for the
problems of the modern age is
triggered by the realization
that anomalies make past
frameworks unacceptable.
The
sense of information overload
is the sense that our world
view is getting more inconsistent
with each new increment
of facts.

search for

a

This bombardment of information
is part of a general
overstimulation of our senses (the impact
of media images,
the pace of social change, the
transience and novelty of
our environment) which has given rise
to definite psychosomatic, psychological and psychosocial
pathologies.
are paying
a

steep price for our way of life.

These are the symptoms
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of extreme wartime terminn
tension,

^
society-wide
battle fatigue•

or future shock.

The problem is one of
human adaptation.

As Tofflor
Phrases it, unless man
cuickly learns to control
the
rate of chanye in his
personal affairs as well
as
in so-

ciety at

larcje,

brea,cdown..^20

we are doomed to

a

massive adaptational

p^.,^ themselves on
their ability

to adjust pragmatically
to new problems and
circumstances.

This boast may not apply
to the condition of our
psychic
state.
The observation of Rene Dubos
ds directed toward
this point:
The limits that must
be imposed on social

and technoloyical innovations
are determined not by scientific knowledge or practical
know-how, but by the biological and mental nature of man
which is essentially unchangeable.
It is undoubtedly true that
we can survive as

species within a wide range of
situations and under
severe pressures.
However, our modes

a

of living and think-

ing are not subject to infinite
variety or permanent

instability.

The maladaptive responses of our body and

mind indicate that we cope with the social
and psychological hazards of our society only at a cost
to our potential

development as human beings.
While
cal

— the

it

is true that on one level--material/physi-

society has been productive and fulfilling of

our desires, development as human beings requires that
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other, higher needs
be
e met.
met

T'h^ most
n.
. u
The
basic emotional

requirement (beyond
physical
Y^icai saf^t..
L
^
safety and
survival) is that
Of love and affixation.
This is a vital support
for
psychic strength, especially
in t.mes of stress.

Soc.al

belonging and affection
are getting more
difficult to
achieve, despite the
opportunities of a pluralist
society.
The following observation
attests to this
fact.

In the rush to
industrialize we break
up communities [physically,
culturally
and spiritually]
so that the controls
formerly regulating behavior
destroyed before alternatives are
can be
provided.
urban drift is one result
Of this process, with
a consequent rise
antisocial practices, crime,
quency,_and so on, which are so deU^
costly
,

m

orw:ri-beLg?2i^^^^

--^.-^

The weakening of personal
and geographic ties has also
been brought on by the quickening
pace of change.
Our
style of life telescopes
relationships with people and
places, impeding the formation of
bonds of trust and
community.
For many, the feeling of belongingness
is
both artificial and superficial
given the transitory
nature of our contacts with others.

More abstract needs remain similarly
unsatisfied.

People desire some measure of prestige and
social esteem;
ego satisfaction is

self-image.

a

necessary prerequisite for

a

Also important is the belief in one's

healthy

!48

efficacy— control over
er one

'

c;
s

^.w^
own

i-^ and
life
therefore some

power over the actions
of others with
respect to oneself
Likewise, a hi,h value
is place, on the
needs for creatlvity and achievement
ent.
^nrSocial
and^ occupational
mobility is
the standard tactir
tactic for
for- those
who want prestigeous,
powerful and/or creative
positions.
However, all societies
have provided some
opportunities for need-gratification
-i

for most of its members.

=> i

There is some evidence,
though,

to suggest that industrial
socities generally and the

united States in particular
are noticeably limited
in
the degree to which these
higher needs can be met.
Examining the satisfactions
of worklife situations
demonstrates this point (although
other topics would suffice equally well).
Despite the claims of business
leaders that technology and
automation have eliminated the
most routine and mechanical
jobs on the assembly line,
the factory work environment
remains debilitating and
dehumanizing.
it might be becoming more so;
even so-called
creative positions are increasingly
defined as adjuncts
to the machine or "specialties"
within a "subfield" of a

"discipline."

Organizations have grown too large and too

complex; workers at all but the top levels
are alienated
by distant authority operating through
depersonalized

hierarchies.
a

24

Industrial psychology has established that

work environment which ignores the nonmaterial needs
of
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the employees risks
the loss

"

r.f

productivity and profits
si,nifiea„t. therefore,
to note the .a,or
decline
the .otivatu, power
of the work ethic,
revealin,
^tself in hi,h absenteeism
and turnover rates,
carelessness (or perhaps
conscious sabotage,,
,

.

-

^

-

anda.eneral

resistance to on-the-job
J
authoritv
-rv.
^ ciutnority.
The normative mechanisms of industrial
cohesion and coordination
are hreakrn,
down.
other means of insuring
joh performance and
task
integration (e.g.,
remuneration, strict
oversight
coupled with threats of
dismissal, require more
material
resources, are less effective
than hoped for.

and thus
tend to reduce productivity
still further.
many
respects the working
conditions of Americans remain
behind
those of their European
counterparts, and this has had
an
impact on comparative
economic growth.

m

When this analysis is
applied to society at large,
the connection between
"style of life" and "quality
of
life" becomes apparent.
The limits of our adaptability
to future Shock and the
inability of institutions to satisfy
higher level human needs combine
to bring about a host
of psychologically-related
social diseases.
Increases in
crime and violence, alcoholism
and drug addiction, broken
marriages, child abuse, etc., are as
much social costs of
our form of industrialization as
is polluted air and
'

water.

We face a diminishing of social
cohesion, especially

:
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-

o..

„..n

areas,

^ea. ana .Us..ust-a

ana .He .reation
o. a

cU^ato

of

,a„,3on

„.en.a., U,.
Conse.uenU,.
society .3 .o..ea .o
reso.t to ealcu.aUve
ana/or coe.cive
-aes Of integration .eca.se
the „,o.:ai restraints
on ant.social behavior are
aeclining.^S

TO other victims
of growth,

the loss of social

cohesion reveals itself
in a nonviolent
for.-increasing
socxal insensitivity
brought about by a turning
inward
away fro„ the larger
group ana the larger
group's problems.
California, in .any ways
a sociological
laboratory
of POSt-industrialis.,
is an excellent example
of the
modes Of thought and action
encouraged by the psychological pressures of change,
insecurity and lost identification
With the wider communitY
Personal alienation and malaise
have
also increased among many
sectors of
California's society. ... in
both
Northern and Southern California,
encounter-group mystique, the druq the
culture, and other loosely
organized
manifestations of the search for
alternative life styles have been
sufficiently
evidence to promote a rash of
popular commentary. ... [in
addition,]
the doctrines of neof undamental
ist and
mystical religious movements have
increased their drawing power. 2 6

m

The growing concern with personal
self-awareness (or personal salvation) is in essence a
conscious withdrawal from
the structural problems of our day.

The long-run political

implications of this development have been
excellently
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outlined

,a„in Schur in rj,ej,,,^^^^^^^^^2,

extent that pa.t o.
the pu.iic
..^or.ed in sei.-neeCs
the.e wUi .e weakened
pressures tor soerai ana
economic'
Change.
.hese sy.pto„s of
social disintegration
are the
other Side oi the coin
to the violent hehavior
described
above.
It is safe to say
that both industrial
and political cohesion are bein,
threatened by
creeping paralyses
Of noncooperation, as
expressed in various types
of
escapis. on the part, not
only of the oppressed
and exploited, but even of highly
"28
privileged
groups.

Social Breakdmvn_andjjjiij^s_t^^
Both Of these behavioral
responses to psychological
stress (and the feelings of
alienation, frustration and
insecurity which lie behind them)
will inevitably have
a negative impact on
growth rates:
first, by diverting
scarce resources, not the least
of which is political
attention, from other pressing
issues to the social problems caused by future shock and
need deprivation; second,
by creating an atmosphere of
justified noninvolvement,

making effective unified action
against environmental
and economic crises all the more
difficult;

and third,

by directly causing

a

decrease in worker morale, in iden-

tification with corporate goals, and in
traditional

aspects of economic development.

On this last point we

note that, along with the decline in the work
ethic, we

,
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eonce„3 ana

a

.es.re .o. e.,..en..aX
„eani., <™.„..
tary simplicity)
have replaced
t^pxaced the
i-h. v
keepmg-up-wi th-theJoneses syna.o.e fo.
so^e, with i™po.,.„,
.onse.uen.es on
consumer .uyin, pattern..
Xn addition, faith
in the
outputs Of the private
.ar.et syste. has waned.
Pro™
personnel practices
(affirmative action, to
investment
policies (environmental
impact statements, to
product
quality (seat belts or
f ire-retardant
children.s pa.amas,
more groups are relying
on the government to
correct the
perceived abuses of tne
the nriw^4-«
private sector.
Charles E.
Silberman has addressed
himself to the economic
import,
at this point still
vague, inherent in the
social and
psychological developments to
which I have alluded:
Our uncertainties today
begin with
the probability that
Americans may be
°' ""^""^
different
tha^'^h""^
that
they add up to a whole new
outlook
on life and work and society.
The
new values could profoundly
alter Consumer demand, on the one hand,
and the
growth of productivity of the
labor
force, hence of the economy's
capacity
to produce, on the other. 29
.

Thus,

we can anticipate some drag on
our GNP, or on the
quality of our lives, from the
psychological costs of

social change and
economic growth.

are in a period o,
transition, „f continual
transition according to
o loffler,
Toffio,leading to the seeming
uncontrouableness ol social
change.
We can therefore
i

order to find the hu„,an
resources which will
promote
personal and social
adaptation to the enfolding
events
Of the future.
However, our society
.ay be unable or
unwilling to reverse the
aforementioned trends toward
social decay and psychological
anguish.
I„ our commitment to consumerism,
individualism and the "now"
mentality, we may have lost
that sense of national
purpose,
conviction, hope and cohesion
which is societys most
important resource.
Social breakdown
is a real threat,

especially in light of the
increased pressures and sacrifices the future will demand
of us.
How we define our
collective destiny, whether we can
emotionally identify
with the lives of generations
yet to be, will dictate the
success we have in responding to
our long-range economic
and environmental ills.
In the words of Kenneth Bouldiny,
"there is

a

great deal of historical evidence to
suggest

that a society which loses its identil.y
with posterity
and which loses its positive image of
the future loses

also its capacity to deal with present
problems, and soon

•

falls apart

U^ts

tk^

•

,

.

.

°^ this statement for
.o growth
cont.ove.sy .3
seXf-eviaent

E°yuy£al_J^imits
Li™its to growth
advocates often ignore
the political aspects Of the
environmental ana economic
reality.
They slide over the no.r^
un
inevitable
conflicts of interest
among social groups
that will mark th.
the way towards
reduced
economic expansion.
Their uupe
hope is th.f
that some moralistic
consensus will arise out
of the
uiie i^aocK
shock Of
of being
h.
on the
brink of ecological
disaster vxn
(in eirect,
effect the
fh. creation of
a permanent „ar-li.e
united front,.
B.ually confident
about the political
variable are those who
re:ect the
limits argument.
Proponents of growth see
our physical,
social ana economic
problems as amenable to
careful
political control and resolution.
The ability of public
policy to rectify the
environmental wrongs and manage
our society, with a minimum
of delay, conflict, error
or
cost to our economic growth
rate, is never doubted.
Both
of these positions, in
spite of some allusions to
politics,
basically contain no realistic
appraisal of the political
prospects of certain changes. By
ignoring conflict and
uncertainty they have tried to
depoliticize these issues.
As Heilbroner has noted, this
i

4-

<=
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omission Of a political
dimension is
^
compieh^nsion^of T^,
Prospoot.
For the exerrl^f I'''
lies squa^"5 fn ti P°l'ti<^'-'1 P°wer
deter„,inaUon o? th^t"'"'''' °'

^^^^^^^^^^

^l'^'^

we have touoheC on
the political variable
in previous
sections, bot we now examine
it directly in order
to answer
a basic question:
can political decision-.aUn,
be relied
upon to overcome, with
reasonable efficiency, the
various
Obstacles to continued
economic growth, or will
it, too,
suffer from t-nc
the rriQoc
4-1
r^i^
crises of the age and thus
help to cause,
not cure, our future
economic ills?

What we are confronting
here is the possibility of
political limits to growth.
[Political limits are] set by
the already overstrained capacity
of human
beings to conceive, design,
manage,
support, and adapt to extremely
complex systems of human
interdependence.
In short. It is the
political limits
that are likely to constrain
the continuity of physical growth well
ahead
of all other factors.
The United States
and other members of the world
communUy
are now pressing against their
political limits and will find it
increasingly
difficult to take actions that would
be required to assure continuing
growth.

This notion of political limits will
be tested under fire
as our institutions and processes
are asked to deal with
the problems of resource scarcity,
pollution,
the loss of

'56

-a

the decision-.,-..in,

.apacUy of u.e poXU.ea:
syste.

that these sho.tco.in,..
at the very Xeast,
van
ser.ously diminish the
effectiveness of pu.fie
poUc.es

designed to prolong
growth
jrowth.

Th» remainder of
The
the section
r-

examines this hypothesis.
The major source of
stress for the political
system is the ever increasing
and varied demands
thrust
upon government by an
ever increasing variety
of groups
Since the New Deal, almost
all areas of social life
have
required ,or appear to require)
governmental action. The
degree and nature of public
sector involvement now being
called for is a far cry from
the public-private distinction premised by Lockean
liberalism (and still touted in
current political rhetoric). a
negative "invisible hand,"
operating on a number of present
crises, requires
an

enormous increase in collective
control of the previously
self-regulated private sector and, with
more difficulty,
the acceptance of a radically new
perspective regarding
the amount of governmental intervention
we must tolerate.
Failure in other subsystems (e.g.,
environment, urban
society, international economics) prompts
and justifies
our turning to politics.

^et,

not

Of the de,„anas
overloading the syste. can .e attribute,
to this so^.oe.
.or

„an. .roups
the poiitioal syste.
has .eco.e the new
..co..ons...
..^ry
"terest see.s a greater
share of poi.tical
lar.esstarrff considerations,
subsidy programs, tax
benefitsmindful that the burdens
of such interest-specif
io XegisXatron will be spread
throughout society via
higher
prices, higher taxes or
^ rates
hiaher inflation
higher
stemming
from deficit spending,
etc.
The forces promoting a
tragedy of the political
commons are formidable."
Compounding this new pressure
on the political process
is
government's continued concern
with unresolved policy
areas; incremental ism
does not solve problems
so much
as defers them.
Finally, additional time
and energy must
now be devoted to the
issues posed by the limits
crises.
Thus, the demands placed
upon the system have escalated
to threatening levels.

Parallel developments have been
taking place with
respect to the qualitative nature
of these demands.

Policy issues have become more
complex and interrelated,
the variables that need to be
considered are more numerous, and the costs associated
with delay or error
are

much greater.

Given these difficulties it is no
wonder

that the impact of governmental action
is often opposite
from expectations; r^licies operate
counter intuitively
'

.

stxU Know surp.isin.Xy
lUtle a.o.t
txons t.„u,h „.xch
poucy outp.„s
we

the into.connec-

(auU.o.ita.ive governmental decisions, are
trans.or.ea into policy
impacts
(soc.al consequences,.
This ignorance is
heightened
"hen „e focus on
issue-areas, such as the
environment,
about Whose internal
Cyna.ics even less is
.no„n
Policy
overload is also related
to the gravity of
the problems
that ask for attentinn
Tr,
ttention.
an era of back-up
systems
and low-level technology,
the consequences of
policy
mistakes were never
irreversible or cataclysmic.
Now,
however, errors in policy
judgment can have severe
repercussions upon many other
social, economic and
ecological
events.
As mentioned above,
complex interrelated systems
and subsystems are more
vulnerable.
Thus, governmental
decisions are filled with
immense risk, thereby placing
the political system under
immense stress.
.

m

Add to these factors the
role of time.

If we ponder

over the problems associated
with limits too long, if
we do not quickly appreciate
the severity

of the situation,

if our policies are piecemeal
and ineffective,

can only worsen.

with

matters

The imiTiediacy of these crises
clashes

political system prone to delay, obstruction
and nondecision-making.
It is difficult for us to realize
the
a

time pressures we are under.

energy needs,

for instance,

Geometric growth of our
means that solutions posited
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on past re,u„e„,ents

^^^^

^^^^
..3 pace Of can,, .eaves
Utt.e .00.
^or reflection a„a
consultation
In the present
context
Of r.sk and uncertainty,
it is no wonder
that policymaking is more stressful.
.

unfortunately, the
political syste. has not
adapted
to the new de.and
structure of our stressful
era
The
to handle certain
types of problems while
ignoring or

anguishrng over others.

Thus,

the polrcy-.a..ng
process,

by xts very nature,
distorts our perception of
a given
issue and prevents
rational approaches toward
its resolution.
According to Karl W. Deutsch,
the procedural and
conceptual biases of politics
emphasize
fc.miliar
ol^^fr
over the new, the past
over the present
the present over the
future.
They involve overestimation or
overvaluation
ot the organization compared
to the en°^
P^^t
methods
and commth^rr^'over new ones, and
mibments
of its
current will and inner structure
over
all possibilities of
fundamental change.

The press of elections and the
"now" mentality of the
electorate discourage long-range
time perspectives,
especially those which attempt to
justify present sacrifices.

Simultaneously, fragmentation in the
policy-forma-

tion process (pluralism and interest
group participation,
checks and balances, veto groups,
incrementalism,

.le,islative-co™,ittee-a,ency

aUiances,

se.iousl,

.

are supported in
terms nf
Of their immediate
and personal
Pol.trcal benefits;
thus, there is
the tendency toward
syn^oUo acts whioh
achieve temporary
.reathin. ti.e „Uhoot anta,on..in,
the powerful
interests which would
feei

m

•

•

assured by pseudo-policies
icies whiVh
P
which, like nondecisions
generally, give time the
opportunitv
pportunity to
t-^
aggrevate our condition
Without substantive
leaislat^nr,
r
Jegisiation, further
deterioration of
our Physical and human
environments is
inevitable.

Realise, too, that
past affluence (and the
illusions Of affluence,
allowed us the lu.ury of
irrationality
and waste.
We never had to
maximize the utility of every
dollar spent. The decision
costs of increased policy
efficiency outweighed the
benefits gained by attention
to
marginal policy productivity.
But in an age of scarcity,
economy is a necessarily
important aspect of a program's
overall objective.
Yet, such a concern
represents a
basic conceptual shift for
the public and for policymakers alike. The requirement
for optimality increases
the decision costs (and
thereby decreases the capacities)
of the system generally. v,e
can expect political resistance to efficiency reforms from
groups that benefit from
patterns of waste and ineffectiveness.
We cannot ignore
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the fact that „e
have reached the
present i^asse
part Because of the
ahsence of past
poUtrcal
prudence and rationality.

-an

.

The procedures and
instxtutrons of our political
syste. further complicate
the tas. of fash.onin,
an
effective response to
the limits
tne
limit-c ciises. is
our system
an appropriate vehicle
for dealing with
these new issues^
in an interesting
article entitled ..clean
Rhetoric, D.rty
water,..
„y,iek Pree.an in and
Robert „. Have^an
summarize the
ne strnnt-nr-=i
stiuctural, systemic reasons
why current
approaches to water pollution
abatement (and environmental damage generally)
are failing.
The authors claim
that despite the legislation
recently passed, the regulatory strategy being employed
to limit pollution "pits
the power of public
agencies against polluters in
a context in which the rules of
the struggle and the information
available to each party are
biased against the government." 5 The economic
inducements public policies offer
to companies result in
sub-optimal measures being taken,
with financial benefit going to
business but little gain
in water quality.
Certain types of pollutants that
are
less measurable or less visible
are de-emphasized in

policy because political pressure
stresses point source
pollution.
Thus, feed-lot run-off, heavy

metal pollution,

loss of soil fertility and nutrients,
etc., are allowed to
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continue.

Federalism creates
reates crn..
cross-pressures which delay

onto anothe..

The lack of policy
coo.aination and
Obstacles in the way of
i„ple„,ent.ng legislation
are
additional causes of
failure.
Here as elsewhere,
the
PoUtical process distorts
policy .ntentrons.
Solutrons
Which are technically
and economically
feasible are not
politically Viable.
Antr-poUution policy has become
..other source of government
funding, another chance
to
distribute public largess
towards oneself.
Optimists who
.re counting on effective,
efficient governmental action
Should consider the
conclusion reached by Freeman
and
Haveman:
"the continued spending
of taxpayers' money to
clean up after polluters-along
the lines of current
strategy-is going to be an
enormously expensive and
relatively fruitless venture."^**
The idea of political limits
is

a

credible addition

to the host of other
challenges to growth.

We may con-

clude that a syneryenic relationship
is present.
That
is, politics may magnify
these challenges, distort rational
attempts to meet them, prolong costly
and debilitating
trends and, in general, achieve minimum
salutary effect
with maximum misallocation of resources
and, therefore,
maximum negative impact on growth rates and
standards of
living.

It is also possible that the political
system
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-

ove™He.„ea, u„..:e .o
cope „.u, poUc.
ove.Xoaa
°^ co.frontin.

Us own U„,ies,
syste.
might collapse, a
pathology best
"esc describe,
described as political
future shock.
SiS_J^5s__o£jLegitjjMio^

The nonphysical limits
to growth discussed
in
this Chapter are all
indications

of the failure of
tech-

nique,

the inability of
various specralists to
manage
the social system. The
law of diminishing
returns

is in

effect on a societal scale.
The more complex the
society, the
regulatory functions ar;
required
the more lawyers are
needed to argie
about inequities, the more
tive personnel are .required administrato olan
supervise, and audit.
Most of Itlse
people are necessary to manage
an extremely complicated society,
but they
inevitably drain away vast numbers
of
tax dollars and thus reduce
the disposable income of the workers
who
producing the goods and rendering are
the
services for which people enjoy
spending their disposable incomes. 38
n^ore

From

'

a

managerial perspective bigness,
centralization,
intensive specialization and
interdependence exact their
own cost in administrative
inefficiency.
in both the
public and the private sectors there
are programs of

enormous waste, inconsistency and
ineffectiveness.

The

optimists' expectations of relatively painless
managerial

—
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-aus

,or o.r

,™an

and p.,3i.u

p™We„,s

fore highly
questionable.

a.e there-

Soch expectations
provide the „,omentun,
for an
accelerating cycle of
Ce.and-failure-f rustratron
,
heightened level of
conflict co,„.rnes with
an added sense
Of urgency on the
part of combatants
to improve or .a.ntaxn their position
through the conung
economic crisis
However, in the absence
of a spirit of
course, trust
socral cohesion and
patrence mutually satisfactory
policies may not be found;
the system
ysLcm tails
fails to live up to the
Cesires of concerned
citizens. This further
exacerbates
the Situation.
"The greater the failure
of the State to
meet the demands made
upon it the more the
State is overloaded With fresh demands
for it to rectify the
shortcomings of its performance.
Frustration in some circles
™ay take the form of
impulsive violence, disruptive
terrorism or well-directed
social protest activity.
The
failure of technique is transformed
into a matter for
politics:
"Our traditional methods of
election and management no longer give administrators
the skills and capacity
they need to handle their
complex new burdens and decisions.
They become swollen, unresponsive-and
repud iated
This grim prognosis strikes at
the heart of our
political system. The era of the
politicized society
'

.

foreshadows the end of consensus politics.

«
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ren5^?L"-*y.°f the system mav

^
down.

New

forme,

'"^^^^

^-^^^

n

be

ons is

-----

^ir^ii:

ries are revived, on
new terms

with

Berr;r::,in.

cr:aZe'L%"""^-

cne desirable direction
of change. 41

This serious observation
is not necessari ly
t ied to the
fate of any of the previous
elements of the limits to
growth controversy. The
squandering of the resource of
legitimacy is a separate
guarantee that major social and
political changes are in the
offing.

Conclusions
Chapters IV and V have examined
the varied aspects
of the limits to growth controversy.
The argument is
clearly not one-sided and will
undoubtedly remain on the
social agenda until events decide
the
issue.

this is no reason to avoid taking
has a critical role to play:

a

stand.

However,

Human choice

"probably the most important

factor in the complex equation of the
country's future is
the way individuals will respond to crises
"''^
ahead.

we must choose between the combatants in
this debate,

So
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snowing that

prudent weighing of
th. av.ilahl
^ ^ ^ tnc
available evidence
IS always subject
to reconsidor.M
Gconsideidtion.
My own analysis
leads me to nmnr-^h
dccepL 4-u
the limibs hypothetic,
''.yLJ"^nesis, not because
the
expectations oi the
p.o-,.o„th position are
i^possi.ie
but because they
are
a

•

,

.

'

i.«probable.

At first yiance the
issue seems to be one
of bal-ce; a product or service
econo.,, ,uaUtative
vs. quantitative growth, a sociaivs. private-benefit
orientation,
cU.ecteC or uncontrolled
development-these terms seem
to summarize the
problems and choices
'

confront.nc, th.s

nation.

We need not limit
growth,

so the argument goes,

only re-emphasi.e

certain of its components
in order to
oonstruct a more appropriate
and sustainable form of
economic growth.
Growth advocates hope to avoid
ma ior
structural change by successfully

tinkering" „r

within)

the present system.

th

(and

The concept of technique is

at the heart of this
position.

The economist searches

for answers in the careful
adjustment of free market

incentives.

The scientist and engineer
seek relief

through the application of their
areas of specialized
knowledge.
And the social scientist
relies on the ellicient management of effective public
policies.
Technical
'solutions^' in this vein can overcome
the obstncJes to

future prosperity without requiring
basic and painful
alterations in our economic, social and
political systems.

.

2G7

Indeed, many conLcMid th^f- -i
that the continuxny
cjuest of the

r

"

A,„eri.

CO..,, .......

-

P™:ecti„,..„,,,.,,,„^,^,^^.^^,^,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^

'^aveinaicat.a.at.h.utiono.oonn.ict.

nolcy have

Science an.

.oc,

been the .ene.o.ent
forces that „iu conti.
..nuG
to reshape the
physical environment in
response to new
economic demands. "'^^

The curative power
of tcchnolo.lcai
tinkerinc, to
rectify the i.haiances
of econon.ic ,rowth
.s, accor.in,
to the li„,its position,
grossly inadequate

to the type of

problems we now face.

These superficial solutions
yloss
over the touqh
jn DaLLics
baf Llo^ and
-.nri major
m-,
consequonces which truly
effective policies would
entail.
More aud more observers
are impressed with the
fundamental nature of the limits
crises.
What of the claim that
we need only adjust the
balance in our mode of
development in order to successfully handle the disamenities
of cjrowth? Tho " t inkeriny "
that would be required for
this endeavor will necessitate
basic changes in our political
economy.
effect, we
will have Uiereu^o) accepted a
redefinition of growth, and
our acting on that new definition
will be nothing short
of revolutionary.
Tfius, while technology might
ideally
alleviate a large part of the economic
hardships and dislocations we will experience, its effective
use will have
major structuraJ. consequnnces

m
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^^ent to the

public interest
est.

Tho best
h
^
The
outcome can hardly
be achieved when
private interests
iiLcrests, fh.
the sacrifices of
which are a necessary
neri^c^o v,,
part of the total
good, can prevent
the passage of
desired policy.
policv
n
Conflict
will cloud both
problems ana sol.Uons.
in
process, .He ,ene„:
lessenxn. Of our poutrcal
capacities „U1 itself
.eco„e part
Of the overall crisis.
. reairstic appraisal
woula conclude that faith in
puhlic policies aesr.ned
to maintain
growth levels is suspect.
an area so fraught
with
-If-interest. socral importance
and conflrctin, opinions,
PUbUc action will never be swift,
clear, cost-effective
and decisive.
„e „iu probably continue
past trends of
•

•

•

m

neglect, conflict, inconsistency
and waste.
The product
of our political labors
„,ay bring relief,
but it will be
transitory, costly and
ultimately self-defeating.
The major consequence of
the political factor will
be on the third variable--tim,^
if
time.
If t„
technology attempts
to buy time for long-ranye
solutions, it is equally
accurate to say that politics
will often waste time.
We
need to gradually adjust our
structure to a new reality
and our minds to new attitudes.
A conservationist mentality
does not develop overnight nor can
it immediately motivate
actions and institutions.
Yet, we have talked of crises.
.
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term which assumes
very iittle ^
time for such social
and psychological
shifts.
^iuiiixttedly,
Admittediv ^
time pressure can
encourage the necessary
impetus to decis.on-.a.ers,
does not create a
cU.ate conducive to cal.
deliberation
and rational
proble.-solvin,
This factor see.s to
be the
-St crucial and most unknowable
rn the controversy.
Reviewing the evidence,
the „,ost prudent and
plausible conclusion is that
there will be a long-term
rnere
drag on
our economic growth.
At best this will
result in overall
stagnation with selective
severe distress for „,any
industries, regions and groups;
at worst, economic downturn
will significantly lower
the standard of living for
n,ost
Americans.
a

,Z

-

.

wm

Those who want to keep people

a

part of the history-

making process, who reject
notions of historical imperatives or behavioral inevitability,
ndght object to

implied in my analysis.

I

tl.e

detenni^is.

share with them the belief

that the future is always open
to the handiwork of humankind.
However, the various historical,
ideological, physical and social forces discussed
in Chapters IV and V

compose the context within which the
subjective factors
of technology, politics and time
interact.
These structural givens may not determine the future
but they do have
a

future-shaping role to play.

Problems in the physical

and human environment are imperatives in the
sense that

.
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-ey

are t.e .,ena.

our energies.

^uch,

our a.sc.ss.o,.

,,,,3

they n.cess.rUy
i.peae our

capacities, aivert our
attenUon, aivi.e our
collective
resources, re.uce our
options an., uiti„,atei„
prevent an
accommodation between
further ,ro„t„ and our
values as a
people.
The limits positron
therefore encompasses
.ot,
Objective and subjective
elements in reachrn, its
conclusxon.
in the words of
Kobert Ueilbroner,
..„hether

,^are

-"iHibl^^iL-2L^iii.ciro,^^
^^^^^

be no doubt that

radically different future
beckons.""
Though events propel us
toward limits, our polxtical system hesitates,
recoils and soe.cs expediency.
a

It

is unprepared

(or afraid)

to accept the possibility
of

limits, to conceptualize
a no-growth society.
NO toerican politician
has ever been
able to talk about [problems
ated with a no-growth future];associthere is no political language indeed,
in
flmerica-not yet— in which they
can be
discussed, no language not
founded on
premises of growth and expansion,
and
the country desperately needs
such a
language
The demands of the transition
period are enormous.
Just
as growth helped mold our
conception of ".hope," "success,"
and "the American way of life,"
so limits may be equally

demanding in reconstructing these images.

However,

if the

limits position is correct, we will,
we must somehow have
to accept our new circumstances.
Indeed, even though the
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political syste. .ef.a.ns
fro. conr.on.in,
the issue
°^ no-g.o„th, „.ny people
are slowly awaKenin,
to the
prospects of iimiL..
lirnil-s
r..^
But
how will society
understand
and interpret the
evolving political
economy. The ne.t
Chapter examines the
prospective Battle over
this ,uestro„
its implications
for the future of
..errcan politics.
i,

CHAPTER
SPECULATIONS ON

TIII^

VI

FUTURE OF POLITICS

Introduction

This chapter speculates
on the political questions
dominant in a no-growth or
slow-growth future.
Our
initial Objective, however,
is to examine the process
by
which society cones to recognize
the new economic rea.Uty.
conflicts surrounding this
process-fhe politics of awareness-are the first shofs in the
political battles to
come.
Attention next turns to forecasting
methodology.
Biases in current futures research
are noted,

and the

"scenarios" approach employed in this
analysis is introduced.
Discussion then focuses on the various
scenarios
competing for donu.nance in a future of
limited growth.

Specifically we will study the conflicting
interpretations
of limits vying for popular support,
the strategic
appeals associated with those interpretations,
and,
ally,

fin-

the factors determining the political success or

failure of the conflicting images of the future.

The

chapter's conclusion probes the implications of "limitsto-growth" for the future of democracy in America.
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Despite the evidence
.n f.vor of the
li.Us-toSrowth posit.on
.ospite the headlines
wh.ch ..pi..ito. Us vai.dity, the
pressures fo. change have
not
built sufficiently to
force the t-i-cacion
creation of a» new political system premised
on a new set of
political issues
This ti.e la, is critical
for the analysis which
foUows
«e cannot usefully
speculate on the dynamics
of a future
political situation until
we know how that
situation

evolved.

Eudolf Klein alludes to
this preliminary concern
in posing the following
question:
"what are the social
and political processes
which will produce a stable
society, as distinct from
the social and political
problems that may be created
by the emergence of such
a
societyr'l We need to examine
the means by which the
limits-to-growth problems presented
in Chapters IV and V
will lead to a general
acceptance of economic limits.
The future is an outgrowth of
the process of economic
decline as well as a product of
a declined
economy; put

another way, the politics of limited
growth reflect the
politics of limiting growth.
Resistance to the Idea of Limit s

Creating

a

limits consciousness will not be easy,

so intense has been the support for
the growth-as-is

'
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position.

B.

Bruco-Briggs (citing Hudson
Institute
figures in an art.oXe
representative of all professional
optimists, has proclaimed
the present feasibility
(read

desiraMUty, of

a

world of 15-.0 billion
people

consn,,,-

xng on average the
products and services of a
modern
American upper-.iddle-class
fa„,ily-a 100 fold increase
in world productive
capacity. ^ Additional
examples of
optin,ism abound.
Even the calendars seen,
to inspire
confidence:
"the cultural heritage of
nullennialis.
leads to a widespread feeling
of hope that rounding the
bend of this last thousand-year
cycle will usher in a new
and better era for n,an."^
President Carter has discovered
that the energy crisis is not
sufficiently war-like in
its magnitude, as of yet, to
impress upon the public the
need for national unity above
politics-as-usual.
Indeed,
the mood of progress infests our
attitudes almost in

spite of events around us.

'

Individuals, divorcing their

own material fortunes from that of
the society, expect

personal improvement even while acknowledging
the troubles
of the present.''
The public's faith in future growth is further bouyed
by business interpretations of the limits debate.
(Zero Economic Growtll)

The ZEG

position, according to some

business analysts, is planting the seeds of' its own success.
Fruition depends not on actual environmental or sociopolitical

.
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i-uts create

climate of economic
opinion .es.stant
to growth.
onrney Brec.enfeia
..ritin, in the Saturday
believes that current

—

'

a

(and inture,

--It

.iow^o:^^

tro™ ..siness insecurity
about the level of social
support for growth.
Business leaders are
hesitant about
making an investment in
the
unc ruture
futnrn because of
forces
which make their growth
plans very
cuy iiSKy
risky (e.g.,
(e a
consumerism, environmentalism,
labor demands, government
interference, an anti-incentive
tax structure). ^ Many
of our
economic ills arc therefore
"cured" with a healthy
dose
of optimism.
NO doubt there is some
truth in this observation.
A precipitous loss of
public confidence would
very quickly incite a
run-on-the-banks mentality and
result in a psychologically-induced
economic collapse.
SO the maintenance of a
positive economic posture, which
includes the belief that obstacles
can be easily overcome
by technological advances or
by minor adjustments, is an
important cause of business opposition
to antigrowth
enthusiasts

International economic and political factors
can
encourage a "growth-at-any-price "
attitude.
When future

economic expansion is tied to notions of
national security,
society tends to tolerate the domestic costs
of growth.

David Amidon states this point clearly:

n
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There will continue
to be Virtually
virtu.
irresistible worlrl wnVi
to growth prec?sel7so^.r""''""^^
SO loncj as there
i
ny,^r^r.A ^^^^-^^^-^Y
conflict
iT.T^'''^ international
anti-growth,
nationspates is the ate^v'
attachment of rival
blocs i-ofv
^^'^ relatedness Of ec^°"°'
economics and power and
presselms to "afford a °PP°''t™ity which
chance to increase
power i°
Policip=, t„

^

'^"^'^"^^^^

«het^ej-r:!;cSnt[ro^cr;L\-fnrjr'^:"that a^ythinq'thaf
3^^=
i?,^ht
f--^'^"'^"^'^ its poJer
a possible aH

canno? H
cannot
be neglected as

.

Growth""
Growth of course, is col.?rict
generally supposed to contribute fairly
directiy
to increased national
power. 6

^

Resistance to growth-reducing
policies takes on the aura
of patriotism.
This,

however, will not still the
debate.
Programs will be proposed
which, for instance, impose
strict regulatory standards
on the discharge of
industrial
wastes.
If foreign "enterprises
were not subject to
similar stringent supervision,
they would enjoy relative

price advantages in international
trading."'

This would

adversely effect our balance of
payments, spur the export
of investment capital, magnify
the economic
impact of

antipollution policy, and thereby intensify
resistance to
a

limits-to-grovrtli awareness.

A great deal of the popular
opposition to the limits

position can be attributed to the structural
biases in
how we perceive indicators of the costs
of growth.
The
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as

„a.u„i.

.0 accept pre..,,,

natural problems as
the 7oro
zeio base acjainst
which to con.pare
future disamenities.
Our past .v,
experience with limited
con.u.os up :U. u.e
„.,.,3 of
.„,„,,,„3
periodic recession, an.
depressions .Ha. have
increase,
unemployment, decease.
Uvin, stan.anKs, an. .eon
the
source Of so „,uch
.tsen-.
The equations have
been hurnec,
the public's consciousness:
.„.-owth = affluence.
l-i".its = deprivation.
Perceptual bias is also a
factor
in the weicht „e
yxve to economic measures
.

"

of well-bein,,

AS

a

result, people are
inclined to overlook any
evidence
that economic activity
may be reducing their
standard of
living.
communities defend industrial
plants that pollute
the air and water because
of the alleged primacy
of monetary considerations,
other examples indicating
a similar
distortion of values can be
found.

Perceptual bias also refers
to the way in uhich
signals of decay are conceptually
isolated from their
economic and political roots.'
The health hazards imposed
by certain types of pollutants
are difficult to
monitor.

Built-in time lags, interactions

wi

i

h

environmental pro-

cesses and synergistic relationships
with other pollutants
(as explained in Chapter IV)
complicate the task of tracing
responsibility for the specific danger to
a specific
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co^eroiax ac..v.U..
the^selves

Kn-,

. o™,ental Capers „Me.
,„.,,,es.

....eas.n, a,,.e,ate
v„,„era.nu. a..„easin,

the likelihood that
°^ the population

ha™ «iu occr
"
win ,e aiiected,

'

thah
'-•lat

ah-,
higher
a

percentag e

that the severity

„U1

be

proportionate!, greater,
perpetrate the raea that
^rvid.al
fate and chance, not
political and economic
structure,rTI7
behind the pollution
pro.le..
continuing along this sa,„e
vein, many dramatic
tic signs
q-innQ o-f
^
of environmental
decay are perceived
to arise from diverse
and seemingly unrelated
sources.
As
a result, broad
demands for basic relor,,,
get transformed ,nto
weak piecemeal and
issue-specific proposals; examples
include
an air inversion in Los
Angeles, unreclaimed strip-minod
land
rn Ohio, soil erosion
in Kansas, cancer deaths
and birth defects near nuclear power
facilities, massive oil spills
off
the Texas coast, or a
worsening water table in Florida,
viewed
as isolated cases, these
events could be minimized as
the
•price Of progress" or the
"plight of
industrial man."

A

similar form of perceptual evasion
occurs regarding the popular understandinc, of social
problems.
The tendency here
is

to place the blame for crime,
delinquency, declining social
cohesion, etc., on the superstructure
(e.g., permissive values)
rather than on the substructure
(inequality).
It is obvious

that overcoming these biases and
building an awareness of
the true import of the growth crisis will
be painful and
therefore resisted by many.

This resistance is not confined to any one
ideological
position.
Opposition to limits spans the political spectrum.

Advertisements by companies favorinq growth skirt
the

fundamental nature of the limits debate.

A public

2

--ice

.essa.e p.o.oted
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,.,e

.VK.ert...n, Council
of
A.eri.a ...s.ness
a.na.n„ as.s „Uat one
person can .o
to so.ve t.e
polXut.on c..sis. rn.
...esUons Uste.
<-9., Cleaning spark pl.,s
to cjet better ,as
„ulea,e,
putting Utter in a

Utter basket, are

olterec, as v.tal
steps towar. an
eC.ective solution to
envrron.ental decay
The prece concludes
with a reveaUng plea:
"Above aU
let's stop shitt.ng
the bla.e.
People start pollution.
People can stop it.
When enough A.,erieans
realise this
we'll have a fighting
chance in the war agarnst
pollution."
This approach not only
diverts responsibrlity;
it also sets out a
hopeful and basically
painless .cans
of avoiding the basic
growth-environment choice.
Leftists also attempt to deny
the li„,its argument.
Claiming that scarcity has
been contrived in order to
increase corporate prices and
profits, Stanley Aronowitz
is very „uch a part of
the progrowth perspective.
"I
believe that the chance of
stemming xnflation depends
entirely on finding ways to
expand production of real
goods. "9 Gus Tyler reinforces
the same

theme."

His

support for left-liberalism is
based upon the expectation
that, once in power, its
representatives can remove many
of the contradictions of capitalism
which inhibit
the

economy's future growth.

Both authors contend that the

slow-growth position is elitist and
inegalitarian.

While

.
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there is much substance
to thp,',m
then charges
that corporate
policies lie behind resour,-o =,
resource bcarcity, other
elements of
the limits argument
are J-ess
less clearly
clenn,- a matter of
conscious
manipulation.
That
-nat as,
is
n,o
„u
the characterization
of the nogrowth position as
eUtist does not rin, true.
anv
case, the pro-growth
stance taken by most
companies and
leftists indicates the
ideological breadth of the
resistance the limits position
generates.

m

Final mention should be
made of the "insider's"
assumption that the pollution
issue will follow the usual
cycle Of public problems
and eventually decline
in popular attention.
This is a common pattern,
according to
Anthony Downs, but one that
is unlikely to occur for
this policy area." The author
cites a number of reasons
why he expects that ecological
matters will remain in
(perhaps even dominate) the
public spotlight, reasons
which can also apply to other
problem areas we have
examined.
This,

then,

is the dilemma of transition

confrontation between

a

— the

set of events and concerns which

will demand increased attention and
massive resistance
to the economic implications of these
events.
How will
this resistance be overcome?

The following section

discusses the various ways in which the public
will accept
the validity of limits to growth.
This is the politics of
awareness

:
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Those „Uo already
have .ee„ convertea,
„Ho welcome
°^ have .e.U,nec, ,he„selves
to the i.penain,
aecX.ne
.rowth rates, ao not
reaaUy a.ree a„,o„,st
themselves on
ow the p^hUe.s
..a„a.en.n,..
ta.e place.
Some o..ervers
bel.eve that society
„Ul vol.ntarUy accept the
ethics
no-,ro„th. reduce
personal and social
aspirations and
develop into a ior. of
steady state.
.he toUowrn, com-nt by Erich .antsch is
indicative of this line
of
thinking

' '''''''
T'\IT'T"''''
possible

1 think it
conclusion,
is
iL, we shall have to
that
net the W^sJern
countries not only to
prevent their
that'^he
We:t"TJlJ
^-^"^i

h^

dard of

;

•

^^""""^ ^'^^ rnaterial stLn-

°^

^^^^ population,
consumption
and taking
^
"'"^"^ equitable
^
distribution o?
of ^
the world's resources.
This
IS going to be hard
on the Western
governments and even harder on
the
people. -LS

cu??.a sh^ro

I

such a view depolitici.es
the process of linuts
"consciousness raising" and consequently
is able to gloss over the
conflicts that such a transformation
would entail.
A
variant explanation of the vol
unta ri ..t ic transition is
offered by Walter A. Weisskopf
According to Weisskopf,
everyone in society is experiencing
a profound loss in
.

„
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non™ate..a. ..,..3

^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^

the steady state
is desirable
existential
existential ly even thouah
It IS not yet a
physical necessitv
ece^sity.
t do
I
not doubt the
truth of this
conclusion
sion, but
hu^ It^ IS quite
another .natter
to assume that our
exi sto„n
existential
loss applies to all
and
xs seen with similar
clarity by everyone.
,

1

•

,

,

The Obstacles to
voluntaristio transition
scenarios
are both political
and conceptual.
First, while the
sta.es people have in
maintaining present
arrangements
are real, the future
remains vague; interests
have not
yet concretised.
One's losses from change
are often
Obvious but the future's
constituency cannot speak with
as firm a voice.
Admittedly, some people can
identify
their interests
in a no-growth future
and voluntarily
accept its con.straints.
For most others, however,
living
in a culture that is bent
toward the "here and now," a
more
compelling reason to forego growth
will have to
be found.

Second, the shift to

a

mentality of economic limits is
not

something that can be imagined
or Intel lectualized easily.
Awareness can come best only with
hard experience (although how "hard" that experience
will have to be is open
to debate).
An interesting demonstration of
this point
is found in a story told by
Jerry Mandel on understanding
the idea of finiteness.
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have some friends
years ago moved to who about three
Lcr iivliv
ing mc3st of thpir- Hawaii after
land, and who
^econtlv"
wiote me that
they are
« ^
si,Ff=;;
(^''^^"^f'^ring
from
island sickness
TALiUTrTT" tIT°"''- f- -^l-triato
driving
aro:^d'?,™^rj:„^™^^
I

i

lt.Tnt,t'2

-;

,

^^^"^in^

tha't

appe"ar?'^L^°rnr.:r^^^:^-^-"

"^--^^

thi.s'p?oBfii^ °^ Hawaii don't have

sUt"d"'^?"'^-^^^'~
about gettrng

?rlLa'°d:f4^'^->^

"

Off

The limits perspective
cannot be internalized
,y any voluntary effort of will.
will
To
^r.m^
lo some extent we
have to live it,
experience it, in order
n-rr^c^y to
appreciate the change it
demands
in our outlook and
conduct.
.

A quasi-voluntaristio
vision sees the coming
decline as a result of the
reevaluation of public marginal
utilities and a subsequent
steady adjustment
to a less

expansive and more ecologically
livable society.
The
gradual transfer of funds from
private material to public
or nonmaterial sources of
satisfaction is, in fact, what
is presently occurring
under the notion of personal
and

social trade-offs:

"as environmental quality
deteriorates,

people will, through voluntary
controls and the political
process, divert resources from
material goods to environmental types of material well-being.""

Technology helps

buy time to avert the most serious
effects of this exchange,
to allow for its psychological
acceptance, and to insure
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that the economy
and the
>e socip;^„
,
society can
adapt gradually
The growth mentality
ty (and n,„
^
therefore
the political influence Of growth.s
advocate., slowly loses
rts pulUng
power as the high
costs and deep
contradictions of further
.rowth .eoome self-evident.
...s last point has heen
aptly Phrased
.y .y,,,.^
conventional
economic assumptions
prove inconsistent with
emerging
ecological realities,
economistic UUnking loses
credibility..."
,,,3 gradualist version of
limits-awareness Places us in the
middle or turning
point of a classic
S-shaped growth curve.
As we approach the
..ceiling conditions', imposed by a
closed ecological system,
the slope
JHlturally levels of f
The question of how
to reduce
growth is irrelevant. We
would not voluntary choose
a
steady-growth policy and repudiate
growth; instead, we
face the prospect of slowed
growth (with some regret, I
suspect) as a consequence
of policies dealing with
other
problems that have risen in
priority to the
•

.

..crisis.,

stage— social breakdown, water
pollution,

etc.

This vision does have a
political element.

The

incremental antigrowth impacts of
numerous, separately
contended policies, rather than the
conscious mass acceptance of

steady state, more realistically
portrays
sociopolitical processes. In addition,
it does not fall
victim to the failing found in much of
the ZEG literature.
the
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The social values
we have
ave lostiost-coimnunity, unalienatinq
work life, authentic
personal relationshio.
-i-t,xdi.ionsnips
cannot be

—

Of our econcv, not

Us

continue, y.owt..
cause Of gro„t„-.inaucea
pro.le.s, .na, as

...

,.as

the root

.een often

scenario assumes that
c.^^ „^
the crd
x-ne
crises
we will confront can
be overcome through
piecemeal pro.ra.s, that
our structural
dependence on growth can
be withdrawn in stages.
Thxs rs
n,y opinion,
not lively.
E. P. Schumacher
parnts a
-re accurate picture of the
difficulty involved:
..the
present consumer society
-LCLy is like
liko a. drug addict
who, no
matter how miserable he
mav teel,
fp^^i
-f^
may
finds
it extremely difficult to get off tne
the nook.
honk "^^ Any
a
time gained by technological advances is, like
an addict's

-

,

i

"one last fix," a

reason to believe that limits
can be permanently avoided,
and therefore a chance to
postpone the processes of
reform.
Gradually "tapering off is
conceivable
but not probable.

An effective way of encouraging

a

limits-awareness

is by indicating the
consequences of ignoring its inevi-

tability.

AS Frederick Ferr6 poses
the dilemma,

Either the ending will be involuntary and tragic, through the
dooms
of starvation and disease,
or through
widespread pollution catastrophe,
or
through economic collapse due to
exhaustion of nonrenewable resourcesor the ending will be voluntary
[gradu"^^^sly horrondously dif?"^19
•

*

286

The potential of
disaster
aster is
i« a, popular
theme.
This quote
.ndrcative of the
general Moo„.saa,..
approach to no.erre offers socret.
no choice re.ardin,
ii„,U3
but a very important
choicp
Choice whhi
with respect to when
the public recognizes
the necessi
loceosity
tv of reducing
growth.
Delay
brxngs on disaster.
x„ reality, though,
the doo.sday
^^terature is a..ed not
at prediction but
at dra.a.
.
believable simulation of
a major social
or environmental
crisis may be sufficient
inducement for readjustment
in
.rowth policy.
own
,.,y
Reeling is that such
simulations
wxll have negligible
effect on long-term trends
given the
strong resistance to
the limits position.
A more realistic cinu
and less r^r^mn^
dramatic version of the
disaster thesis ought to
be examined.
Perhaps our economy,
structured for growth rather
than for

-

™.

.

'

^

stability, will

periodically overshoot its
natural limits (whatever
they
may be at any given time)
and then abruptly tall
back
down to a lower level of
economic activity and personal
(dis)comfort.
Robert Heilbroner posits this
bleak sequence
Of events in his analysis
of our awakening to
the new

order.

There seems no hope for rapid
changes
in the human character
traits that
would have to be modified to
bring about
a peaceful, organized
reorientation of
life styles.
The myoj^ia that contines the present vision of men
to the
.

.

.
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TOre diffi°uir"^9''^' rendering stiu
retrench,;;:nt'an; r^edi^f
u^n'r'^f'^
fore

J

"thei than

urS;"L^--;:„-'---;--n,e
by conscious rhoico

hv

^xcixiy viable social
system. 20

Spas^otio growth thrusts,
followed hy periods of
retrench-nt, depression, and severe
hardship, win by .agrees
^Iter oor psychological
and structural
inclination toward
""bounded, undirected
^ater.al growth. . ..storm
oi cr.sis
problems" will provide
^
urnvir^c a sufrrcrent
enough demonstration
of the inevitability
of limits ^^
to iorce some
y oi
reevaluation
of personal and social
goals.
•

This examination of the
possible transitions to a
limits awareness addresses
a number of the
concerns
raised in this chapter.
First, the level of conflict
engendered in coming to grips
with our economic fate will
carry over into the future.
Intense animosities will
hinder consensual no-growth
strategies whereas a spirit
Of common sacrifice will
be to their benefit.
Second, the
manner of our confronting limits
will go far to determine
the actual level of sustainable
growth we will have
achieved, an issue of immense and
obvious importance.

288

Third, the debate
over Limits
xmits wiJ
.
will continue
even after
the structure ha.
adapted.
rxu.n^^.
Lxpansionist interests
wanting once more to 004- 4-v
U.st the waters oi:
growth will face
countergroups seeking
J qualitative
qualitifiv. improvements
from further
I

.

•

i

•

Fu^tures_Je£ecu^
The e.e.,ence of a
-rutures.. industry has
.pawnee,
the kind Of adherence
to do^.a prevalent
rn other .ore
established disciplines.
"Prof essronal predrctions''
eo„,e
fro. acadenucs „„a
research rnst.tutes which
contemplate
the future fron, the
vantage point of economic
and technologxcal imperatives.
Decision-making (and therefore
future-creating, in the
post-industrial society will be
marked, according to thrs
school of thought, by
reliance
on specialized knowledge
rn all spheres of
policy-making.
Ideological (value, considerations
give way to questions
Of technique.
Increasingly, the rationality
of means and
ends loses its political
element and takes on a deterministic meaning.
Although paying lip-service to
the idea
of value choices and public
input, many futurists support
a set of assumptions and
criteria which effectively predetermine or at least strongly bias
the eventual policy
selection.
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Samuel P.

comments on it in the
following:

social

and

1^

f

^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^

^
.Ur''""-'
T ^""^ ^
''^

^'^^

economic,

teristic: ''T^ey'do
central
role to the natL
institutions? po iticai'^ro'"'^'^^^^
political iuiers,
rulers or
o^ political
noi^f '^f^"'^'
values
Tn
To aa „„
considerable degree inf^,^t
tt'

Tl]r^J^^r^^

cincept^-i^n-^

This omission is somewhat
understandable.
in other fields,
futures

'

Like experts

..experts" tend to interpret

political input as interference.
public Choice adds
tions.

An acknowledgement of

major element of ambiguity
to predicTherefore, the hope as well
as the expectation
a

is that this factor not
enter their equations.

However, the conclusion that
politics is absent
is not entirely accurate.
The establishment approach
to
future forecasting is as
political and strategic as was
the ..end of ideology', position
voiced a generation ago.
Perhaps the most lucid statement
of this criticism is
made by Jan Miles in The^overty
of Prediction
On the
.

implications of technical methodology
upon futures
research generally:
It is probable that quantitative
social

science is largely reinforcing rather
than challenging an image of a future
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tion and statistical ^?^h

"^^"''^^^-^i"i-

•-science
priesthood, can coL. v ?^
the
impression
that onlv fho
prescript?ons Sf^ecLicar'""""""'^^'
^^^^1 experts have any

validityjr

Deference to expertise
expert -i^f^ iso ^-K
the encouraged norm.
the public and its
representatives
-i

but
DUX,

Not only

a]
also
so

.h. researchers
the
themselves may become
"mystified" with the supposed
certainty Of the quantified
conclusions.
But what are the
actual political biases of
this
Luro antinniit-^
antipolitical approach?
Miles continues:
^

Thus a great deal of current
consists Of treating trends research
as univer^''''^^^
Predictions
?
^o '.Iv contingent
oolely
upon technological
and economic forecasting,
of technolocrical
fixing- and technological
of prescriptions of piecemeal planning,
reform to
ensure the adaptability of
the status
auo, and of pouring scorn upon
tive conceptions of the future. ^"tiH"a2 3
'

'

The dominant futures research
paradigm utilizes a methodology which gives the appearance
of objectivity but is
in fact biased, reaching conclusions
which give the

appearance of inevitability but are in
fact open to
political choice.
Additional bias stems from the irrelevancy
of much
of the forecasts coming out of the
establishment perspective.

:
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Their proiectics
tena to ove„„.phasi.e
changes
the
for.s Of society.
Por example,
alterations in the
context „ith.n wh.ch
traditional social forces
operate
(e...,

P-3iaentraX-Con,ressionaX relations,

feaeralis,,,,

the future of our
cities)
itics) may
m;,v leave
untouched the most
important substantive
issue<. (e.g., degree
issues
of control
individuals exercise over
fo
u
life-shapmg
decisions, changes
the allocation of
valued material and
nonmaterial
-sources). .He fre,uentl.
idealised .mage of a
consnmerrst future ignores
the more basxc question:
i

1

i

-

WUl

the

new gadgets and services
of tomorrow improve
our lives
or divert our attention
or
be a cause for further

conflict and insecur.tyP

enw,

P.ture modes of social
organx-

zation-the formal element-may
not address our deeper
need for more rewarding
social re la t ionshxps

,

an increased

potential of self-actuali.ing
lifestyles, or more secure
and satisfying self-images.
The politics of the future,
if it is to have meaning
as a distinct change from
the

present, must involve some
impact on these most basic
of issues.
Trends and alternatives must
have a connection
with the substance and not just
the forms
of the future.

Given the heavy influence of the
technof utur ist
perspective, it becomes critical to
reemphasize the role
of people above imperatives.
Dennis Gabox states the case
we 1 1
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The future will
be mad. lo^. bv uhn^
objectively rno" ik-.
^ '^'^'hat is
take to bo t rue hr. :r ^"^ ''^'''^ P^°Ple
to their qon
7 ^''^'y '''^''^'^ that
about it,^what'they^^::^^Hr;^^^/^°
and what di r
^'^'"'''^ efforts
make tor the tin,flLnco
5
"^^"'""^^^
'^'^^ they
will thus crea;ef24'
•

I

r

,

,

^

'i

-

this regard,

the often-abused
word ..crisis.,

is useful

discussin, stressful
social sUuations
because it is
not deterministic
but
nn 4k
jjLii.,
on
the
con
conttary,
f-

1

leaves room
i

f-or--

indeed, probably
necessif ates-.political "
activity.

An attention to crisis
focus on the particular brinqs us to
iss. is of pubparticular
points
po?n?s"irtim''
time, on the policy
options
that were considered
and chosen b^
governing and influential
el tes
and
on the way in which
the cri t cal re-

m

:ff:ct:d?25^°--^^^^ actors- w;L^^
The future is open-despite
the probable constraints
of
economic limits-and many
alternatives exists from which,
presumably, the people will
select.
How we view the
possibilities, potentials and
implications of these options
(in fact, whether we
contemplate them at all) will determine the shape of our future.

The thought that the public
will somehow collectively select one or another
alternative future seems the
height of political innocence.
Yet, in a very real sense
this will inevitably occur.
Specific issues will of course
be handled by those few in positions
to make decisions.
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The

™..s.oIe Win,,

to p.ov..,e a context

"hich policies are
chosen, an.
help predetermine

.u,

,:Hat

sense it

wUi

the oFficim
olf,c.ial „
evaluation of the potential
Wendell Bell and aa„,es
A. „au present a
,

alternatives.

wUhin

.

™odel of social change
which incorporates the
pubUc
Choice perspective.^^
it is sche.aticaUy
represented
Figure 1. According to
Bell and Hau, the
decisions
that help Shape the
future evolve out of an
accepted
i.nage of the future.
This i.age is formed ,a„d
continually reformed) from the
interact-inn of our
xncoraction
perceptions
Of reality and our
personal and social values.
it, in
turn, operates w.i thin the
decision-making process to set
in motion the ludxvidual
and collective actions
that will
construct a new reality. To
be sure, an image
is not

self-fulfilling.

It

might be unrealistic and
therefore

beyond the system's capacity,
or

,:

may be short-sighted

and contain the seeds of its
own destruction, or it may
be
thwarted by outside factors which
society can neither

anticipate nor control.

Generally speaking, however, an

appropriate, popular and dynamic image
of the future
shapes behavior, attitudes and
institutions and thereby
summons forth its own realization.
The greatest obstacle to image-actualization
is
the inevitable conflict that will occur
among divergent

images of the futu.re.

The technocratic model discussed

CYBERNErnC-DECISIONAl MODEL
OF SOCIAL CHANGE
EXOGENOUS
F
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Wendell Bell and James A. Mau, "Imaqes
of the
Theory and Research Strategies," Pell
and Man (eds.), The Sociologv of the
Future
,

(New York:
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above is composed

„.,„e.ous .r.n.U alternat
ives and
Choices but it .as.caUy
conforms to Tho.as Ku.n
.
--iptiono. a dominant paraai,.."
T.e e„o.t o. so,„e
^nte.ests i„ soc.et.
to propagate

t.Us .„a,e to the
e^cXu-

-on

of alternative
scenarios ina.cates
the political as
wen as inteiiectuai
nature o. paraai,.
contircts. Co.nizant Of this fact and
critioxzrn, the narrow
perspectives
Of technocratic
planners, .rthur I.
Waskow wants to

encoorage

a

..politics of r.a.ininc,.

and publicize

in order to create

variety of approaches
to the future. 2«
But, as John McHale
states
^^s, such
surh a h^,
development is already
taking place due to the
tenor ot
Lcnor
of i-ho
the times
which we
a

^

+-

m

live.

There are multiple future
posslbiliPresent replete with rapid
chnnni" uncertainty
chanye,
and trubulence
seemingly oppos;d
dvnan??
dynamic
forces or trends.
Diver gent
theories of the future simply
reflect
this situation of flux and
indeterminacy indeed they are part
of that competitive process of imposing
meaning
upon human events in a
"situation in
which no plausible theory has
emerged. "^^
The future is fluid and "up
for grabs" until such time as
a picture of the issues
central ho Limits to growth politics captures the continued attention
and firm support
of the public (or of that segment
of the public interested
in and capable of having an impact
on decision-making).

What then is the future of politics?

It cannot be a
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static vision; rather,
politics
purities vin
.
vvrll be dynamic,
reflect^n, a Ion,-ter.„
competition between .roups
ana iaeolo.ies
that are attempting,
through the promotion
of a speoific
-age, to set the .Mased,
groundruies tor the ne.t
halt
century of our history.
short, society will
„e
.uided not .y a ooilective
rmage of the future but
by
the balance of
poirtrcal power among
contrasting and competing images.
,

m

Delineating these specific
alternative images is
the most futile of
undertakings.
People's expectations
and desires will change
as circumstances
change.

Also,
in a real sense we each
have our own individual
dreams
(and fears) for A„,erica.
Finally, many of the better

publicized images are form
variations on a sxngle substantive theme. The full scope
of possible futures cannot
be encompassed within one
paradigm.
I
have chosen to
sketch out four alternative
images
or scenarios, not be-

cause they represent all currently
viable options for
policy-making and future-creating,
but because they are
sufficiently diverse to include the
major perspectives
of social theory. These scenarios
will be offered as ideal
types, indicative of four distinct forms
of political/

electoral/psychological appeals.

The neo-liberal or plur-

alist scenario' represents, in essence,

a

continuation of

present political, social, and ideological
arrangements.
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niodified somewhat
to adapt
adaot tn
r
to ^^
the fact
of economic limits.
The radical or neo-M^rvio^
neo Marxist paradicjm
views limits as an
opportunity to create ^a iof4-

left-oriented mass constituency

de.andin. .asic change
in the stratification
system.
.he
corporate-conservative or
neo-fascist model is primarily
a counter image,
designed to thwart leftist
influence
While continuing to
centralize political, economic
and
social power in the hands
of an elite.
The traditionalauthoritarian or middle-Class
conservative position seeKs
to accept limits by
reverting to a
more static social

system and more controlled
forms of economic activity.
Within each image a great
deal of disagreement can
be
found, but it is the
differences among these scenarios,
not within them, that
constitute the broadest- that is,
the least self-limiting-conception
of future politics.
The strategies associated
with each image of the
future are also ideal types, to
be strategically discarded,

readjusted or combined as social,
economic, and political
conditions warrant. The success of
a strategy will depend
upon its ability to convince the
public that its expectations, its scenario of future events,
aid its explanation
of the present, more realistically and
beneficially deal

with the new economic situation.

garner support, it must respond to
questions.

If a given image is to
a

number of pivotal

Who is to blame for economic hardship
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(rainorities,

foreign powers
wtixs, cioih.i'
capLLalisLs, etc.)? By
what measure are we
to doF-ir.^
define our interests
(as a nation,
a class, a
group)? Whaf
What, Iff anyllnng,
can be done (reform,
revolution, resignation,
^n, etc.)?
etc
tm
The response to these
questions will form the
crux of any strategy.
The political interaction
between the competing
scenarios gives the publrc
the opportunity to assess
the
appropriateness an. desirability
of each.
But this evaluation is not done
isolation.
The context determines
the relevancy and relative
strengths of the various
i-ges. certain variables are
vitally important in aiding or hindering a strategy's
quest for popular support,
by their ability to affect
the public's prior perceptions
of the situation.
This is the core feature of
a futurology
that has not become depoliticized
in which interacting
strategies and socioeconomic
developments will combine
to shape a new set of normative
predispositions and,
.

•

-i

)

m

'

,

with them, a new political system.
This is politics in its most dramatic
form, a
critical battle not over a specific issue
but over which
of numerous perspectives will mobilize
the political

loyalties of the nation for the next 50 years.

To impose

one's perspective upon the political system has
enormous

consequences on the kinds of conflicts generated, the
kinds of policies passed and the winners and losers in
the

.

:
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political wars.

it -Ls
is small woru
^

Uttit.nat

oj

interpretations
°^ the present an. i„,a,es
of the auure are
hotly congested,
sohattsohneiaer .escri.es
what is at
Stake

The_definition of t-hn
I.e. the dominant
preipe"^ tTv-iT-T^
i

i-

I

suprc^e_^^

power-

J>f

?he'?ss;:s\!S^
issues are because

^he

'it,

power q
volvedin the definition?
He who
determines what
i

DolifnV.J

•

the country/ because
iho
Vr"^"^^'
the definition
of thf- ^n-i^
the
choice of
confVT.^
""I^'"'^^
of
conflicts
^^uxxxcls
?
a??n
allocates
power. ^1
'

The following four
scenarios-the
i-iit,
s
trateai
^-v
bcrategies
that. promote
them, the values that
are imDljrih
implicit in them, the
interests
that are favored or
disadvantaged

m

•

by them-all are

potentially part of the politics
of the future.

Liberalism
^2l£_Case__fo r Ideological Cont
inujJ-v

The neo-liberal

(or liberal capitalist)

is a valid point of departure
since,

perspective

despite numerous

claims of its imminent demise,
liberalism remains the
dominant paradigm of our culture. As
the historic conceptual context of our political system,
it defines, at least
initially, both the major policy issues
and the terms of
debate.
The liberal scenario of the future depends
for

3

^ts attractiveness
on the

a.Uity

-ages While

00

to pa.-, alternat
1 ve

cjraauail, aUaptin,
and evolving to the
pres-.es o. eoono„.o i...ts.
.o the extent that
the
w^Xl be an incremental
out,„„th of present trends,
a
modified form of lihr.,-^!
Ixberal-capxtalrsn. stands
a faxr chance
of maintaining its
dominance.

Charles

W.

Anderson uerends
defends ^ho
the pursuit of ideological continuity.

*°
line, of evolution b wh
lulion
"k' we might contrive
which
.ore desirable
£uture\itna'"tior ou of
the materials at hand.
i
„onld
'°
possibilities
cont'"':^'
tained rn the going concern
than to
' scenarios of the fu ure
or
mode?f
"iticism ,„ defining
TltlL'i
alternatives for public choice.32
'

.

.

This is faith in liberal
millenniaUsm,

m

the expectation

that bold, rational policies,
prompted by a spirit of
sacrifice and cooperation for
the public good, will solve
our new problems in the new
age.
Obviously, liberalism
is under attack; the language
of personal and group asser-

tion-"nonnegotiable demands," "total]

proposals"-may very well result

y

unacceptable

in nonUberal policies of

coercion, a form of institutional
counter-assertion.
there is also the possibility that the
urgency of the
crisis will sufficiently modify consensus
politics to

But
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and to adequately

Un

the public

'

s

eyes)

emerging social
pressures.

respond to

Aided by
hv the expertise
and
technology of the social
lai, natural
natnr.i and applied
sciences,
lauded equally by
corporate
ace leaders
P
leader. and
.nH union
spokesmen,
Republicans and Democrats,
this scenario envisions
that
we Will aeal with
econc.c limits within the
parameters
Of our current
political structure. This
optimistic
Claim shouM not be
aismissed lightly. Because
Uheralis™
w^ll most probably
continue to control the
policy-.a.rng
apparatus and dominate the
political spotlight for the
immediate future
it faii^
uture. It
falls upon other
perspectives to
mount a serious and successful
challenge.
If the liberal
response to limits proves
viable, its electoral strategy
effective and its image of
the future popular, then most
of tomorrow's politics has
already been written.
•

Themes and Polici es
A number of themes will most
probably be included
in this paradigm's appeal for
support.

Not wishing to deny

completely the possibility of future
growth-that
relying on this m.eans of moderating

is,

still

social conflict-the

liberal strategy would claim that
economic progress remains
a realizable goal.
Though reduced, regulated, and perhaps
redefined, economic expansion could continue
and thereby
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conunue

wouM

its consensual
innuence;

serve U,c sa„e
function as

the shadow o. growth

,.»tH

hac,

v-usi,.

served pre-

....e is ai„a,s the
possiMi.t,
overe.tencUn.
ourselves.
The rrs.s of „,a,or
reversals ,in social,
ecological an. economic
ter„s, „oui. force
the .over
cnt
"

"

-

—

^

-.at encourage aan.erous

unsustainable levels of
growth.
Of corporations „,ay
have to

A,,randi.in, impulses

be reduced,

likewise, the

destabilising i„,pact of
consumer demands will
.erhaps
decline.
But on the whole the
values of competitive
striving, consumer
orientations and material
progress
so central to the
liberal-capitalist ethos wxll
not be
eliminated, only tempered.
Growth

wil.l

still be

a

prime objective of public

policy, but the actual nature
of growth may be redefined
to avoid the envxronmental
pitfalls of industrial expansion.
Spending on social

services-public investment-

would not directly confront the
environmental factors
limiting industrial growth and
additionally would perhaps
impact positively on the symptomn
and causes
of social

decline, easing pressures from that
quarter.

Mass trans-

portation is the most obvious example of
this shift, but
other forms of collectivist coopera t
i vist ownership and/or
usage is just as indicative (time-sharing
arrangements for
,

clothes washers and dryers or vacation homes,
multifamily

.
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dwellings/ comnmnity
Dased Pnfo.n
Y based
enteitamment centers such
as museums ana
p„..,
•

.

transition to

<anticxpated, continued

service economy,
whether publicly or
privately funded, will
further- ,i
lurther
those dimensions of
growth
least threatened by
environmental repercussions
The fly in the ointment
is the lack of
economic
Wherewithal brought on
by limits. with
industrial profits
declining and inflationary
pressures making budget deficits even less desirable,
the money for the above
policy
agenda is not easily found.
The general
a

belt-tightenmg

will effect government
spending levels, perhaps
leading
to politically explosive
cutbacks.
Whatever the rationale
in terms of growth and
efficiency, the familiar
pattern
of policy retrenchment
in times of economic
retrenchment
will probably recur.
It might be more realistic
to expect,

at least
initially, a change not in
definitions of growth but in
the means by which growth can
be encouraged.
Through a
deeper understanding of the problems
we face and of the
most modern techniques of political
economy, the government (and by this is meant primarily
the federal government) can enable the economy to
drastically reduce

inefficiencies and contradictions.

Public aid to and

administration of the private sector, so the
argument
goes, will be the difference between a
spirit of hope or

'
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one of despair.

Cont-nl
ConLral r.^
planning a„d control
can lessen
the doplicat.on
rn.erent in competitive
capital.s.; it
can direct production
towards ecolo.,ically
sound goods
-d services (thus reducrng
the possrbiLrty of
adverse
impacts on our ecolocjy),
ccoJoci vW It can
coordinate our resources
on the national level
to strengthen our
econo.xc pos.tion vis-a-vxs toreicn
trade rivals; rt can
further
^

4-

cooperation between possibly
antagonistic elements of
the economy; it can
promote research and
development
efforts.
In short, planning
and control wxU maxindze
Whatever growth potential
is still available
to us.

Only
by this further merging
of the economic and the
political
systems can we apply the
tools for sound econo.xc
recovery
More trust and confidence
will be tendered to the political system in order for it
to carry out these functions.
But this does not reflecta departure from the liberal-

capitalist paradigm.
power will not be

a

The growth in formal governmental

threat to private business interests

since the thrust of policy will take
the form of incentives for growth and profits (through
use of various
subsidies, market control arrangements,
and mechanisms
for shoring up consumer demand).
The expansion of public

responsibility for growth rates represents an
adjustment
of

a

second-order value (limited governm.ent) in order to

protect the viability of

a

more critica] and central value
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(-SS acuiescence

to unequal wealth
due to the a.el.lor-

at.n, effects of economic
,.owth)
The fus.n, of social
and scient.fic technolo,,
creates an ..press.ve
potential
to deal with the
problems of -Lxmj.i:s.
limits
The
iiie scenario
anticipates that liberalism
will reas-um
reasoure no
us spiritually as it
attempts to revive us
economically.
.

•

•

We need to note that
this scenario requires
even
-re economic concentration than
presently exists.
According to Anderson, central
planning as a "technique only

worked satisfactorily when
80
was concentrated in 20

addition,
unions.

percent

percent

of the production

of the firms. "^^

success often required the
support of trade
This points up another vital
element in maintain-

ing the dominance of the
liberal paradigm.

The effective-

ness of this level of centralized
bureaucratic control is
dependent upon great amounts of
group compliance.
Liberalism obtains compliance through
cooptation, not coercion.
For example, some leaders in
Germany attribute that
nation's peaceful labor situation
to the principle of

co-determination whereby the worker is made
partially
responsible for the success of the industry.
Along a
similar vein, reformist representation in
the decisionmaking process (e.g., consumerist, environmentalist
and

minority spokesmen on corporate boards) institutionalizes
conflict and creates

a

collective stake in the system's
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maintenance.

-"-on

Pet-^r

pxans in

6

Drucker's observation
about union
nr,i.^i.

^.U^^J,,,,^

^^^.^^

^^^^

thewor.er.srutu.-e has been
tied to the strength
o£
^'^
corporate America
w^a
erica.

Widespread participation
(or pseudoPartroipation, has the
added advantage of
drspersino
responsibility for policy,
always useful if one
wants
to deflect pointed
critrcrs™ and demands for
structural
change.
The public, Kept
kept out of the
^v,
processes of economic
policy-making, might very
well turn on leadership
elements
threatening corporate wealth
and power.
Cooptation
.

(par-

ticipation) may seem to ue
be

a

DalnfnKi^ approach to
palatable
prevent-

ing this polarization.

Traditional divisions withrn
the liberal perspective
will continue.
Left-liberals (reformers) will
dispute
right-liberals (the "Establishment")
over the efficacy of
different techniques for handling
potential social unrest.
Progressive groups would push for
broader participation
and selective appeasement,
noting the recent success in
isolating and defusing student/radical
activists (primarily by responding to noneconomic
issues-drug use liberalization, loosening of sexual standards,
abolition
of the

draft, nationalizing the eighteen-year-old
vote,
art and media censorship)

.

reducing

Student involvement in college

and university governance provides an
outlet for demands

while reducing the economic and political
implications of
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student f.ustrat.o„.

actual .„pa.t o. ,o™aX
participation mechanises on
questions of power and
policy .s
open to debate, but
on the probie. of

eonUict

the consequences are
clp>arclear.

„,ana,e.ent

n
Broad
involvement can qive
the appearance of unity,
create consensus- inducing
depenciency, and cloud
issues of accoun tability-very
useful
strategems for perpetuating
control.
i

•

One important theme
of liberal politics is
the
issue Of economic mobility.
Undoubtedly, opportunities
for advancement in the
public and private sectors
will
diminish as economic stagnation
sets
Class lines will
harden and the upper classes
will become n.ore concerned
about passing their advantages
on to their children.
This is as critical an
occurrence as is the existence of
limits itself.
Economic opportunity and
expectations of

m

.

individual advancement are deeply
ingrained in the American
mythology.
These hopes will not fade away
quietly.
instead, what once was a safety
valve for lower class strivings may become a time bomb of
frustration, resentment
and political unrest.
For this reason liberalism must

continue to press for policies to encourage
mobility and
maintain opportunity. Education had been
the traditional
means of promoting an open class system, but
other mechanisms and outlets are being tried, with mixed
results.
An additional reason for keeping the goal of
opportunity
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as a real o.,ec..ve
.elates to the

U.eral desire to
opti„a.e ,„„tK levels,
an a.™ Ul-se.ve.
a rl,la
class structure:
"fho
r^v
the pressures to
use human talent
efficiently, by rewarding
„,erit, are coantered
by pressures .a.ln, for sooial
continuity in the class
positron
Of fathers and sons...39
^^^^ ^^^^^^
drrection win engender
enormous opposUion and
inspire
intense debate.
Support for this positron
(and other
reformist and adaptive
programs) might

entail a mild
brand of class consciousness
to overcome the formidable
power of economic privilege.

of Liberalism

Liberalism faces obstacles to
continued ideological
preeminence.
Some of these obstacles arxse
out of the

propensities and biases dominant
in the scenario itself.
Others stem from the uncertain
influence of variable factors
which may lessen the appeal of
the liberal image.
The
principal bias is one that we have
already discussed.
Designed to respond to concentrations of
power, liberalism,
in either its Republican or
Democratic
variant, will dis-

tribute uneq_uall>; the burdens of economic
decline.

In so

doing, it will incite rather than mute
social conflict.
For instance, the thrust of regulatory
policy allegedly is
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to controX p.i.ate
powe. .o. the

actual impact

,„ay

pu.Uc

,00.,

,e quite another
„,atter.

The old
laissez-faire views of
economic freedon, and
property
r.*ts have been greatly
modified ,y events and
policies
since the Depression.
A redefinition
redef in
„
of property rights
(e.g.. pollution
regulation, has already
taken place, as
noted by Daniel Bell:
..property today consists
not only
Of Visible things riands,
possessions, titles, but also
Of Claims, grants and
contracts. The property
relationship is not only between
persons but between the
individual
and the govern.nent
"
But this is not so much
i h-

.

the

socialization of private
property which conservative
ideologues warn us about; rather,
it represents the privatization of social policy,
the extension of private
property rights onto selected
areas of the public sphere.
Private interests use public
power for private gain (via
grants,

subsidies, market guarantees and
other specialinterest programs,. Politicians
defend this policy

approach-Interest-Group Liberalisra-as democratic,
of government regulation in pursuit
of

(e.g.,

tlie

a

form

public interest

economic growth, industrial stability,

.

^ ^

However,

political '.control" of business may lead,
through incremental steps, to a major redistribution of
wealth from
poor and middle to the corporate class.

Luther

and Virginia H. nines back up this analysis:

p.

Gerlach

'.Critics

3
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-

'o-^n.' .o.e an.

.„o.. o. .He

„e.ns o. pro-

duction but without
commensurate
1-JT.e contrn,
contiol o
over operation
°^ Partic.patrou u, tinancial
rewards..
.he econonue
syste. ,arns further
legitimacy .hUe the
political systern has to bear
th
Lhxs additronal
burden on its own freedom
Of action and on rts
level
i

of public support.

The emphasis on
long-range planning and
expert. se
and the diminution of
polrtical standards of
rationality
..ight lead liberalism
to adopt a very strong
elitist
position.
The Umrting of public
rnput by intellectual
intimidation and/or manipulation
leaves the expert decision-maker free to construct
and pursue "optimal" polrcy.
Paul Ehrlxch and Dennrs
Pirages attempt to justify
th^s
bias of liberalism.
'

Lonq-range planninq in a very
complex
society will require a much
higher level
of competence in politics.
Governing
must be transformed into a
profession
that .IS reserved for wise and
dedicated
individuals. ... In the short run,
the critical problem to be faced
in
transforming politics might very well
be
to defend existing political
institutions
against a populist onslaught
.

This attitude will strengthen the hand
of status quo interests,

further inega 1 itarian policies, and all the
time

give the appearance of rationality, objectivity,
and necessity.
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—

The fouow.n,
,uote fro.

--="o„3

Busi^^e^

s

.hie. res... .ro™
.

sce.ar io

biased toward business
interests.
It is inevitable
that tlio n
--.U grow „ore slowXy
tha„"it h.^f"""
<;

.>y

do-wlthTsr°o'r\Tfi'
the economy as a
whoL'"'''"'°^'

to

^hat

^ilea.e ou^ of
;\:itib,.ro,.H^Ttar^

a'r:;,r^e1'^L:i"l'r'^^^=''^'^^'--"--tsumer, will all

n^^

\

'

and the biggest lenders/^!"''

^

'''^^

^^n-

^^t'u'

Americans
to swallow-the
wn?io ''m
idea of doing with less
so
that big business can
have more. 44
The article's line of
thinking conforms well
with the
dominant ideology. Even
more important, this may
be the
only policy direction
feasible (passable) within
the
capitalist, inegalitarian
structure of liberal consensus
politics.
Efforts to induce economic
recovery will be
justified by updated versions
of the "trickle downtheory.
Attempts to reduce feelings of
hardship and relative deprivation will be symbolic
(psychic reassurance)
and status oriented, letting
material distributions follow
past patterns.
in short, many of the claims
of privilege,

backed up by the power mustered by the
privileged, will
find a receptive audience in the future
liberal perspective.

Economic hardship, even more than presently,
may
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-

not

a

.a.io„.x ca.a„,u,

,

^^^^^^^^^^^

-.uax.,

^^^^^^^^^

The biased
poUcy-co,„plex envisioned
for postliberalise „iii ,i„,,,
^ ^^^^^^^^

^

distributive arrangements,
but only m,,,,,
Clearly reoo,ni.es the

interests, rnstrtutions,
processes
and attitudes
responsible for poUcy-ea.in,.
.He success
Of liberal strategy
is therefore tied
to tactics of
deflecting bla.e.
a syste. of control
based primarily
on the market, the
allocation of benefits and
burdens rs
not perceived to be in
the hands of an identifiable
social
group.
Because the market mecha.usm
is so highly impersonal, the power to alter
this distributron appears
diffused
inequality seems to evolve out
of abstract, quasi-sanctified
forces or by purposeless
chance.
Because responsibility
is so hard to pin down,
acceptance tends to be the norm.

m

There are reasons to believe
that this reaction
will be less pronounced in the
future politics of limits.
First, the policy load on
government will increase in
amount and intensity. The po] iticiza
tion of more issues
inevitably will lead to more overt conflict
between competing interests over vital policy matters.
Daniel
Bell

discusses this point:
The more planning there

is in a socithe more there arc open group
conflicts.
Planning sets up a specific

ety,
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v?siblfno^''i''°"'

al

"'^i'^'^

prefer-^

becomes

^

value conflicts. 45

^

^hs^rpsns

second, as government
becomes further involved
in the
economy, it becomes
the le.itrmate target
for economic
9rxevances.
The ongoing breakdown
of the public-private
drchotomy serves to remove
a form of conceptual
insulation protectrng the
politrcal process from the
distrrbutrve ramifications of
economic arrangements.
Third and
most important, the coming
economic decline and its
impact on political and
social structure will have
an
illuminating effect on public
perceptions.
"rerhaps the
only benefit of a crisis is
that the institutions become
transparent, that their structure
and power relations
are visible to the naked
eye "
if the reward system
now appears as the consequence
of the purposeful activity
of those groups benefiting
from public policy the most,
its accountability-and the
potential for consciously
.

«

changing the system towards one's
own ends-is clearly
revealed.
Increased economic concentration and
government
regulation tend to shift blame from iimnutable
market
forces to obvious and controllable rules,
institutions and
individuals.
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Many factors intervene
wh.eh either undersce
:ore or
conceai ,and de.iect,
t.e responsr.i
ii

-i-r,

ty of the

systeV

„ay .e the or.anizationai
e«ectrvene..s of eo„,petscenar.os.
-9
Zn the absence of
reco.nizea ie,it.„,ate
alternatives to the
dormant paradr,., any faii.re
can
be interpreted as
unavoidable and outside
of the syste„,.s

control, excusable
because the objective
srtuat.on required
certain outcomes,
unintended in spite of
great precautrons,
etc.
However, the probability
is that lef t-liberalis.
will offer a continual
(though not structural,
critique
of the reigning
capitalist ideology. The
e..istence and

validity Of this reforndst
alternative is vital, for it
offers legitimacy to other
for„,s of leftist criticism
and thereby ,„ay move the
entire tenor of political
debate
in that direction.
The role of the media is
also critical.

In an

atmosphere of natioml crisis, the
media may help lower
expectations and counsel patience,

excuse the failings of

government and encourage an apolitical
fatalism, caricature
extremist positions and dramatize
their potential for
violence, fragment issues and
publicize personal aspects
of the problem (scapegoats and
success stories),
and,

general, may rally around the
However,

1

in

ibora 1 -capi tal i st flag.

in a climate open to some criticism,

the coverage

might emphasize the structural connections
between disparate
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headlines, hx.hl.,,,
corruption and the
unevenness of
economic sacrrtrces,
rllu.inate the substance
ot radical

-terpretatrons of events and
the alternate pol.cres
that
follow, and, in general,
help wean the publxc away
f.o.
a blind acceptance
of liberal politics.
Notrng the
trends of the last decade
and the nature of the
.ed.a's
wor., sa.uel P. Huntrngton
envisions the latter
outcome
as likely.
His co™.ent, directed
toward political conflict
within the executive branch,
applies with even more

appropriateness towards politics
generally.
The national nedia
increasingly
came to conceive of themselves
in an
adversary role vis-a-vis the
executive
government.
At stake were not
conflicting personalities and merely
differing political viewpoints,
but also
fairly fundamental institutional
interests. The media have an
interest
exposure, criticism, hiqhlighting
and encouraging disagreement
and disaffection within the executive branch
The loaders of the executive branch
have an interest in secrecy, hierarchy,
discipline, and the suppression of
criticism.
The function of the press
IS to expand political debate and
involvement; the natural instinct of
the bureaucracy is to limit it."^"^
.

.

.

m

The press can reveal or conceal the failings
and biases
to which the liberal scenario is prone.

Events in the international arena can also improve
or hinder the appeal of the liberal scenario in various
v^/ays.

Generally speaking,

"war and the consequent
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prominence of fo.ei.n
poUcy concorns do in fact
worX
toward a reduction of
Polarisation, " especially
that
resulting fro. class
distinctions/^ This diversion
of
popular attention and the
national unity brought about
by the presence of a
common enemy rs clearly
beneficial
to liberal strategies.
But rntense international
divisions
put additional policy
loads upon liberal governments,

diverting resources from
economic recovery and threatening the level of individual
freedom t)>at is the hallmark
of liberal philosophy.
Such tensions may be inevitable
once the true dimensions of
the limits crisis
are known.

For example, a prolonged
world-wide economic slump "could
force individual nations to
pursue their separate interests and breed an international
political disaster as

well." 4 9

Foreign and domestic spheres interact
in

mutually detrimental relationship.

a

We also cannot overlook

the possibility of raw materials
cartels forming in the

underdeveloped world (parallel to OPEC) which
would be in
position to demand a higher price through control

a

of the

resource supplies.

Third World governments may national-

ize Western industries,

initiate acts of terrorism and

sabotage (even nuclear blackmail) against Americans, or
in other ways threaten our physical and economic
security.

While the negative impact of these hypothetical developments

may be substantial, their political consequences might

1
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actually be
syste„,-supportive, directinu
^-LJ^'-C'ting at.
attention and
'

-

"

unaccountable .orel.n
. p,,.,,, „„,^^,^
„,^_^^^^^^^„
^^^^
^^^^^^
to pass policies
demanding mass sacrifices.
^P'-re.

Even on this score,
the interpretation of
events
not Obvious, and
.Herefore there wrll
probably be some
a.sacreement over the
replications of rn terna t
iona 1 problems.
Mthough direct military
threats win ,i„cst certarnly unify the natron,
other typo. of rnternationa
tension will prod our
patriotism much less.
Foreign
nationalization of American
investments overseas may
.ppear to be a justified
reaction to exploitation,
or a
useful end to a corporation's
e.xporting capital and ,obs
outside Of the Unrted States.
foreign nations experiencing Similar economic
pressures might approach them
in a
way not in keeping with our
liberal framework.
The.
success of these approaches
would put into doubt the
correctness of our own techniques;
their failure would
reinforce faith in our system and
buttress the belief that
nothing more can be done to better
our situation.

-

It is

therefore uncertain how events
overseas will effect the
viability of liberal strategies.

Conclusions
The diversionary potential of any
variable is

critical in estimating the staying power of
liberali sm.

"

—
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^ability can be
deflectoU. i, efforts
to institute left-UberaX
re.or.s confront not
clear opposition
but the structural
,uic,sanC of consensus
politics, and
the severity of the
crisis does not give
credence to
.deologrcal crxticis... the
probabU.ty is that Uberal ls
wrll hold as an image
of the future.

111

But there are too
.any tensions wrthrn the
paradign,
The dominance of
rrght-liberal forces .ay lead
reformists
to embrace the ideology
(and the class-oriented
strategies
of leftism in order to
further the ideals of
liberalism,
on the other hand, the
institutrons procedures and
power
relations of capitalist democracy
tend to block reformrst
goals and to fulfill conservative
objectives.
Can liberalism contain those forces
which are polarizing the
,

society?

The pressures of limits to
growth may make
leftist images and neo-fascist
counterstrategies more

effective at mobilizing support.

Incapacity on the part

of the dominant paradigm clearly
represents increased

options and political resources for those
interests and
ideologies intent on competing with and
supplanting
liberalism.

Half-hearted policies will not remedy the

imbalances and strains of the economic crisis;
rather, it
is reasonable to expect that they will

intensity

botli

the

problems and the public's frustration with governmental
failure.

How liberalism weakens, in which direction it
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leans,

„U1

determine the altern.Uve
images that v.e
^or center stage and
„iu also shape the battle for
preeminence between liberalisn,
and rts challengers.
Even
failure liberalise sets
the agenda for politics,
the
context of the debate.
If the power structure
prevents
reformist policies, structural
crrticisn fro.

-re

the 3eft is

appealing.

if le Et-liberalis.
appears to be gaining

influence and
na success,
surn(=>r^c
Image will

„,ore

a
=.

-.^

corporate-conservative counter-

lively arise.

A polarization of some

sort is probable, either
by the growth of
opposed to the liberal ,„iddle,

a

set of forces

or by the fading of liber-

alism and the increasing
confrontation between policy
extremes.
The most effective strategy
will be the one
most favored by events and the
one most able to mobilize
the public to appreciate its
image of the political future

Neo-Marxism
Positive andJJega_biv e Dimensions o f

RaOA^al_j^^

The drawing power of leftist or neo-Marxist
images
of the future have been successfully
dampened under con-

sensus politics.

Admittedly, egalitarian values have

had some influence, and class consciousness has
not always

been submerged as

a

political force.

Still, as a thorough-

going critique of and major alternative to the liberal-

capitalist paradigm, it has been quite ineffective within
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the poUtic.l arena.

economic
^^PPo.l Of

The awarenos., and i,„„act
of

can potcntiaXl,
enhance U,o .nteX.ecU.al

leru.t po,.c.e. an. cr.a.e

,He

o.oUonal cli.a.e

wxthin Which leftist
stratocjie. wiJi Uour^.n.
As noted in the
previous

section, ,„uch depends

upon the fate of the
liberal response to li„,its.
The
dominance of Republican.
Establishment or probusiness
forces pursuing their
objectives with narrow sel
f-servi n.,
policies may leave
>.cavc
lp.ff-i-iK,
.t.ictt-liberalisni witli no reformist
y
and consensual opti.ons.
There is l.ttle reason to
believe
that the hardship i.n.posed
by limits is a burden that
powerless and powerful will
equally share.
Indeed, logic
(and past practi.ce) compel
us to accept a different
conclusion:
The costs associated with
economic Umils, and
with attempts to overcome those
limiLs through public
policy, will be as unequally
distributed as have been the
benefits of growth.
Obvious economic injustice will make
it more difficult for liberalism
to maintain the legitimacy
and social cohesion necessary for
its survival.

Additional drains on these vital resources
can
be expected

from the increasing

The political system, even with

inc^pl

a

and broad administrative control,

ness of public: policy.

surfeit of information
is unable to hancllo the

problems which threaten growth rates.

The issues have

become too complex and interrelated to be dealt
with

.
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through incremental
and
na plural
icfpluralist
processes; the liberalcapitalist paradigm may
ay no lnno«>k
longer be
appropriate to the
tasks of environmental
protection
detection, social integration,
political staMUty, etc.
PoXUical .aUure a„a f..t.er
deterioration „iii
cre...ii.ty to the ar,™,ent
that
Patchwor. repairs cannot
.end this .ost recent
and ser.ou=
damage to the social
and economic .abrrc.
.adicaX change
is required.
t

•

i

•

Finally, liberalism
itself tends to give
sanction
to leftist
critiques of the system,
a fact noted by
Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Iiriggs
1-^etween revolutionaries
and
tho^i't^if
the status quo v.'iU be
promoted if
there IS a continued tendency
toward
^^^"^"^"^e
the part of the
I'.tVhi^li
established forces in dealing
with
progressive" and/or humanistic
revolutions, agitation, and
criticisms of
the existing system.
The principal
cause of this factor is that
the Western "Establishment" is to a
]arge extent motivated by the same
values expressed by its critics.
Since the
Western leadership itself believes
in
peace, justice, freedom, etc.,
it is
vulnerable to claims that these ideals
have not been achieved. -'0

We might have some reservations
regarding the system's

real commitment to these ideals.

However,

the rhetoric

of liberalism helps instill in the
public the values which

form the basis of the neo-Marxist image of
the future.

'

•
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This alternative
to the
iiloeral perspective
^ lih<-r.i
--c.es o.t a ,u,.,,
^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
Picture o. ..e
^^^^^^^ ^^^^

publicized i™.,e „ou:a
.e p.o.is.ons .or
a .ore e^aUtar-an straM.rcaMon
s.ste., a „ore
ae,„ocra.ic socret., a.K,
more humanistic social
SQrl^^ relationships
v^i
(all hallmarks of
radicalism's idealistic
appeal)
ipeai;.
nnt .^
But
along with this
positive alternative
attracting support there
is a ne,at.ve component critiquing
present arrangements.
This is
a matter of
tactical necessrty. as
navia C. Schwartz
indicates.
j-

It is often easier
to attract support
being

against something rather
"^ner ?han
rnan
for somethina
C4
^^tressmg
what
one
is aa.in^? r
coalition
poJen?
1
tential,
Thus, very disparate
groups
can converge on the
one agreed
''''
overthrow of the hated regime.Slon ^point
'

'

The class bias of governmental
policy, increased and
visible economic inequality,
exploitation anxieties (job
security, occupational safety),
etc., are sufficiently
onerous prospects to spur pressures
for radical change.
These negative expectations, and
the positive image of
the future provided by the
neo-Marxist alternative, highlight the crux of the radical strategy.
This strategy receives encouragement
from the
social tensions produced by limits to
growth.

Economic

'^-t.ess opens up eno^ous
oppo..un.i Ues ,or
polari.i„,
-ciet, axon, .i,,.
^^^.^^^^^^^

the left.

The i^ediacy of
the economic crisis
also
eliminates the ,„a,or
tactic „Mch had
previously been
the route to raaicali.e
the wor.in, class-.raauaUs.,

education, single
issues-the ..politics of
the Ion,
haul...The dominant „ood of
cynicism, powerlessness
loss of trust and faith
in institutions, leads
to a
marked receptivUy to
new outlooks and a
notable expectation of radical change.
The left cannot ignore
this
opportunity without foreclosing
on its future potential
for power:
A turning point, by
defrnitxon, cannot be
returned to.

'

Leftist -interpretations will
also benefit from a
Changed attitude toward the
system in general and toward
the business elite in Dartirnl-irrn.
particular.
j.he generation whose
political socialization encompassed
the years 1960-1974
have been exposed to and
therefore are cognizant of an
undercurrent of structural criticism
unlike most previous
generations.
The idea that something is basically
wrong
and in need of change will not
be too unique or difficult
to accept.
Then, too, there is a growing
realization
that our corporate economy is not
all-beneficent.
This
recognition weakens the defense of the economic
status quo
based on the positive outcomes of the system.

refers to this trend.

David Bell
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A rcoliny has bocjun

lo spro id

in

+-h

nas made the society
uylier, dirtier
"-iodine slZo
^It
sense or
or?/°i'"*=^'
Identity between the
^""^
the public interest =°^P°ration and
has been replaced
'
by a sense of
incongruence. 53
The loss Of corporate
stature cannot help but
,ive aid
and comfort to political
strategies designed to reduce

corporate pov/er.
An additional possible
advantage to the noo-Marxxst
cause hinges on the nature
of the ocono.n.c decline
we w.ll
experience.
if it appears that the
hardships of limits
are not equally felt among
all social groups,
that the

wealthy have been able to protect
their resources and
even take advantage of the
situation,
rosontment and

pressures for redistributi ve policies
will build.
Publicizing both the affluence of the
economic elite and
the deterioration of the living
standards for most other
Americans will make stratification more
visible
and

irritating.

This is especially true if the classlessness

myths discussed in Chapter III remain

a

of liberal ideology and popu.lar culture.

examination of the dysfunctions

oi

is doubly relevajit in an era of

econoiii.ic

formidable element
David Potter's

these equality myths

When

limits:

Living in a, society thai |pi-eac,^hos
practices outward uniformity, [an
individual]
finds himself the ob iect
of class discT- iminations mf)osed at close
quarters and based upon marcjinal,
andl

.

.

.

i
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tenuous criteripi
no longer
unjust and

iTel^l

Suf

'

r'""'
^^^^^'^^

^^^m
.

^'^^ real 'economic
separated
classes,
^""^^
ha^ m^d^ ^
distinction
or
class^tr^li?''^
?
^^'^''''^'-^i^^tion
seem doubly unfair
by elLinf?-'
Ing cirs^T""''"^
'-'''''"^^^y Without
being able
in
f
u

disp^iitiorn

•

.

subjective differentials
morP
^^"^^'i"^^ objective
d?f?pf i'^?' f"-^^
differentials
less evident. 55

There is

strong possibility that
power relationships
between economic groupings will
become as explicit and
repugnant as other class
distinctions. As generalized job
anxieties increase, employers
acquire extra bargaining
leverage in proposing work speed-ups,
poorer working conditions, the arbitrary removal of
"trouble-makers,"
a

tigher work regulations, etc.

differences is

a

The perception of class

critical precondition for

oriented strategy.

In

a

viable class-

the past the differences within

the broad middle class were seen as more
important, but
such distinctions as blue or white collar,
regionalism,
urban or suburban residency, even race and
age, may not
be able to cloak the unity of class interests.

And this

IS especially likely if economic limits make
material

needs and distinctions more central and salient.
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Michael p. Lerner
-rncr

in
ir,

system in ,,„erica" .ets
out

"tk,.
ihe

a

c ^
Future
of the Two-Party

scenario along leftist

lines.

Lerner anticipates
that rates of economic
growth
w.U decrease drastically
due to the inability of
u S
monopoly capital to
continue the exploitation
of Th.rd
world nations or the
domination of the rnternational
economic system
ystem (thc^
(the "^v^^
end of imperialism"
argument).
in
the past, a small part
of the surplus
skimn^ed off the

top by American corporations
trickled down to the lower
classes, providing some
benefits and an apparent coincidence of interests.
However,
In the period ahead,
monopoly capital
will have less room to maiieuvr^M",
this will progressively decrease and
its
ability to buy off American
workers
As a result, there will be
an increase
class consciousness, which wil]
be
expressed first througli labor agitation, second through existing
party
mechanisms, and last through' the likely emererence of an explicitly
socialist
party.
.56

m

.

Lerner

-s

.

assumption, not so unreasonable given the
above-

mentioned biases of liberal politics, is that
the powerful
will pass any hardships of limits onto weaker,
poorer
groups.

A divide-and-conquer strategy whereby ethnics

and poor/minority/inner city elements are played off

against each other is used to deflect attention away from

32

7

structural criticism.

However
wtiver, thi.
.
this c:^strategy
cannot
succeed in weakening
class unity since It
it ^
does not address
tho.a,o. issues Of
.He
sand. e,ona. ..e author
aces not clai. t.at a
socialist victor, is

^

inevitaMe,

but,

in keeping with a
realistic vrsion of the
future. He
does expect that the
focus of poiit.cai
debate rn thrs
country „rll shrft farther
to the ieft.
The issue of
inequality will fi^.^y
.e put on the political
agenda.
Lerner's vision is perhaps
that of a true believer
seeing possible converts
wherever he looks.
Yet, analyses
Of relative deprivation
and revolution give a
strong
measure of support to the
neo-Marxist scenario. An examination of revolution is
highly appropriate to this
study.
It will underscore those
two factors that heighten
social
unrest and channel it towards
politrcal action:
A con-

ceptual rejection of existing
reaUty and organized efforts
to bring to realization a
different image of the future.
The work of James

C.

Davies is perhaps the most

cogent and relevant of any attmept
to grasp the aspira-

tion-frustration-aggression relationship central
to leftist
scenarios. The following summary quote
of Davies' thesis
has been graphically represented in
Figure 2.
Revolutions are most likely to occur
whon a prolonged period of objective
economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal.

•
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"EKD SATISFACTION
AND REVOLUTION

Figure

source:

2

James C Dayies, "Toward a Theory of
Revolution,"
Davies (ed.), When Me n Revolt and Why
(New York
~^
Free Press, 1971), prTJsT
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^'""".'?
and, during the
latter
of anxiety and frustr^M^ "'7''"^

Pated realltyT"

^

™"

'''^''"^'^

antici-

The J-shaped curve in
econo.io capacities occurs
over a
time span too short to
aliow for adjustments in
expectations.
When ..people are .ade
aware of not having „hat
they have been brought
to think it feasible
or proper or
necessary that they should
have/, tensions and the
search
for bla.e results. ^8
government and other instrtutrons
(e.g., capitalism) can be
blamed for this gap, desire for
a radical alternative
builds.

„

An increase in relative
deprivation (and the corollary of perceptions of downward
mobility) is the major

motivational impetus behind leftist
appeals.

As the gap

between needs and satisfactions widens,
the feeling grows
that one is falling behind, losing
ground.
Relative to
one's expectations, deprivation seems
to worsen, whatever
the real levels of need satisfaction.
In

addition, actual

(as

opposed to felt) downward mobiliLy may be an unavoid-

able consequence of the economic dislocations
brought on
by our approach to limits.

What intensifies this problem

are the numbers experiencing such mobility and their

probable grouping among certain precarious sectors of the
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economy.

--ax

,,,3 sit.ation a
.e-ovaX.ation of ..e entire
syste. „,ay ta.e plao3.
structu.aX

interpretations

Of one's predicament
tend to predominate,
as do coUective strategies for
improving one's chances:
"If an
entire stratum, craft,
or profession is declining,
there
is more chance of
unity in misery and a
coUectrve protest

Vulnerable segments of the
workxng class, middle
class aspxrants to professional
and managerial positions,
rural and middle America
generally, and elements of the
intelligentsia may seek redress
of their condrtron through
revolutionary change. These
groups will be hurt by the
economic and social transformations
to come, and therefore they will probably
provide support and leadership
resources for the leftist cause.
And where the normal
channels for collective action are
blocked, and the

policies offered to these groups do
not seem to measure
up to their desires and to the
vastness of

the problems,

then protest will take

a

radical turn.

The pivotal role

of liberal policies attempting to
keep open the class

system is more clearly apparent.

If these efforts are

not made or are thwarted after passage,

the potentially

explosive situation of downward m.obility beckons.
The overarching educational strategy of the left
is to increase an awareness of class unity and
the role
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Of economic position
on one's

U

Social prote.t
Which rests on occupational,
cultural, phUosophical
regional, and racial
bases can be used
xnstru„,entaUy
to further leftist
causes but their long-range
usefulness is Slight because
of the ultimately
divisive classcutting nature of their
outlook,
Li„,.Us can allow people
to appreciate the
srmilarities in therr economic
condition and therefore to
overcome the separations
imposed
by alternate self-definitions
of
fe

.

,

interest.

between blue collar ana
and clerical
rlf^r-ir^^i

oi

The gap

service occupations

will be lessened, increasing
perceptions of a common
working-class
interp^^ic-ir^;.
J-nreiest.
a
Similarly,
other challenges to
the dominant culture neo-nostaly
ia and primitivism,
back to nature, inner-awareness
and personality development, new family arrangements,
antiscience and antitechnology, sensitivity) are individualistic
and apolitical
in their long-range goals but
contain the seeds of a
i

(

radical social critique with neo-Marxist
dimensions.
left anticipates

a

transformation of the ecology movement

toward less reformist aims, and this can be

a

catalyst

for an overlapping coalition of issue-based
movements

connected by

a

The

class analysis of American politics.

Along these lines, Michael

riann

'

s

study,

"Tlie

Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," indicates that,

while the ideological principles of the establishment

.
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P.raai,„, a.e
^^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^^^^

Class ™o„„o.., .e,..,,„,
^^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^

^^^^^^

policies ciass interests
nre accu.aOoly oxpres....
Mann beueves a„u,
SOC.U, sta.in
i .

resuUof

l^he

social xj^ed inabi '^•ty
M tv of
o.t

\-hn
Llio

Irmor classes to
coiuk.cL
their awareness of
tvT»-i-w,,
UL particular
in Loir-'cM
-Lij
csts
Lh a broader
\,

i

r.

L(...j

delegiti„,i.I,Kj

i

vv'

i_

I

uto.pretntion ot .ociety."

„„m u„„.s
will notably raise the
priority oE concrete issue
co„llicts, perhap. to the
po.,vt at whi.,.,, u.o
dominant libera,
abstract beliels w.i
see. loss a„<, e.s relevant.
,„
effect, economic l:i„,lts
win „n.,c.n„i„e the cohesive
ampact
of socialization and
provide a conceptual bridye
llntin.
particular class interests
uut^xcoLo wi
withh a tJioi oucjJu/oinq class
critique

U

,

i

i

,

i

In a relal:od development
we can anlicipate a rise
in

the importance of ideology
qoncraLly.

be under immense pressure from

coming decades.

They

will,

need

a

mn

1

I:

:i

People

wH

1

faceted crisis in

to assimilate and under-

stand the often inconsistent
information and behavioral
signals that they receive. At the same
time the dominant
explanatory framework may have been discredited
aivl

rejected.

Searchi

acting within

a

n<i

poJ

i

for an

i

nterpreta

1.

ticized envjrcninu.nt

i

on of events

,u.d

(movements,

threats to one's interests, calls for pa r tic ipa f ion

,

high

emotions), peopJe may icmore fhe explanations of
established
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-aae.s an. see. so.e
secu...,

..^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

Ideological consbructs.
Short Of

a „,ajor

ideological co.™it„,3nt,

a grouporxented refo™ist
posture (e.g., trade-union
consciousness, .ay leave
„o,„ tor strong pressure
placed sporadical.
ly and for narrow
ends.
However
uwcver, Its
.k't. to inspire
it-c; ability
generalized and intense
dissent
ibsent or f-n
to .
ejicompass a broader
view of polrtxcs and
society is severely
restricted
Anthony Giddens has
demonstrated that relative
deprivation and resentment,
alienation and social
disorganisation cannot in and of
themselves brrng about a
change rn
consciousness. There
inere is
i
m-.^r^va ma^or
perceptual leap that
must be .ade. Revolutionary
consciousness "involves a
recognition of the possibility
of an overall reor^._a:,
c-

^i2ILJ:il_the^^

^-belieOh£t_^uc^^^
th£OU2l^clas^tJ^."^

Offering an alterna"I7^J7^^.

of social order and fostering
the popular

(political)

support in furtherance of that image
are the necessary
tasks of a leftist political party.
The existence of an

acknowledged organ of leftist aspirations
is vital in the
politicization-polarization process. Among the
functions
of the mass-based neo-Marxist party
is providing political

cues for those who are sympathetic to

a

class analysis

but lack the ideological awareness to
recognize their class
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interests on abstract
or drstant issues '
A certain
threshold point is
reached where the
or.ani.atio.;'
ana strength enaMes
rt to effectively
address
PoUtrcal cues to a noticeably
enlarged audience.

The

-edibility Of rts
anti-establish.„ent
a. well, allowing
people to

rather than ask

the,,,

„.essa,e is increased

swij^ ideological aUeaiances

to take the More
difficult step of

rejecting the previous
.odel of politxcal rationality
Without having been offered
a substitute.
The .ove.ent,
once legitimized by numbers
and prominence, can prcnote
the very conditions most
favorable to its Maintenance
and
growth:
sensitizing members to deprivation,
increasing
social disorganization,
inciting establishment repression.
The dynamics of ,„ove.„ents
allows people to make the conceptual leaps required for
revolutionary change."
The

gap between ideals and reality
becomes the wedge with
which the left can encourage
individuals to loosen and
eventually break their attachment to
the current economic
system.
The existence of

a

viable anti-system movement

might also lead establishment forces to
reactions which
would intensify the drift to social polarization.
If

liberalism is itself pushed to the right in order
to counter egalitarian strategies, reformists will find
it

increasingly difficult to differentiate themselves from
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the more critical
left
left.

-nt, .issent
results.
(ascribe,

t„ an
,
In
effort to quell the
„,ove-

is la.ele. disloyalty,

.Uh

counterinturtive

..Where the existing
regin.e tends to
a revolutionary

force

or illegitr.nate
status onto

a

reformist group, the
revolutionary fervor of the
croup
may markedly increase..."
Hadical action becomes
the
only option as the
society contrnues to
polari.e.
The
recruitment of reformrst
groups and other disillusioned
and resentful members
of the old order <e.g.,
elements
Of the national bourgeoisie
embittered over the economic
and political power of
multinational corporations)
offers
a broader constituency
for the left
(but one that will

be a future source of
tension as well)

.

m

sugary,

the strengthening of
neo-Marxist forces and the reaU.ation of the leftist scenario
is possible on its own
(Davies), and downright
plausible if certain actions are
taj.en by liberal forces and
by radical organizations

Which would heighten class
consciousness and mass receptivity to revolutionary change.

Defects in the JLHeftist Scenario
The weaknesses in this scenario, and
therefore
the causes of its potential failure to
dictate the iinaye

of the future, are many and varied.

The first category

concerns contradictions within neo-Marxist
ideology.

The

.
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^trate,, o. u.e ,e.t
is to incite
.esent.en. a,..,.,
"e,uaut.. .uis appeal
rein.o.ces
„..,eria:i3.

ethxc o. U.e.a.
capitalist an. ..viaes
t.e p.Mie on t.e
^asis o. ..at etUic.
Both of these ejects
.u„ .o.nte.
to the aavert.se.
.„a,e ot an e,aX.ta..an
t.tu.e, a t.anscen<^ent social .nit.
.e.on. „ater.ai.st
st..vin,3 an. .eoio.s.es
The not.on that the
anti-syste. .ove.ent.
once in powe.
can heip society .eet
the blocked material
expectations
Of the .ovetent's
adherents conflicts with
the ai™ of
creating a structure with
non-bour.,eoise values and
asprratxons. can a moral and
compassionate society be achrcved
through a polrtics of
conflict, envy, and probably
so.e
violence? The authoritarianis,,,
of the traditronal left
is juxtaposed to the
imagery of the humanistic
left; the
means to gain power conflict
with the broad ends for which
that power is sought.
Consumeristic envies provide a
power base but undercut long-range
ideological goals.
The "solution" is not pleasant.
Either the goal is pursued
authoritatively and the initial strategy
rs merely manipulative (e.g., the Russian Revolution's
slogan of land
followed by Stalin's collectivization
campaign) or the
'

goal is abandoned as the left
experiences derad ical i za tion

Deradicalization is probable if the scenario
is
allowed to develop without coup or civil war.
a

number of forms.

it can

The distinction made above between

take
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the

fo™

vs.

the substance of social
change is appropriately returned to here.
The typical leftist
policy Ma.

'

toward nationalisation
of private property
is an ineffectxve ™eans of chan,i„,
the nature of eeononuc
relationshrps
society.
This constitutes part
of a ...odified, inadcquate definition of 1-ne
tho radical
r;,^-;^-,!
perspective.

-

As E. F.

Schumacher has noted, it is
often the scale of ownership
that is .ost at fault. a
.ore substantial (and .ore
radical) approach is needed
in fostering a humane
relatxonship
between the worker, his work
and
his world.

Perhaps the major form deradica
lizat ion takes is
in the switch in emphasis
from economic equalization to
equal opportun.Lty and social
welfare, primarily because
the latter two goals will travel
on the path of least
political resistance, Frank Parkin
discusses this tendency:
In so far as countries with a
record
of socialist rule could be said
to
differ from others in patterns of
rewards, it is in the relative openness
of their class system.
in other
words, Social Democrats appear to have
been more able or willing to broaden
the social base of recruitment to
privileged positions than to equalize
rewards attached to different positions.^^

...

The role of political expediency is central.

Parkin

continues:

Whether or not socialist api)roaches
to inec^iiality become politically acceptable depends on whether or not they confer advantages on the dominant class, or
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-^niportant

section of it.
WelfaJo
rnaritocratic reforms do
carrv^such advantages.
Cdrry
Faalif^rS
an refornns dosxynel.to
chanqe
?he ru^c^
of distribution and
ownership do not.^f
.

.

Doradicalization will occur
if tho nuddlo class is
satisfied with tho gams n.ade
in oponxn, up the class
systc
However, according to the
neo-Marxrst scenario, such
groups will have been thoroughly
in.acrsed in the leftist

image of the future,

including the critical concept
of
equality.
This points up one of the
most damaging weaknesses of the scenario.
Many people will give support
to radical positions without
ever accepting their ideological underpinnings.
Still materialist and individuali
tic, their attraction to the
left stems from narrow
self-interest, not a cooperati vist or
socialist mentality
This somewhat cynical observation
is well stated by

Lopreato and Hazelrigg, paraphrasing
Pareto.
.

People
do not engage in "class
behavior" for abstract reasons. Thev
do so because it is in their selfish^
interest.
People do not v;i sh equality.
They are merely "bent on escaping certain inequalities not in i:heir favour,
and setting up new inequalities that
will be in their favour, this being
their chief concern."
In the process,
they will support those parties that
oCfer the greatest promise, but will
offer whatever explanations are "fashionable" for their actions, f^^^
.

.

.

An instrumental commitment to noo-Marxism is almost

a

guarantee of declining popular iniluenco with increased
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PoUoy

success.

,s Uu.s .ou.,rul
„...,er a

aete^Une.

leftist coalition
operating within the
confines of pluralist electoral politics
can hold together long
enough
and fervently enough
to truly revolutronize
the stratification system.
The assumption of policy
success is itself one of
the weakest links in
the leftist scenario.
Many of the
administrative problems facing
Irberal programs will also
diminish the effectiveness
of radical efforts.
Indeed,
overreliance on central planning-a
hallmark of socralism
in power-may tend to
strengthen trends towards political
instability and managerial
incompetence discussed
in the

previous chapter.

Lest we think that

a

clear ideology

somehow allows us to apply simple
solutions to complex
human problems, the plight of
England (prior to the dis-

covery of oil

m

the North Sea)

'

should demonstrate the

handicaps under which all systems must
operate.

A Labour

government, sympathetic to the material
demands which its
strategy had helped to promote, had found
it difficult to

institute effective action versus the limits
crisis while
at the same time maintain both a
semblance of national unity
and a spirit of egalitarian reform.

Economic distress

and the confrontations spawned by leftist
ideology encour-

age anger, resentment and even violence, diverting
scarce

political resources towards conflict resolution and away
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economic recovery.

-

,,ere is rea.son to
believe that

the context o.
X..its to ,.o„tH,
de^ocr.t.c neo-.ar.il.
not a Viable and
stable approach.
civen the potential
conflxcts o. a U.its
society, 30,„e fo™ of

authoritarian

control,

£lthe>^b.,^y^i^^^^

be inevitable.

embittered,

,„ay

class „ay indeed becon.e

a central poUtiissue, as so^e contend,
but the ability of
leftist
parties to handle ciaos
class f-nnfii„k
conflict wrthrn
c-al

nonauthoritarian
structures can sincerely
be questioned.
The „,ajor obstacle to
the success of this i^age
is
not those inentioned above.
Rather, like its liberalcapitalist counterpart,
radicalism must compete with
other images in a structural
situation which is not favorably disposed to its message.
Our political culture
has socialized us to oppose
radicalism instinctively, to
suspect its idealism and reject
the substance of its
arguments. This cultural and
ideological bias means that
a heavier burden of
proof rests on the leftist
position
than on other approaches to the
limits crisis.
While
conservative scenarios play on established
patterns of
belief, radicalism requires mass
acceptance of new ideas
and new modes of organization at
variance with past
experience.

The neo-Marxist imago also carries

burden of organization.

a

heavier

Present forms and levels of public

participation help maintain present power relationships.
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The dominant cultural
attitudes of deference,
resignation, parochialis,,,,
and top-down co,,,„,un ca
tion
conservative in their
.nCluence, can be overcome
only
organized „ass involve„,ent
in the political
process,
such a co„„„it,„ent,
dxfficult to achreve in any
era, is
even ™ore difficult
today.
Walter Dean Burnha. has
documented the trend toward
voter disaggregation which
is
reducing both voter
participation and the ideological
potential inherent in electoral
politics.
The directed
passion, party loyalty, and
total mobrlization underlying the leftist scenario
may be almost impossible
to
nurture. Conversely, other
strategies which demand less
of their adherents' time,
attention, loyalty, etc., would
Stand a bette.r chance.
,

The blind optimism (road
material determinism)

of the left as it contemplates
economic decline ignores
the political conflicts to come.
Hard times are not

necessarily or inevitably opportunities
for the building
of an egalitarian constituency.
Quite the contrary,
Times of depression are conservatizIt is in the affluent periods wh.-n
people can afford to demonstrate and rebel
and worry about their identity crises.
In times like these, they become more
square, less interested in Consciousness
III, more worried about three meaJs a day,
more job-oriented and the hell with liberal arts./O

mg.

If economic and social collapse occurs, a survivalist

i
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-^ehavior.

...e

„.ost

basic ne.C. o.a„„

attention,,

the .o.t narrow
definitions of self-interest
have currency.
We can oe
be certain that^ an
attempt to stimulate these perceptions
will be made by .roups
bent on

undercutting leftist
strategies.

Corporate-conservat sm
represents the counterimage
to neo-Marx.sm and
xs to
this scenario that I
now turn.

U

Corporat

e Conservativism

The corporatist-conservative
scenario reflects a
quaj^itative refinement of the
strategies and policies
pursued by conservative business
interests within the
liberal paradigm. More conscious
of rts own interests, more
intent on long-range control,
more subtle and effective
in its use of power, the
business elites formulate a

Machiavellian strategy that is not
accompanied by any
clearly positive image of the future.
An outgrowth as well
as a challenge to the dominant
liberal framework,
this

scenario is

a

reaction to the potential inability of liber-

alism to ward off the threat from the
political left.

Fear-

ing the rise of class consciousness, class
based resistance
to economic privilege, and a radical
restructuring of the

stratification system, corporate conservatives devise
counterstrategy.

The personal frustrations of

a

non-elites
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Who are painfully
facing the new realxty
of economic
1-its .ight be deflected
and/or redefined to actually

^t^^ili^

the system of control
and even to further the
interests of the economic
elite.

This strategy is obviously
Hobbesian in its conception Of power, conflict,
authority and human nature.
A
centrally inspired and
controlled "state of nature,"
a "war
of an against all"
among j^on-elite force_s,
allows for unchallenged power by industrial,
commercial and financial
elites.
The past inappropriateness
of the Hobbesian
vision in explaining American
politics was due in large
part to the mitigating
circumstances of economic growth
which cushioned the impact of
self-interest and muted the
frustrations of subordination.
Economic limits lend
relevance to the discarded vision.
But the new Leviathan
will not necessarily suppress
conflict; instead, it will
remove its system-destabilizing and
egalitarian ramifications.
Numerous social divisions, skillfully
manipulated,
will displace class conflict and create
an atmosphere of

structural insecurity.

This is the perfect context for

corporate groups to achieve political hegemony and
for the
wealthy to reap economic advantage. Kenneth E. Boulding
alludes to this scenario in
society.

a

discussion of the steady-state
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In the stationary
state, there i=; no
escape fro. the rigors
of scarcity?

unfortunately tfis°inc^^Lsl
p^^^^^"
°tT.:
offs for successful
exploitat ion--ttat

£S™|rin--i--?ion-arpry-^-

\

better than in procrresq Fi o
growth].
Stati^nLTsL :;rti™ore'
soclTtlll
^n'whrr'""^ mafia-type
primarily
an
instil n^^^^'f^'^^^'
redistributing income
iSward
toward^the powerful and away
from the

'

In its own way,

corporate-conservativism would politicize
the distribution system as
surely as neo-Marxism
would,

but with totally different
consequences.

Bertram Gross has laid out the
extreme version of
this image of the future in
an article entitled "Frxendly
Fascism: A Model for America. "^^
The author suggests
the growth of a fascist state is,
plausible given certain
trends, unless the drift is recognized
and consciously
thwarted.
Under the guise of democratic and
patriotic
slogans, the governing elite will defuse
the forces of

social change and covertly direct social,
economic and

political activity for its own benefit.

Democratic symbols

and institutions will survive, but only in
form.
tial

(and pervasive)

Substan-

control, according to Gross, will

be concentrated in relatively few hands, immune

constraints of pluralist politics.

from the
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A managed society
rulpc.
police

k^,

r

^nre.^^l^^^^ons-

Attempts to .nspire
division, diversion and
despair, and
to manipulate these
attitudes
-LLuues toward
tow;.rr^ .
support of elitemaintaining programs,
underscore
uerscore the
th^ long-range
implications
of corporate-conservative
strategy.
complementing Gross's picture
of "Friendly Fascxsm"
a scenario of the
future that stresses
rnternational
dynamics and variables.
Nurtured perceptions of
leftist
threats to national security,
either from within or outside our borders, lead to
demands for a build-up in our
external and internal military
capabilities in order to
insure America's stability
and survival.
Real threats
(terrorism and sabotage,
expropriation of overseas investments, resource embargoes),
when combined with a wellorchestrated series of implied
dangers (economic breakdown,
fifth-column insurrections), will
yield an agreed-upon
justification for increased surveillance,
suppression,
ideological vigilance, a state of military
preparedness
and perhaps the diversions of brush-fire
wars.
This image
of a garrison state, developed by Harold
Lasswell,^^

-

is an

obvious corollary to other elements of
corporate - conservatism.

^
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It is especially
related to the
Lne desiro
aesire fn
k
to submerge
class
as a political
issue.

or en's'cutn'"'" °'

SGrvP^%o

^

^'"^

^''^^^'^^

^^^^^

^1^^^^ lines

agreement
c?f
tion:Us^:\:i?-^:^--rw:rtl.e^^perceptions
orm^^berr^/S??^-^
and inhibit

enemy anrcoL^i^b^^ro/^oyaUr^
thereby blurring the
percepU^n of'
objective class differences
or making
It a fringe, subsidiary
consideration

.

^

Events in the international
sphere can be expected to
influence greatly the
application and effectiveness of

corporate-conservative strategies.
In terms of the domestic
dynamics of this scenario

there are numerous cleavages
along which the working
class, broadly defined, can
be divided.
To explore and
exploit the internal disunity among
the left's potential
constituency is a central task of
corporate-conservative
tactics.
Racial and ethnic distinctions are
traditional
points of weakness, perhaps made more
vulnerable during
times of economic transition.
an article on verticle
mobility and bias, Joseph Greenbaum and
Leonard I. Pearlin

m

conclude that mobility, up or down, tends to
increase

prejudice towards Jews, Blacks, and, by inference,
other
ethnics as well.

Feelings of prestige insecurity, during

the process of downward mobility especially, encourage
the stereotyping reactions associated with prejudice.
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Inter-ethnic scapegoatxng
assures an al.ost unbridgeable

gap between srmrlarly
situated wor.rng-class
groups
Regional differences
provide additional sources
of division, as revealed in
the continurng battles
over energy
policy between orl-rich
and oil-dependent states.
Even
age differences can be
exploited to advantage.
For

instance, the student
protest movement has been greatly
defused by ignoring its broad
critical messages and
instead treating it as a
generational and cultural conflict,

isolated from potential allies,
student radicalism could then be handled as
simply another case of group
pressure within a pluralist system.
a more telling
example can be found in Richard
Nixon's
1968 and 1972

Presidential election campaigns.

Playing on racial,

welfare and cultural images through
such symbolically
loaded issues as crime, drugs, abortion,
radicalism and
patriotism, Nixon combined corporate
funding and a
Middle America constituency to fashion
victory.
Such an
approach, consciously pursued over

a

number of campaigns,

could optimally encourage members of the middle
class
to view themselves in opposition to v/elfare
poor, asser-

tive minorities, liberals, planners, humanists, and
other

images of the left.

Obviously, corporate-conservatives

must firmly direct this movement so that their own interests and maneuverability are not threatened by these newly

salient issues.
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The overarching
econonuc ethos of this
i„,age
<^-ides individuals
.na groups ana, in
,He process,
further diverts their
attentions fro,„ the true
causes of
their condition.
Materialise re.arns a
dormant feature
Of social hehavior.
i„.eed, as social
organisation
degenerates, unfulfilled
social and personal
needs
increasingly heco.e a
source of displaced
consumer demand
-itai Et.ioni notes how
far this process has
already
progressed:
The American way of
life may well
have been founded on
the notion that
"^"""S.P'^oducts is a main ?oute
to obtaining greater
affection (from
spouse and children)
highe^ prestige
fellows), "^and"'^^
iv^n'T^f'"™
^-^^tualization (in the commind
,

Limits to growth heightens
consumerist desires and, with
them, competition between
people for the fewer rewards.
The aggression arising from
frustrated expectations is
turned against competitors or
against oneself, not against
the system.
The zero-sum game of limits,
played
for a

reduced slice of the pie, pits
blacks against whites, sunbelt vs. Northeast, suburbanites
against city dwellers.
The business elite need not play for
it has already taken
its share off the top. As long as
the structure fosters
this game, as long as economic tensions
produce a culture
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Of alienation
rather than one of
oo,™on perceptions and
P-Poses, the
corporate-conservative strategy
can en,o,
political success.
In this regard,
the development of a
two-tiered

economic syste. is
especially conducxve to
the sort of
social cleavages most
supportive
u-i-ve of
r-i
UL coroorst^
corporate-conservatism.
Multinational giants lead
a top sector of
„a,or
companies whose successful
operation is securely maintained through market
control arrangements with
would-be
"competitors." Small companies
or companies in peripheral economic sectors
are prone to the cyclical
dislocations
of the economy and
receive a reduced share of
production.
Economic power maintains this
division.
In

the labor
sphere, unions affiliated
with dominant companies or
industries, and who recognize
the facts of managerial
prerogatives, obtain a fair return
for their labors.
Likewise, technological skills are
rewarded whatever the

industry or company.

On the lower rungs,

the poor, the

unskilled, minorities, small businesses,
subsistance
farmers, migrants, etc., form a
permanent underclass

without opportunity or hope.

The fear that this group,

who bear the brunt of the costs in the
transition to a

limits economy, will challenge the relatively
secure

position of the bulk of the working class guarantees
the
support of the middle-class population for the system
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ana against
e.alitarianis..

class also provides

workers ...aKin,

a

. Ur.e an. v.siMe
underreference cjroup with which
those

if

can favorably compare
themselves
thus reducing feelings
of relative deprivation.
Pinally
the existence of this
depressed group gives rise
to a
survivalist mentality for
others a few rungs up;
the
fear of falling to such
a state is impetus
for directing
an attention and energies to
individual needs, narrow
self-interest, and the pursuit
of material security.
Policy in the
corporate-conservative scenario
would follow one major
pattern.
Programs will be devised
Which, While purportedly
responding to public demands,
serve as vehicles for the
redistribution of funds toward
the wealthy and powerful.
Antipollution efforts will
take the form of subsidies,
tax credits and government
supports in an infinite variety,
assuring us a dime's
worth of antipollution "bang" for
every dollar of public
and consumer monies spent.
Increases in spending for
social welfare, health care, housing
needs, or manpower

development

will help funnel money to representatives

of the corporate elite, leaving the
social needs still

glaringly apparent.

Part of the reason for the public's

tolerance of this charade is the intimidating
weight of

technocratic expertise used to buttress policy choices.
The masses defer to the government's judgment, aware
of
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probable policy failure
but impressed by the
rationalxty behina the
atte„,pts.^8
^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^

the in.iv.,ual and
poUtical ratifications of
this policy
pattern in his article
on basic hu.an needs.
Given a
Coverntental structure that
is unresponsive to
hu.an
needs, symbolic
assurances of responsrveness
will lead
a person to direct
his aggression, not
against a known
Obstacle ,i.e,, the
"Establishment",, but inward
toward
himself.
TO internalize frustration
rs to depoliticize

^t and in the process
to create a climate in
which

rational analysis of one's
situation cannot take place.
A3 Etzioni makes clear,
this is not merely a hypothetical concern.

World War II
^.ay mark the initiation of a new period,
post-industrial or post-modern, in which
inauthentic elements are arising.
it
IS a mark of the
post-World-War-Il
industrialized societies that they
devote a major part of their
endeavors
to "front" activities. 79
.

.

.

.

Inauthenticity is an aspect of politics
generally, but
it is central to the
corporate-conservative
strategy.

Even decentralization, which has long
been thought
of as a radical departure from
current structural arrange-

ments, can be construed in ways that
are perfectly

acceptable to this scenario.

The sociopolitical implica-

tions of decentralization may be highly
supportive of
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conservative interests.

Decentralization is a .eans
of
(1) reducn, relative
deprivation
reducing contacts
across co™.unal-olass
lines which would otherwise
accentuate Class distinctions;
,2) deflecting attention
froo,
central structures and
similarly disadvantaged
peoplepotential allies-While
emphasizing local issues, local
distinctions, etc.; ,3)
structurally (ideologically and
institutionally) inhibiting
support for social policres
dealing with collectively-conceived
of problems
(e.g.,

stratification);

(4)

insulatrng and li,„itrng the xmpact

of local radical tendencies;

(5)

encouraging the acceptance

of locally-imposed social
and political controls,
ignoring
the structural roots underlying
local conditions (e.g.,

high unemployment);

(6)

coopting local leaders by offering

them limited power and status in
exchange for acquiescence
in the national status quo;
and (7) promoting non-economrc
paths to individual satisfaction (e.g.,
local political
mobility)
thus undercutting the strategic
use of envy,

,

deprivation

a

nd resentment in fomenting radical
discontent.

Other policies can also be devised which,
while radical
in form,

are conservative in substance.

As to the problem of economic limits,

the corporate-

conservative scenario, more so than the other alternatives,
IS likely to continue pro-growth policies while
tolerating

the high environmental and social costs this development
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entails.

A pro-growth and
consu.erist ethic is facilitated by the organized
ideological and institutronal
power of big business.
Political efforts to
restrict
either economic expansion
or corporate prerogatives
bring on threats by
co.panres to export their
capital
investment to friendlier
cities, counties, states,
or
nations.
This for. of blackmail
is used on all government levels to Obstruct
any attempts to impose
profitreducing controls on business
operations. As to the

unwanted environmental
side-effects of post-industrial
development, costs can be
transferred from the public
at large to those segments
of the public least able
to

defend their interests.

Unavoidable costs (higher

resource prices) can be handled
through the price system,
thus becoming a regressive
excise tax falling most heavily
on the poorest.
Social stability can be imposed by
conditioning welfare benefits to "good
behavior,"
increasing police power (wiretapping,
stop-and-frisk
laws), maintaining control over
the communications network,
and by the judicious use of selective
coercion.
Growth
will be sought to the limits allowed,
but these limits

and the view of what costs are tolerable
for the sake of
growth, are greatly extended under the corporate-

conservative scenario.

3

This scenario

m.cjlvt
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signal tho end of
politics

or at least the end
of representative
government.
Su«ly
that is the the.e
behind Gross's "Priendly
Pascism"
crted above.
Thrs the.e is echoed
by Christopher Lasch,
"ho fears a nu.ber of
politically restrictive
postindustrial trends.

The tendency of political
grievances
to present themselves
as personal
grievances, the tendency ?or
repressive authority to assume
the guise
of benevolence, the
substitution of
psychology for politics, and
the pern>anagerial mode of
thonahrri°'
thought help prevent conflicts
from
coming to the surface and
contribute
to the illusion^that
ideology has exhausted itself. 80
Both subtle and overt forms
of authoritarianism
benefit
from the developments which
Lasch presents.
Without any ideological contrast
model, this image will
have free reign to shape our
political destiny according
to its own values and interests.
Corporate-conservativism,

hov;ever,

is not immune to

the numerous potential pitfalls
and complications that
will obstruct any of the various images
from gaining

absolute dominance.

With reference to this scenario in

particular, the degree of policy comprehensiveness
and

elite coordination is probably beyond the
system's
capacity.

Even with increased centralization it is

highly unlikely that any plan can be initiated without

the unintended
consequences and

weaken its ability to
operate.

e„ors of design that

There is also the need
to Simulate
representativeness in order
to ™axr„ize

voluntary compliance,

rrnally, the problem of
policyeffectiveness is compounded
for authoritarianism,

-

as it
for liberals and
radicals, by the complications
of

economic limits and the
piiibsures
pressurp-^ of „„i
policy-overload.
Effectiveness aside, the
corporate-conservative
strategy must make its
appeals in competition wxth
other
strategies, each relevant
in its way to the reality
of
limits.
The politics of the future
prohibits any easy
victory for neo-fascism.
The efforts to submerge
the
class issue and to cloak
the injustice of widening
inequal
ity must overcome the vocal
opposition of left-liberalism
and radical elements.
Previous discussions of these
two scenarios indicate the
strong forces behind the
question of relative shares. This
is an issue that will
not simply fade away.
Thus, there definitely will be
contrast models challenging this image.
They can be
•

concealed only by our relinquishing even
the appearance
of an open society.

Short of this outcome, we can expect

that the corporate-conservative strategy will
have

a

role

to play in the politics of the future but
one the impor-

tance of which will depend upon the interplay of
events

and competing strategies.

3
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The final scenario,
DurJ.hexmian xn its idealization Of a static social
order, harKens bac. to
an age
Which growth and the
narrow n.ater.al strivings
that
accompany a growth ethrc
were not the central dynamic
Of life.
Traditional-conservativism, more
reminiscent
Of feudalism than of
post-rndustr ra lism, rs a plausible
-del Of the future because,
despite the intrusions of
modern economies and social
patterns, it has remained
an attractive way of life.
A study of the impact of
nogrowth on selected metropolitan
areas reveals that there
are potentially very desirable
consequences to be achieved
within a static setting.

The stability of the no-growth
communities seemed to have positive
aspects in some of the case study
areas.
Church, family, and ethnic ties were
strong.
The incidence of stress diseases
was low.
They were relatively safe from
crime.
The reluctance of so many
people to leave was not perhaps irrational, but a reflection of a particular
set of values in which these qualities
outweighed the possible material gain
associated for some of them with moving
to a more prosperous area. 81
.

.

.

.

In our prospective no-growth situation the
public's

decision would be not one of limiting personal mobility
(as in the above quote).

Rather, it would be whether to

adopt public policies which emphasise nonmaterial values
within

a

less stressful social setting.

According to
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thxs scenario,

^^^^^^^^
=o™.unity, .ather than
the

^^^^^^^^

entities (race.

eUss

culture, „iXl tone
.own the level of
intrasocial conflict
and provxde nonecononuc
outlets which prove .ore
important to an individual's
self-i„,a,e than the
satisfaction
of consumerist
material desires.

.

Indeed, a major aspect
of the traditional-conservative strategy is an
attack on materialism and
the social
deterioration brought on by
modernity. Thus, limits to
growth policies would be
more conscientiously promoted,
and they would be tied
to a structural and
ideological
reconditioning of man and society
more in keeping with a
no-growth economy. The principal
reconditioning goal
would be to lower expectations
of material progress and

thereby to prevent the growth of
class consciousness and
frustration-aggression tendencies.
Morris Rosenberg
states this theme in the following
quote.

He would expect class consciousness

to be least where the individual's
past

and anticipated future position
accords
with his present condition.
This is
particularly likely to occur in a static
society, in which a view into the past
or future is not likely to produce perceptual distortion of class position. ^2

Positions in such

a

system are allocated via

a

high ly

modified meritocracy, without the degree of divisive

competitiveness associated with the notion of equal
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opportunity.

.ow .oMlity expectations
.ave other advantages for society.
They bring about lower
levels of
insecurity and frustration
(the psychic costs of
competition and failure),
reduced fragmentation of
the social
order arrsing from mobility,
and renewed interest in
the
worth of the work one is
presently doing.
The task of reducing
expectations is also handled
by calls for the stoic
acceptance of the end of growth.
The process of accepting
limits will transform man's
acquisitive appetites and allow
him to rediscover nonconsumerist life styles.
Personal living habits will be
made less complex, more
simplified, fulfilling basic
psychological needs but without many
of the frills (goods
and services) which society has
come to demand as necessities.
The belief is encouraged that
these cutbacks
in one's standard of living
are inevitable, ought not to
be resisted, but, on the contrary,
ought to be the impetus
for the creation of a new social
order.

Further lowering of aspirations can be
anticipated
by readjustments in types of reference
groups which

determine levels of relative deprivation.
truth is that

"a

The ironic

decline in prosperity, if not too violent,

can restrict the sense of relative deprivation
by inhibiting comparisons with more fortunate groups.

"^'^

Whereas

radicals attempt to revise our comparisons upward, thereby

359

hoping to heighten
feelings of resentment,
conservatives
point to those below or
those in other countries
who are
worse Off, thus promoting
feelings of satisfaction and
perhaps even gratitude.
this regard it is important
to note the role played
by advertising in increasing
expectations and perpetuating
relative deprivation. Advertising intensifies
dissatisfaction and taps elements
of our personality (ambition,
vanity, greed) not appropriate to a limits economy or
a nonmaterial perspective.

m

Presently the trend is for more
"hard sell" (the role of
sexual images in product promotion,
commercials directed
at children), and this will
probably continue as the

economic situation worsens.

It is obvious that this

scenario will involve controls on
advertising (and other

reference-group-determining mechanisms) as part of

a

general policy of reducing economic expectations.
The description of the social structure
proposed

by traditional conservatives also serves
to elicit acceptance
of the consequences of limits to growth.

Society is

viewed as an organic whole composed of interrelated roles,

institutions and groups.

By upgrading the status of

lower-class occupations and by highlighting the functional
and social importance of all positions, the interdepen-

dence of the various parts of the structure is demonstrated
and accentuated.

A well-nurtured spirit of national unity
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and a transcendent
taith in the whole
syste. prevents
people fro. seeing their
roles i.> i3olation
or in purely
self-interested terms.
In this light
inequality

is

justified and toler-

ated as part of the
natural order of things.
Hardship
and unequal opportunity
go unresented.
To the extent
that limits to growth
are taken to be unavoidable,
the
inequities of the sooial
structure will acquire a simxlar
oast and a like.inded
measure of resigned acceptance.
Efforts to question material
stratification will be rnterpreted as threats to the
equilibrium of the system and
to the nonmaterial
benefits the system provides.
The quest for stability is
basic not only to this
image of social structure
but also for the ascending
ecological perspective as well.
The conservative implications of environmentalism dovetail
nicely with the political
implications of the traditionalists'
limits to growth
scenario:
'

Although [the ecological perspective]
has radical implications it forces us
to regard the structure of a system as
a whole
it is also quite conservative.
It suggests that changes should be made
with extreme care because even the most
well-meaning and constructive action
can have deadly consequences.
To view
the environment as a system, then, immediately imposes a certain constraint
on the outlook of economic and political decision-makers 85

—

—

.
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Traditional-conservativism thn<;
=
thus presupposes
a philosophy
that limits the artlnnc
actions of the
power-holders along with
the hopes of the
powerless.

An examination of
the source of this
scenario,
social basis, and the
circumstances required for
its

-rength. win ,elp to
differentiate

its

it fro. the corporate-

conservative strategy
mentioned previously. This
brand
Of conservativism is
a counter-strate.y,
not to a resurgent leftism but to a
degenerative liberalism.
The
dominant liberal paradigm
is unable to cope with
the
demands and pressures of
the limits crisis.
its coalitional, nonauthoritarian
procedural biases prevent effective
policies from being formulated
or initiated.
Liberalism
flounders but its failure is
not a catalyst for leftist
mobilization or countermobilization
by the corporate right.
Power is maintained by a
top-bottom coalition of forces
which fails to represent the
interests
of the "great

middle.

Middle populism organizes in
response, gaining
conservative strains and allies along
with some liberalreformist supporters. However, it
remains basically

unsubverted by either side, being
anti-big-business as
well as anti-liberal-leftism.
Seen as a prime constituency
for numerous strategies, once organized
on their own terms,

they are viewed suspiciously by both the
corporate elite
and traditional radicals.
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Herman Kahn and B.
Bruce-Br.g.s cite the
possibxlxty Of "ideological
renewal governments"
dedicated
to preserving
traditional values against
intrusions by
left revolutionarres
and the right business
leadership ^7
Populist rn the sense of
sincerely atte.ptrng to
further
the interests of the
con^on .an, this alternative
for.
Of authoritarianism
has a rural and traditronalist
base.

However, in this nation
other elements of the population
-ay be drawn to
traditronal-conservativism.
its neo-

nostalgic, anti-growth, and
anti-technology appeals have
a strong attraction
for segments in the
environmental
movement who see the problem of
no-growth as that of
social integration rather than
class conflict.
Frustrated
by the petty debates of
incremental politics, these supporters seek to further policies
for broad social and
ecological regeneration while paying
a price in terms of
liberal (individualistic) freedom and
democratic (pluralis
tic)

procedures.

Faced with social and environmental

Armaggedon, people may readily renounce
voluntaristic

approaches and opt instead for authoritarianism.
Heilbroner makes

a

Robert

strong argument along these lines:

The passage through the gantlet
ahead may be possible only under
governments capable of rallying
obedience far more effectively than
would be possible in a democratic
setting.
If the issue for mankind
is survival, such governments may be
unavaoidable even necessary.
,
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The .any p.oble.s
constituting the li,„its
crisis as well
as the problems
associated with n.aintain.ng
stability
a

no-gro„th situation
strengthen the belief that
such
authoritarian structures
will be not only condoned
but
also welcomed.
In addition to an
authorx tar.an bias,

other elements
of this scenario make
it similar in appeal to
corporate

conservativism.

The stress placed on unifying
values,
including patriotxsm and
nationalism, inclines this image
toward militarism and
interventionism (although a reverse
reaction, a turning inward,
cannot be dismissed). Attitudes toward social dissent,
social unrest, and many forms
of social deviance are
comparable in the appeals of both
strategies.
An emphasis on the traditional
values of
the work ethic, frugality, etc.,
may result in a conservative backlash against welfare
programs and an insensitivity toward segments of the poor.
Indeed, a major

strategic goal will be the repression of
class conflict,
seen as the prime obstacle to group
integration and social
cohesion.

Members of the business community may there-

fore create tactical alliances with the
leaders of this

scenario for the pursuit of common objectives.

However,

despite this overlap caused by practical political considerations, traditional conservatism represents

distinct alternative image.

a

364

.

This is quite evident
when we examine other
trends wh.ch ,.ve this
scenario t.es to ieft-X.heral
and
-d.cal polit.cal forces.
Polrt.cal controls on
xnvest-nt decisions, advertising
and other aspects of
corporate
policy Will be necessary
to .nsure socral stability
hut
will be detrimental to
business profits. The
dxscoura.ement of consumerism,
materialism and mobrlity-str.vin.s
and the emphasis placed
on environmental and
spiritual
regeneration and on non-economic
outlets for self-definxtion are clearly not the
goals of a corporate-dominated
ruling elite.
fact, they reflect part
of the cultural
critique of advanced capitalism
prevalent in New Left
writing (and largely absent from
working-class radical
analysis).
A strategy that has in view
the lowering of
levels of class and group conflict
will attempt to smooth
the roughest edges of the
stratification system.
Funds
may be directed toward labor-intensive
industries and

m

projects to garner support from that
sector for the
economic status quo.
In short, depending on circumstances,
choices and threats, this scenario can align
with or

offer the same appeals as any of the others,
gaining temporary tactical advantages in the process of furthering
long-range strategic objectives.

If the leadership of

traditional conservativism can maintain its political
independence, this image stands

a

chance of gathering
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broad based support.

We are witnessing
the beginnings

Of thrs response
in the initral
attractiveness of California
governor Jerry Brown and
President Jimmy Carter.
The critical phase in
this scenario's prognosis
is the transition
stage.
Like liberalism, this brand
Of conservatism is
built around consensual forms
of political interaction and
gradualistic forms of social change.
But stability is a prized
and perhaps rare commodity
in
a market stocked with
tension and strife.
it can be
argued that, of the different
images we have examined, the
attitudes and behavior patterns
of traditional conservativism is best suited to a
future no-growth society.
The dilemma lies in trying
to habituate ourselves to
the self-constraints of limits
to growth while enduring
the traumas of economic crises.
The nonmaterial, conununal,

and spiritual values which this
scenario hopes to protect
and promote may not survive the
potentially explosive

pressures and conflicts ahead.

it is possible that a

politics of drift and estrangement, coupled
with the slow
decline of our economy toward a state of permanent
sluggishness, might ease the transition to traditional-

conservative ideological, political and social structures.
On the other hand, a precipitous drop in economic
well-

being might give rise to
tional confrontations.

a

host of domestic and interna-

In such a setting,

this image of
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the future would
find it difficult
ta.in, hold in the

public's consciousness.

'

it is therefore obvious
that the

popular receptrvity of
this scenario's appeal,
the effectiveness Of its strategy,
is i„ large measure
deter^rned
by the events of the
moment.

Conclusions
One of the major themes
running through this chapter
is that the future is
open to choice.
Most of the meaning
behind so-called technological,
economic, or environmental

imperatives is as an attempt
to Umit the perception of
possibilities.
Such futurologrsts define as
inevitable
what is in fact quite
problematical in order to create a
general acceptance of their own
opinion of events.
But in
truth the reality of choice is
not open to dispute; only
the number of people aware of
and involved in the choosing
is what is at issue.
This tactical ploy-the claims of

necessity-is part of the politics of the
future, being
fought over now in the present.

This irony is perfectly

understandable once we accept the fact that
the future
is rarely a break with the past

(except in severe cases of

catastrophe); rather, it is part of an evolutionary
development, only a portion of which is visible.

Long-term changes

in attitudes and values often come about through
a slow

process of predispositioninq

.

Political appeals help
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create

-^e^u^,_^^_^^^^_^^

^^^^
surface when conE.onted
with catalytic events
ot circumstances. A crisis triggers
these evolving politicalideological propensitres
What passes for a .ajor
turning point in political
and social history
.

is thus the

result of groundwork,
prepared years and decades
previously.
In subtle and
not-so-subtle ways our view of
the future
is being predetem.ined
much as
mucn
n-,c:4r-i^
past
socialization processes
correspond to our present
attitudes and behavior.
,
,

•

^

.

This is not to say that our
future freedom to
persuade or to bo persuaded by
others is illusionary.
We
will face various conflicting
messages and our eventual
r^ental state, our receptivity
to one or another of the
in^ages and strategies of
limits to growth politics, will
reflect this confusion.
In addition, the precondition.uuj
signals of present political appeals
must hope for favorable circumstances whenever the
crisis situation will
demand public input.
If the role of: the press,
events in
foreign affairs, and the nature of
the economic decline
are not advantageous for a given
perspective, the public
v;ill

likely side with a more appropriate scenario.

Yet,

our definition of "appropriateness" is
quite subjective

because these variables (circumstances) are
themselves
subject to the politics of predisposit ioning

.

In the end,

paradigm disputes (of which the conflict among these
four

368

-ages Of

the .utu.e is a case
in point, are aeciCea
the interaction
between evidence (events,
variables
-rcu.stance, and values,
the role of present
political
cusputes bern, a central
factor i„ the future
defrnition
^>nd

application of either
criterion.

Normal politics is
designed to work on mundane
matters with incremental
tools.
„o„ever, the anomalies of
normality build up to crisis
proportions; the structure of
our system is less and
less able to cope.
Incremental,
equilibrium-maintaining policies,
the sum and substance
Of consensus politics,
are futile remedies for
the imbalances and strains of the
evolving crisis. Though perhaps
successful as temporary adjustments
to system

stress,
their continued application
intensifies both the basic
condition and mass frustration.
Many people take comfort
in a flight from freedom-the
search for a strong leader,
personal withdrawal from political
involvement and responsi
bility, regression into antisocial
attitudes and behavior.
Our worsening
political-social-economic-environraental-

existential problems may simply make these
paths more
attractive.
Maybe, however, the depth of the coming
challenge
fo con.sensus politics does not allow for
such easy evasions

The record of America's political history speaks to
the
potential democratizing opportunity represented by the
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cr.s.s Of U,ni,s to
growth.
Of each of these
.eenarios

The debate a„,ong
proponents
,or the eonf.ont.tion
between

thei. ^ore realistically
created intermixtures,, the
conflrcting appeal., „,ade by
the different i,„ages of
the future,
are the signs of a
crrtical era i„ American
poUtic.; a
s.ries Of electoral
confrontations addressing vital
issues
^" an ideologically charged and
polarizing fashron
,„ay

reverse trends toward voter
disaggregation and apathy.
it
would bring the electorate
back into the political
process
as had been the case
periodically in our nation's history,
by offering the public a
choice on the general direction
of the polity for the next
30-50 years.
Critical elections
socialize conflict as nothing else
in normal politics
89

And Limits to growth is

for a critical elocLion.

and that an antidemocratic

a

cause, par ex cellen ce,

The fear that democracy will end

dictatorship will somehow

seize control is not to be lightly
dismissed; the potential
is there for such an occurrence.
But T would suggest that
a different future beckons.
The po.l itics of the future
may mean the regeneration of our political
process, the

re-introduction of citizen input.

Perhaps it signals not

the end of democracy, but its rebirth.

"AFTER

VII

CONCLUSION
All systems contain
feedback mechanisms enabling
them to maintain stability
in the face of incremental
Changes.
Readjustments rn a system's
peripheral, secondary
elements allow it to preserve
its central character.
These mechanisms obviously
operate best when the upsettrn,
exogenous or endogenous changes
do not dxrectly threaten
the system's primary supports.
However, when such threats
do occur, normal patterns of
sel f -regula tion may no longer
suffice.
The system must then either
adjust by transforming itself, reaching a new
equilibrium diverging more or
less markedly from what had previously
r.xisted, or collapse
entirely.
A complete examination of this
process ought
to be highly instructive regarding
the nature of the prior
system, the dynamics of the transitional
state, and the

basic outlines of the future structure.
This study

h.as

attempted to apply such an examina-

tion to political change in the United States.

It has

been argued in Chapter II that the ideological biases,
power

relationships and institutional arrangements which together

constitute the political structure conspire to inhibit the
formation of redistriloutj.ve drMnands and to blunt the
37 0

371

redistributivo nature of
those econon.i

-ch

the

po.l.U:.ical

agenda.

.:.on

t

,

c

demands whi.U do

. t ton. of pn U Uoa I

interaction-consensus pol i tics-p
.oven t the issue of
economic ine,uaii.ty tro.
enlivening our political
discourse.
A wob of conceptual
and procedural cpivens
insulates the
political systen,

f.orn

the potent ..ally unsettlin,
conse-

quences of economic stratification
and material deprivation.
Reference was .ade to two areas
of social conflict (party
politics and lahor-management
relations) which ,n,u,ht otherwise have become scenes of
intense battles over relative
shares were it not for the
success of consensus politics
in nullifyinq any eqali
tarian impulses.
Issue avoidance
is the key goal in the
operation of consensus politics.
The traditional ability of the
political system to divert
social energies away from the tensions
arising rom economic
stratification rests on he existence of
economic growth.
I

I

Perceptions of cp-owth counterbalance and
conceal perceptions of inecjuality. Chapter III indicated

the ways in which

economic expansion has promoted

activities that is

(p.iite

a

set of attitudes and

system-sui>por t i ve

both on our

iiope

belief in

future of shared prosperity,

rate of

a

econc^nric-

for persona)

^)r(M^'Lll

disruptive potential
Cj owt h

is the crucia

its impact

upward mobility and on our
a

high and steady

serves to mod(M'ate the [)oliticaJly

inherrMil
l

In

.

in a

stratified society.

varial)le strc-ng thenincj

bhe feedback

3
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cycles Of consensus
polit.es.
Once these cycles are
b.oken other perceptions,
structures and st.bili.m,
.echanis.s win inevitably
fin the political vacuu.
thus created.
Questions re.ardrnc, the
permanence of
economic growth therefore
,o to the heart of
the future
of consensus po.Iitics.

Chapters IV and V explored
the controversy surrounding limits to growth.
Various arguments were
summoned to
support or refute the prime
contention -that this nation
will be unable and/or
unwilling to sustain economic

growth of

kind and at levels that
typified its previous
history.
Interrelated problems involving
both physical
and social trends threaten
to remove this central
pillar
of consensus politics.
Claims have been made that the
a

development and application of
technology (scientific,
economic, managerial) will overcome
the most troubling
obstructions to further economic
growth.
Yet,

as

I

have

tried to demonstrate, the inevitable
role of politics in
the problem-solving process will
impede our ability to
find and utilize efficient and
effective policies.
In fact,

politics will more likely compound the
growth-reducing
problems we will confront.

Finally,

the element of time

lends an air of urgency to the controversy,
creating serious consequences for decision makers who wish
to follow

their natural inclinations and delay action.

The conclusion
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I

draw

fro,,,

tMs

analyse. .3 that
c.p.ctations of .educed
growth rates are plausible,
i„deoa probable, and are
-de ever ™ore undeniable the
lon.er we ignore the issues
rarsed by the H„,its to
growth debate.
The previous four
chapters were preli,„inary to
the
speculative task this study
had undertaken.
They have
presented the outlines of
our present political syste.,
noted the crucial function
of a central variable,
and
surveyed the nu,„erous forces
that threaten this primary
support and, with it, the
stability of the system.
Such
an analysis of the dynamics
of syste,,, stability
is a

necessary prelude to any examination
of future political
trends.
But it is hardly sufficient.
Knowing how
an

important factor in

a

complex social

syste,,,

will chance

is not equivalent to knowing
how the system itself will
be transformed in adapting to
this initial change.
In social systems the future
is not pre-ordained

through immutable laws of cause and
effect.

The human

element impels us to focus on the choices
open to society
and the historical context within whjch
they will be ,nade.

Present futures research all too often succumbs
to an

apolitical posture.

The language of scientific predictabil

ity rather than of public choice frames our
conclusions.

While certain static images of the future seem to plot
out
the

inevitable direction of change (e.g., steady-state.

'

3
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no-gro„th, spaceship
economy,, they have
ignored the
politics of choice inn
societv'ss f,.i
society
future-creating, directiondetermining activities.
These tr„,e-fixed pictures
of a
hypothetical future society
serve a heuristic funct::ion,
illuminating the values and
policy objectives associate
:Gd
with a given image and
mobilizing politrcal support
around those values and
objectives.
However, they cannot
aet as guides for tactics
and strategies in the allimportant transitional phase
for they do not address
the
problems of coping with the
lost stability of a growthoriented society.
.

Chapter VT aimed at creatine

a

model for the study

of political futures which
would overcome the predictive
emphasis of most futurology. The
four

scenarios presented

here have avoided this difficulty
by stressing the ongoing
interaction of power and purpose
order to reveal more
concretely the politics of the future.
In this regard

m

it is significant to note that
each scenario,

each image

of the future, has reference to a
traditional body of

social philosophy which gives credibility
to its specific

expectations of political development.

My belief is that

the classic confrontation among diverse theoretical
per-

spectives does have relevance in

a

no-growth future.

Political ideologies, recast to address the issues of the
day,

help to structure our awareness of events and to
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motivate our poUt.cal
actions.
°£ the conflicts over equality,

well-being

„lu

Undoubtedly, the specifics
freedom, co.n.unity and

be shaped by numerous
situational vari-

ables (e.g., the actual
nature of our economic decline).
For this reason analysts
would do well to explore
the probability of alternative futures
within various hypothetical
(possible) supportive and
inhibiting settings.
In any
case, this recognition of
competing perspectives and public
choices is an intrinsic part of
the speculative enterprise.
Chapter VI sought to illustrate
this approach to futures
research and to convey the unavoidable
uncertainty that
accompanies it.
One final cominent concerns the
content of the
competing images of the future.
Researchers must somehow

incorporate the notion of political change
into the alternative futures they construct.
These
images,

like the

society they reflect, must be dynamic,
containing within
them internal contradictions and necessities
for choice,
and thus conceived as transitional stages
in the development
of even more distant futures.
is devoid of politics,

An image of the future that

that fails to embrace the

.idea

of

change, has implicitly posited an end to human history.
In this Light,

we can conclude that an analysis

of the political future ought to be closely akin to an

analysis of politico.] history.

This is true on two accounts.
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F.rst, the need to
analyze political behavior,
to assess
the impact Of Change,
to evaluate, interpret,
assu.e and
xmagine binds both the
historian and the futurologist
to a common intellectual
endeavor.
Second, the object
of investigation is the
same-political man operating
within a political context.
The values and philosophies
of the past and present
will still motivate partisans
of the future; various
interests and factions will still
combine, confront one another,
and then recombine in quest
of relative advantages; the
claims of power and selfinterest and the pull of reason and
ideals will, like
always, form the sum and substance
of political debate.
A study of future political
behavior, by including the

human element in its analysis, allows
us to view forecasting in its propter historical light.
Stated simply, past,

present and future intermingle and merge in
perpetual
drama, the continuing story of the human
experience.
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